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SLRIUS LC, a Wyoming Limited Liability ) 
Co~npany, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, REMITTITUX 
v. NO. 32582 
) 
BRYCE H. ERICKSON, and ANY PERSON 
CLAIMING UNDER BY OR THROUGH ) 
BRYCE H. ERICKSON IN AND TO THE REAL ) 
PROPERTY DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: 
CARIBOU COUNTY, DAHO: TOWNSHIP 5 ) 
SOUTH, RANGE 46 E.B.M., SECTION 27: 
LOTS I AND 2, N 112 NW 114, EXCEPT 




TO: SIXTH JUDICLAL DISTRICT, COUNTY OF CARIBOU. 
The Court having announced its Opinion in this cause March 28, 2007, which has 
now become final; therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the District C o ~ ~ r t  shall forthwith co~nply with 
the directive of the Opinion, if any action is required. No costs or attorney fees on appeal. 
DATED this 19"' day of April, 2007 
%@h" Kh!$Mb 
~lerk'of the supreme co r \ 
STATEOFDAHO V 
cc: Counsel of Record 




Bryan D. Smith, Esq. -- ISE3 No. 4 4 1  
3. J. DriseoII, Esq, --- ISB No. 7010 
h,%cGUTIrF, MEACBrth5 & SMITE, PLLC 
P. 0' BOX 9-0731 
4 14 Shoup ,4\re11ue 
Idaho Fails, Idaho 83405 
Telephone: (203) 524-073 1 
Teiefax: (208) 529-41 66 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JGDICL4L DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF DAHO, ITN AND FOR THE COLYTY OF Cfiii1BOU 
SIRIUS LC, a Wyorning Limited 1 
Liability Gornpmy, 1 
1 
P 1 ailsintiff. ) Case No. CV-04-284 
VS, > ,4FFZDAVXT OF 
) SUDITE A. SHIVELY 
BRYCE E-I, ERICKSON. AND ANY PERSON j 
CLALMR"jG UNDER BY OR THROUGH ? 
BRUCE H. ENCKSON AND TO THE 1 
REAL PROPERTY DESCRBED A S  FOLLOWS: ) 
1 
CARIBOU GOLDJTU, IDAHO: 1 
1 
TBJ"ulTSHIP 5 SOUTH, RANGE 46 E.B.M., 1 
SECTION 27: LOTS 1 AND 2, X1i2 1 
fa;Wli4, EXCEPT TXEREFROM THE S ?/z 1 
NElj4 NW $4 NIVl;4, 
1 
Defendants. 
JUDITEX A. SHIVELV, being first duly sworn on oath. deposes and says: 
(1) I m over die age of 21 and make this ;a2i&tvivit based on my o v a  persorial 
(2 )  I hwe been remined imd disclosed by the defendant Bxycs Crickson as expert to 
review "Ixliiiihm Bagley's represelltation of Bryce Erickscin in bdcruptey. 
(3) Attached hereto ar~d marked as Exhibit '2" is a true and correct copy o f  a 
orla1 and profess~oaal bacic,m-omd. 
_____ _ -  -- _ -  - -  - 
hereto and marked as Ext~ibii- "BEl"' incorporaieci as my test~rnoi~y b
reference herein is a true and correct COPY ofa report showing my analysis of Vqiili=~ Bagley's 
Fur-ther your affiant sayeth naught. 
l"r1 DATED this :. day of Mayqi, 2008. 
i-. 
-.' 
. -'p% \J 
SiiBSCRIBED AND SWOilZT 10 before me this&: day ofM3-y. ?OOS. 
i ' 
Notaiy PU%~~C. for CoieiaB .>? - 
! - J w, C ;T ' fm Residing at xt8 b, i i*- i -8 /I 
{Tl -j .2 . - t ,~*  j.,4,'9' bh.iy Gc~rfi~~issiun Expires: <, ,, r .  1 - 
NFIDAVIT OF JfiTDLTXI A. SMVELY - 2 
G ' Documents and SeMhgs\Jr?dirhiLoza' Setrrngs Temporag? 111tsriiet Files~Clonte~,t.!ES 4TMZ*~i'3U7\042 
A"f.Shively.aoc 
I IIEREBY CERTIFY that on this 7 day ofklay, 2008,I caused a true snd 
correct copy of the  foregoing AFFIDAVB ITH A. SEIIWELU to be served, by placing 
the sane in a sealed envelope and depositing i t  in the United Skates Maif, postage prepaid, or 
band delivery, facsimile tra~sn~issior~  ovesni;gt:t deliveq: addressed to the following: 
A, B~LICG Lassoa, Esq, 
Attorney at Law 
Horizora Plaza Ste 235 
1070 Hitine Road 
Pocatelio, Idaho 83201 -2935 
Fax: 475-7602 
[ /US. ~ a i f b  
[ 1 FAX 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
E Ovemi&t Delivery 
LWFIDA$ST OF JUDITH A. SEIVELk' - 3 
F \f)L1EKI'S iBDS\-IS3 3Piea&~g~\042 ,iL"f.Shvel) doc 

Eduea~onat Background: 
A Ur?l;iversiv of Denver 
M.A. UPaiversity of Denver 
S.D. LJniversify of Denver 
Prtofessionnaf Experience: 
M ~ a g e  t& Adolescat nerapist 
Propedy Managment 
Finmcial M m a p e n t  Profesess~onal Practice 
Cornpkoljer USDA Progrm 
Finarrcial Mmagement hensurmce Agency 
Law Cia& &t A x q m e ~ _  -h3G~ & Associates _ - -- - - - - --
-- -- - - iktfsmey- -- -Dworb&-ShiveleC 
-Attorney SEvely & Demos, PC 
Since 1985, approximately ninety percent of clients are employed in an aeculture 
business endeavor, The main office of Sbi~ely & Demos, P.C. is focated in Erie, 
ty in the norlfiern Den~~er  mebopoiiitstn area- er- and- 1 
have a sateltit in Yuma, Colorado, a smsllf agrrculmal co Eastern 
Colorado, near where 1 was born and spent the Erst seventeen years of my life. I have 
filed between 25-30 Chapter 12 cases since the inception of Chapter 12 in 1986. The 
main focus has been tor representation but I have also represerrted secured 
creditors in Chapter 12 tcies. I have represented the debtor in several Cfraphr I. 1 
tcies and have dsa represented the secured creditor in Chapter 1 I b tcies. 

EmERT WITNESS mPORT 
JUDITH A, SHXFrELY, ESQ. 
1, PACTS OF TEE CASE 
Agorney WWam D. Bagley represented Bvce Lf. Erickson in a Chapter f l  
bauliruptey case Eited on October 8, 1998. llnless a m o ~ o n  was Faed for an 
extension of time, the Ckapter 11 plan of reorganktm~on for Bwce Ericksan was lo 
be filed withia 120 days of the date of the petiaon, which h this case would batre 
been on or about Februav 5,1998. On Februam 19,1999, mTUarrz- D. Ibagtey frlied 
aa vofrmtaw pelitfaon under Chapter PI for Kathleen E. Ericksoe, A plan of 
reorganbation under Chapter 1% was not caafwmed iia either case, On May PI, 
1999, the ease was dislmissed for sufBcienl cause upon the moGorn to d i s ~ s s  Taed by 
the United States Trustee. 
For a period of months following May of 1399, Mr. BagIey urnsuccessfay 
attempted negoGs"iions with the secured creditors. Fo 
-- a secured creditor and on December 3,1999&r.-B-a@ 
- - -- - - -- - baahuptcyfo&r;~.e&riekson;-Byrce Eriekson-had vrngaidaaor~ep fees-owe&to -- ----- -- 
Mr. Bagiey for the Chapter 11 bankuptcy. On. NoventkPer 13,1999, after Mr. 
Bagley bad been w o r m g  on the Chapter 12 baaknptcy petiLion and schedules, 
Mr. Bagley prepared a prodssor3f nste secarred by a moreage and req&ed that 
Mr. Erickson sign a prorruissory note secured by a mortgage, on real prolpem Mr. 
En'ckson owned in Idaho, In his deposition, Mr. BagEey tes~fied &at he agreed to 
f i e  a new Chapter 12 ease only if Bryce Eriekscrn gave Mr. Bagley the note anad 
secmria;F.'. 
- -- - - - - 
As an expert wiaess, in this ease, f was asked to address the mager of 
whether Rr2Ham D. Bagley met the required standard of care and whether he 
pros4ded competent representation to Bryce Erickson. The various issues to be 
addressed will be discussed separately. 
11, Chapter 11 F b g  vs. Chapter 12 F h g  
On October 27,1986, Congress enacted a spedal bankruptcy for farmers, 
caPled Chapter 12. Prior to that dale, f a d y  farmers olrEy had the option of erit.iher ra 
Chapter I3 (reorganhation banhuptcy for wage earners) or a Chapter 11. Family 
farmers found that Chapter 11 was needlessly compBeated, unduly t h e -  
g, hordhately expsenslve and, iin many eases unworkable. 
Chapter 12 was designed to give f a d y  hrmers h e k g  barrkuptcy a chance 
to reorganhe their debts and keep their land. It offers f a M y  farmers protection 
from creditors and, at the same time, ensures that farm Benders receive a fair 
payment. Under Chapter 12, it is easier for a f a d y  farm to csrafrrm a plan o f  
reorganbadon. - - - - - 
Slince Chapter 12 was a new bankuptcy, speemcslly for f a d y  farmers, 
Congress provided a seven year sunset to evaluate the eanthrrkg need and aasa the 
effec~veness of Chapter 12. After the fwst seven year sunset, Congress conhued 
to reenact Chapter I2 for vaqfrag periods of  h e .  A sunset of Chapter 12 occurred 
on September 30,1998. On October 21,1998, Csngress reertlacted Chapter 12, 
retreracGve to October 1,1998 to April 1,1999, Chapter 12 was reenacted several 
additionso1 f;irnes and was in effect: when Mr, Erictkson's Chapter 12 was fded on 
December 3, 5999. 
fa his deposition tesbormgi, Mu, Ba@ey was not %%Yare that Chapter 12 had 
been reenacted h October crf 1998, Mr. Bregley's tes~morry was that Chapter 12 
had expired when he started to represent Bryce and was reinstated sametime 
bemeen the Chapter 11 a"rled for Mr. Ericksonr and the subsequent Chapter 12 Tied 
for Mr.. Eri~kson, 
Had Mr, Bagfey been aware that Chapter 12 bad been reenacted on October 
27,1998, with an efEeel.ive date of October 1,2808, Mr. Bagley could have 
eor~vet-ted the Chapter 11 c a s a o  a C h a p t e ~ p  g a ~ w i t h h  three wegks after the - -___- - - -- -- - -  - - - --
- --- - ---petitiorrwa~-f"rled1-Theprcr~s10n-of Ghapter &I-eoaatahed h-&&USC+ 11-1ZCd)- - - - 
states: The court may convert a case under this chapter to a case under chapter 12 
. . . of this fitle ... If (3) the debtor requests conversie>m to chapter 12 of this title, 
such. conversion is equitable. There is no reason to befieve that the Banhuptey 
Judge woul(d not have converted this ease to a Chapter 12 when the case had only 
been recently fied. IPI ]his deposi~an, Mr. BagIey tesaed that he would have Pied 
a Chapter 12 if Chapter 12 had been avagiable. Mr. Bagley further testifred that 
the Chapter 12 worald be less costly and debtor friendly. Mr, Bagley did not seem 
lo have any hornledge of other advantages of Chapter 112 such as the requhement 
that only ;;a plan needs to be fled in Chapter $2, whereas in Chapter 11 a Disclosure 
Statement (tihat does not fit with a far g bushess operation and Is extreme h 
complrexitJ:) and a plan of reorganhation are req&ed. Far a farmer, eonfurnation 
of a plan of reorganization in a Chapter 12 is more ~ e l y .  
11. Johder of Katkleen Erickson as a Debtor 
At the time the Chapter 51 was filed for Bvce Erickssn, Bryce and his wife, 
Kathleen Erickson, had fded far a dissolution of their marriage, and Kathleen 
Eriickson rehsed the suggestion of f ~ g  a joint hibankruptcy with Bryce Erickson, 
Mr. Xtagfey, h his deposlitiion, hdicates an numerous oceasiorns &at the major 
problem in Mr. Erickson's Chapter $1 ihamz~riiptcy was the factor that Kathleen 
Eriekssn was antat a joint debtor nritb Bryce E P ~ C ~ S O B ~ .  
If ,Mr, Bagley had converted the Chapter 11 case to a case under Chapter 
12, the provisions of 11 USG 8 1281 would harye applied to the case. Pursuant to 
19 GSG 8 11201, the automatic stay is apphcablle ko a codebtepr, also Gable on the 
d e b t s ~ i t h  a-debtor wi& the r e q u k e m e f a t t  the plan fded by thdeb to r  must 
propose to pay the c l a h s  of the creditors. This protvhslon of Chapter 12 is not 
ut&ed often shee the hasband aad wife uslaally f"Ie zt joht pegaon. However, 
this case, had Mr. EBaGey competently represented Mr. Erickson and eortverted the 
case tci :Q Chapter 12 and had Mr. Bti&ey bad h o d e d g e  of 6 1201, the only 
requkement in l-he Chapter 12 wauld have been nogee ar~d a rigbt to abject lo any 
motions e f f e c ~ g  the rights of Kathleen Erfckson as a joh t  oBaer of both the 
personal properq armd the real proper*. As an example QE kcompetence, Mr. 
Bagley tesGGed in his deposiaon that he would not have converted te, a Chapter 12 
unm Kathleen Erieksort had johed h the peti~on. L&ewlse in his deposiGorrs, Mr, 
Bagley tesafied that he did h o w  if he could have esntrertied the Chapter f l to a 
Chapter 12 ease, 
Regardless of a eonact OE hterest based upon the par@es behg in a 
dissolrrtriion of marriage proceedkg with divergent goals as to groper@ di~pos i~on ,  
on LTebruary 19,1999, Mr. Bagley 17tled a pegaon mder chapter I1 for ~ t h t e e a  
Ericbaa, Wi-t_hout any basis in stabte sr 'biankrrptcy case law, om December f 4- 
1998, priczr to f ~ g  the petitian, for IC;rtbheee\ Erickson, Mr. Bstdey fded a m o ~ s n  to
j o h  Kathleen Erickssn as a eo-debtor and for amendment of I-be cspkiioa of Mr- 
- -- - Erickso&s banhup*-cnse,-The C3grkqf e o u r s  dsigd tbe nnoHon to join. 
- - - -- - -- - - - -- - - - - - - - - - -- -- - - -- - 
FhaUy ran March 24,1899, Mr. BagIey made a mstiosp for joint 
stration of the two Chapter 11 banhuptey cases for Bryce Erickson and the 
other for Kattrfeen ErIcksort, For his deposition tes 
h o w  the dzference bemeen csnrsoada~on and )o 
ophion, pursuant ta BanrIiruptcy Rule 1015, joht 
~ O ~ O B I  iin this case. However, the exelusivi;@ period for F ~ g  a Chapter 11 
laisclosbtre statement and pEsn in Bryce Erickson9s case is now 6 weeks past due. 
111, Motion for Use of Gash Collateral 
As with most farm bankuptey eases, the secured creditors had a collateral 
hterest in most of the assets, hclelualiing, but not M l e d  to, e a ~ l e ,  crops, farm 
mracfahery and eqdpment, the proceeds from the safe of the elma&el properCrJr laad, 
of coarse, the real proper@. Bryce Erickson bad no operatirng capital and could 
not 6abtah an speratiag loan. Bryce Eriekson, as a debtor in possession. h the 
Chapter II ease, eould not use cash conatera1 tvit.bout first obtahhg an order for 
use af cash collateral from the Ba&ruptey Court. There is almost always an 
urgency t&t f"ie a motion for use of cash eoUateraz1 hmedliately after f"mg the 
Chapter If. or Chapter lL2 case of reorganhation, Bthemise, there is no money to 
care for and feed the cattle and nct money to hanTest and mmrrkel the crops, In 
addieon, payments must be made to utfliQ providers and some funds are requked 
for living expensese 
hfr, Bagley did not fade a modon for use o f  cash collateral until one month 
after the petition for Mr. Erickson was Tied, I1 USC $j 363 provides that the 
- -- - 
debtor in possession may not use cash collateral unless the secured creditor 
consents or the courh after neace and hearhg, autbcrrkes the use of cash colliaterml, 
It is fkst of all hpodant: that debtar's eounsef co unieate with the secured 
creditor lo deter e the posiaoa of the secured lor as to the use of 11s 
coltatern1 and second the rrtoGotl far  US^ of cash collateraf must be careftuny drafted 
to speelficafly set forth the necessar;): expenses and the source of the f u d s  from the 
sa1e of collateraf. In his deposiaon t e s h a n y ,  Mr. Bagley agreed that he should 
have eansulted wlth au aeeourtlant in the preparaaon of the motion for use of cash 
eouateral The problem, of csurse, was that? at this b e ,  Mr. BagIey had not even 
Cllled an appllca~ou for employment of an iaceouatank, Further in his depcrsi~on 
tersamony, Mr, BagXey could not recaU that he bad ever before fded a moGokz far 
use sf  cash collateral. The blatant errors of the msaon hatclueled an o p e r a ~ g  
budget witb projected hcome from October of 11998 through September of I999 iin 
the total amount of $320,973 and projected expenses from October s f  1998 through 
h%ay of 1939 h the tatal amomt of $167,205; use of one seclrred creditor's 
collateral to make payments to another secured creditor; and other expenses to be 
paid to unsecured crediitorsifady members that an aftomey with experience in 
ba&uptcy tvould never have hcluded as part of the e&ibit. It would appear that 
- - ML Bagb w a x e  q f g h  co&ter&h tke2mount of $167x205. PEt -- -- 
addi~owthepfan aGon-is dueto befded-om orb?efclre-Februaq-59-P999 -- - -- 
and an order for use of cash coHateraI is nod sequlired after a plan of seorganba~sn 
is corrfirmed, ObjecGorms to (-fie motion. were filed by two of  the major secured 
whose cash couateral was at: issue. The Bankruptcy Court set a 
r y  hearhg far the emergency use of cash coHateraB and the Court granted 
the M t e d  use of cash collateral in the amount of $23,858 to pay emergency post 
pe&i~on debts due in October, November and Beeember of 1998. Mr. Ba@ey did 
not hBow Bankruptcy RuIe 40631 @) for his motion and the Gsurt elearly 
authrrrhed the use of only t bd  amount of cash collateral as is necessary to avoid 
immeaate and irreparable harm to the estate pendhg a fmal hearhg. 
b o t h e r  important matter in a motion. for use of eash collateral is the 
adequate prstecgsn that the? debtor is offerkg to the secured cre&tor. Adequate? 
protection baslcagy means ii replacement lien so that a secured creditor remahs h 
the same secured position as before the coUlateraE is used by the debtor. E l  is 
difaeult in many farm cases to offer adequate protection to the secured creditor. 
However, &Zr. Eriekson had equiQ in real proper9 and could have offered an 
additional Een l o  the secured creditor for the use of cash cohEateralt. In. a d d i ~ o ~  11 
ates the Een on post petlieion crops and post petiGoar crops conid 
have been used as adequate protection for the secured creditor aihnowirtg use of eash 
cobaatersl, Mr, Bagley does not adequately address the issue of adequate proteeGon 
in his motion for use of eash collateral. 
The accountkg requrhred for the use of cash collateral was never fded with 
the Court and the fmal hearkg on the motion for use of cash callaterill set for 
December 22,1998 was vacated by Mr. Bagley far the reason that there was only a 
I-amount-glf aeI&aonal cash collateral to 61 eoasiidered snd he was in 
process of preparhg a pfaa ts be considered by the creditors and the court h early 
1899. It is iirateresag that there is no further explanaae)~ of why the cash csBateraI 
in the amournt In excess sf $300,008, disclosed la the orighal mer~can, is new a 
ial amount of adtdiaamai cash eolJLsntersi . 
IV, Appllcadsns for Employment of Professlcrmals 
The debtor is requked, under Barahaxptey Rufe 2014, to obtalirn an order 
strpprovhxag the employmeat of attorneys, accountants and for Mr. Erkckson9s 
Chapter 11 case, a seattor. Elither upon hterrirar appKcadon or fmaE applleatican, the 
fees and expenses of  the professionals musk be approved by the Court prior to 
payment as an ad is&s~ve xpense by the debtor. 
In iWr. Esickson" ease, an order agpsovhg the employment b~f Mr. Bagley 
was requked and, ernM that order is obtained from the B a h u p t e y  gSoul"l, the fees 
and expenses of the aMomey, heusred prior to approval, may not be approved by 
the C g ~ t .  J~aChgpt_er& de@Bed =thjyEma~cM ~qms, h&d& a balance - - -- - - 
- - - - - - - -sheets profit anaft-Soss-statemernt, reconcaaGtiron-of-bank statements-and other - ---- - - 
hformation is reqraked by the United Stales Trustee. It is imperative that the 
debtor have an srder apgrovhg the employment of an accountant as soan as 
possible after the peGtioar is fded. Mr. Bagley unndershoad that It was the htent of 
Mr. Eriekson to propose a plain of reorgani;zz~lfionz with the sale of a pofiota of his 
real propere to pay aH secured and unsecured creditors. Mr. Esckso~t, &erefore, 
needed am srder a p p r o d g  the employment of a realtar ts enable the realtor $0 list 
and market the preperq for sale, The realtor was essential far assistance in 
preparhg the Chapter Ik disclosure statement and the plan sf reorgan&a~or_a, 
The requkements for properly preparhg an appfricaGon for approval sf 
employment of prafessioaals, is set d'srth in Bat~kruptgtp R d e  2064, If Mr, Bagley 
had fouawed the rule, the applicaaisns wodd hwe been apprwed on the first 
appBicstion. Mr. BagIey did not me appgea~ons for employment of an aecomksnt, 
a realitor and as the aMorney for the debtor unt-il December 8,1998, Wo months 
after the petigion was fdled, Nose of the three appficaticsrms met the? requkernents of 
Rule 2014 and, on December 10,1998, the Court entered an order denykg the 
apptications, On, December 21,1998, Mr. Bagfey filed tke veriaed statement of 
aBorney and the order for debtor-ia-possessim to retab af-komey was simed by the 
Corxrt on December 23, f998. Mr. BagHq made two addidma1 appllcatfozes for 
appohtment of ;ma accountant a ~ t d  apgohtment of a realtor and PmaUy on ltaarcin 
15,1999 perdttiing the debtor to retah ant aeeountaatt and a realtor. Mr. Bagtey is 
now past the exclarsiviQ perisd for f k g  the disclosure statement and the plan sf 
reorganhation for ~oi~hich he needs the assistance of an accountant and a realtor. 
Had the case a t  been disdsseb upon motion of Cbe United States Trustee 
r-vith johder sf two of llre secured crerSitors, Mr, Ba@ey would have been requtked 
to Eile an applicifltioa for approrial of his fees and expenses hcutrred in the Chapter 
11 case, The sppLicaLian far cempertsaki;au of professional persons is governed by 
11 USG 8 330 which provides that the court may award lo s professional person 
reasonable cumpeasaaon for achal, necessary sedces  rendered by the 
prokssionai person and reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses. The Court 
reviews the time spent on senices, the rates charged, whether the sef ice  were 
aeeessaq to the sd i s t r a ~ a n  oiI; or  beneficial at the ~rme at  which the s e d c e  was 
rendered louofard the eofmpletictn of the case and whelbrer the sedces  were 
performed withh a reasonable amount of time cs ernsurate with the ctznrpled$8i, 
importance, and nabre  of the problem, issue, or task addressed. 
If Mr. fi2a@ey9s Pees had been srabd&ed Is the court for approval, it b .i&eBy 
&at his fees wodd have been signmcantly reduced based upon dup&caGon, in the 
appHeaGcan oFpro&ssionals, the hsndequacy sf the sf the pleadirmgs %"rted in the case 
and the amount of h e  charged for the benefit to the baarhuptcy estate, Witfit a 
conrf"xmed plan of reorganization, the fees wodd have become an ad 
- - -  - expense -- with -- a f r rsf  ~ i o r i Q  f ~ r  e& Ecitvever ~ @ h  e d i s d s s a i  of  the easeP - - 
- - - - - -- -- there wasazo re+<ewd&Mr; Ba es-and eosts and MeBag;legde~sedt his omw----- - 
payment plan through the pronrisstlry note secured by a mortgage. Bryce Eriekson 
did naf: always receive his mall because he was t*g to s a e ~ v e  by d r i h g  a truck 
across eountt-y so Mr. Erickson does not beEeve he received all of the statements for 
legal fees from Mr. Bagley. Mr. Erickssn does  lot recall reviewkg statements aE 
legal fees and expenses before file signed the prohssory mote for appro 
$29,008. Mr. Erickson teseified at his deposiGon that Mr. IBa@ey had the 
pronirssoy note and mortgage prepared for his slipahre when he met; wilb Mr. 
Ba@ey cearcemhg the Chapter 12 bankruptcy. Mr. Bagey cannot locate the 
statements sf legal fees and expenses far review in this case. Therefore, Mr. BagIey 
has not prodded a detafled accounthg of the semices provided for the amount of 
the p ro~sso rg i  note plus the retaker of $5,000 paid by Mr. Erickson. 
Bi. Dismissal of the Case 
,Mr. Bagley" hitial testhorry at his deposi~an was that his ree6;rHee~o~ was 
that the pfaa was confumed and that, sa behalf of Mr, Erieksora, Mr. Bagley had 
voli~rlntarlly disdssed the Chapter I1 banhuptcy. Mr. Bagley tesaE"ne that the 
ease was voluatarUy disnaf-ssed to end the dsery ,  to work wiith creditors outside of 
banlicrruptcy, for econcr~c  reasens to save the costs, hcIu&g the casts of legal fees 
ate the Chapter 11, which had ceased to s8me any purpose. 
Ia his deposition, Mr. Bragley a d ~ t t e d  that Bryce Erickssn's Chapter 11 
was not a compficaked ease. Further, ,Mr. Bagley agreed %haat he snly substsn~ve 
action in the! Chapter f 1 was the motion far use 0% cash eoafrateral. Ms. Bagley 
tesafied &at ultimately he &d not get the Ckapter 11 cases '"shaped up." In Ms 
*stimony, Mr. Bagley accepted respcansibMb for not e f f e c m h g  a plan. 
Mr. EagIey jusafied Ms legal fees and expenses charged to Bryce Erlcksaa, 
based upon m e e ~ g  his stated goal of keepllag the aulohna~c stay in place so that 
creditors could nett c o n ~ r a e  legal aedon. to cokaeet sa the debts, If, h fact, 
obtahhg b e  was Mr. Ba@ey9s prhrary goal for the Chapter 11, without any 
htermGoa of propaskg a plan of reorgankalifia, the ea&e ease would have been a 
bad faith f&g, It%-, Ba@ey testiged that he be&eved it was reasonable to charge 
saorney" fees serd costs to Bryee as he was m a h g  "progress,?' The questfan then 
becomes whether Mr. Bagley did make any progress in the case. 
hIr. Erickson was charged totaf fees and expenses of $34,673.38 and the only 
sccrrmpHshmegit h the Chapter 11 was a stay of ac~orm by the creditors for the 
seven months from Betaber 8,11998 to May 11,1999. On Mareh 3,1999, the United 
States Trustee fded a maBon ts dfsdss the case. The basis of the mo~srp to d i s ~ s s  
is that the debtor has not l"rled a plan and a disdosure statement and has made little 
progress h advanekg this case to ~ocsnfwcaratiao, hforesver, even though the 
debtor" wife had filed a chapter 11 peGastn, Mr. EEa@ey &d not f i e  an appUcaQicsn 
for eaaplsymeat u n a  December 8,1998 and did not &scfsse to the court that he 
hadl bgcm r e p r e s ~ q t h g a e  deb&r% wifeI. TA-U.SLQus&epri;hted out the delays- -- - - -- - - -  
-h obtaiurhg-spgoht1~1e1t~tbof ~needed-garafessicz~aI8and the-resulihg hpact-sn t h w  - --- --- 
istra-tisn of the case. The Iasl ma8;eer addressed by the U,S. Trustee was the 
kcomplete, rnoathfy reports alad faaure to pay the qurarlerjy fee. 
Xa. a Chapter 11 banhuptcy ease, complete monthly repods are essential to 
provide ~fomnaticm about the Fmances of the case, not only to enable the 42,s. 
Trustee to monitor the ease but for the creditors as weU. It is not surprishg that 
tke monthly reports were hcrtmplete. The order retaking the acesarnts~rt was not 
entered unt2 BXarch 25, f 999. Mr. Eriekso~ would not be expected lo have the 
bowledge or t rahhg ,  without the assistance of an aceouatrmnat, to have Tded the 
monthly reports csnrtairrhg a balance sheet; profit and loss statements, s u p p o r ~ g  
schedules and the bank statements. The quarterly fees, reqmked in a Chapter 11, 
are based on the monthly asbursenments disclosed in the monthEy reports.. Mr. 
Erickscsgi would not have had a figare for the quarterly fee vtiifborut accurate 
manthfy reports. 
Even though two of the major secured creditors joked h the Trrastee's 
mo6on to disMss the ease, the Court entered au carder aua~ovvhg ten days for the 
debtor to cure the items conrtahed im the Trustee's motion ta disdss. The monthly 
reports fled by the debtor, lia an effort to comply wrfth the Court's order were not 
adequate ia substathmce, were not complete h the &formation proljded by the 
debtor and conlraq to banhragtcy law, the debhr  was not current 0x1 post-petition 
expenses. A competent ;a&-torrrey would have assisted the acecluntrsltlt h pprepan;mkg 
the monthly reports and wodd have carefuHy re~riewed the hformatickn in the 
moathly reports. I t  is k t e r e s ~ g  to note that the U,S, Trustee" stabs report 
indicates that fiam the RXrareb monlhIy report, the debtor owed Mr. Bagley $7,008 
-h fees over the hftiaif re taker  of $5,000, Shce BkBcagIey hamot been able to - 
produce m y  statements fer the legal fees charged to Mr. Erieksran, the only 
doerrmentsgon niEch supports Mr. Efa@ey9s e l a h  for fees is the March, 1999, 
report which indicates the total fees charged by Mr. Bagley was $12,000, 
It is clear from the plerrdhrtgs E"iled in Mr. Erlcksonis Chapter 11 ease, that 
by A p r l  of 1999 the case was quricMily dishtegrakg. Mr. Ba@ey had aast been 
unicatiag wit& the secured credjitorf to obtain their hpu t  for the disclosure 
statement and plan. Mr. Bagfey bad failed severali disclosures statements an& pEanst 
all of which did not contab adequate hferrnaac.n pursumt ts USC $j l f 23. On 
AprH 22,1999, First MadonaI Bank obtahed an order for relIief from stay to take 
possession sf all of the debtor" sremahhg cattle, A hearkg on the U,S. Trustee's 
mo6iion to disdss was set for Aprg 28,1999. 
On May 11,1999, the Court issued an order dr;sdssh;ltg the case for 
swfficient cause pursuant to 11 USC iji flk2@), Section 6112@) p r o ~ d e ~  that on the 
request of ;a parQ in hterest or the U.S. Trustee, the court may convert a chapter 
I1I case to a ehapker 7 or may dlsdss  a case in chapter 18, for cause, hcludh-klg: 
con~uiinrg Boss to or d u ~ o n  of the estate and absence of a reasonable memood 
o f  rehab&taGoxr; habE@ to ef&c@aLu pJa& g g r g a s o ~ ~ g & & _ b y  the debtor __ -__ - - - - -- - -- -
- -- -&at io-preg'udiciakto-creditovs an& other-eausesUs"ied k that sectr;oa of the - -- - --- - - - 
Bakrrptey Code. The Court believes, and I wsrrId support, that Mr. Erirekson's 
Chapter PI had faaech for afl sf the reasons kcfaded h that paf icdar  proviisiion of 
Chsp(;er f 1. 
&Ir. Bagley testiBed in his dept~si~on. that, regardjess of the drisrmni;ssal of the 
case, he beEeved he was jarslified in his representaGon of Mr. Ericksona because he 
bad held the creditors at- bay for seven monk.kns, and that Bryce Erickson's ease had 
not beem converted to a Chapter 7 BqjuidaC-ion ease, Once agah, Mr. Bagley lack sf 
f a d a n i l y  with the Banhuptcg: Code is evident. Pursuant to II US67 $j IPf2(c), the 
court may not eginvert a case under Chapter If to a case under Chapter 7 if the 
debtor is a farmer. 
Gonfiet of kterest is a cancept that every attorney, at one t h e  or another, 
must weigh and act upon, The general rule is that kin agomey shaD not represent a 
cfienl if the representation of that client will be directly adverse to the interests sf  
anocher client. The issue here is one of loyal@ in iaalin al&omey9s relaGcons&p with a 
client. There is an excep~oigon in that the aeomey may obtah the eonsent of both 
cX_lieats bf the attorney beaeves the representation will lnst adversely affect the 
relationship with the other cEernt. As in this ease, wit& &Mr. Bagley r e p r e s e n ~ g  
Bryce Erieksoa and then eo eachg representation of Kathleen Erieksoaz, an 
imperdssible canfict of Interest existed before! the representaacrn of Kathleen 
Eriickson was undertaken and hqr. Bagley had a duty of EoyaYQ to B q c e  Erickson 
do d e e b e  representation of Kathleen Erickson. 
- - - -- -- - - - - - - - ---  - - 
Bryce Ericboa and fCssth.hXeen Ericlkson had ftled for s dissofurtion. of tbek 
marriage prior to the F ~ g  sf the chapter I1 ease on Octsber 8,1998, IB his 
deposf~on tesenraony, Mr. Bagley staled that he did not recophe any coafict: on" 
hterest although there may have been. a potential conmet of hterest, in that the 
cBents may have had divergent: hterest in presemrhg proper@, Mr. Ba@ey further 
teseaeti that the csumet of hterest beween the p a r ~ e s  would have been more of an 
Issue lirr the divorce court. It is hteresb-ing to note that Mr. Bagley could r e c o w e  
t h ~ f  his dual representaaoa of the pades would zlecessarBy present a cornmet 6tf 
hsrterest: in the divorce eourk, where they would be deaihg with a proper@ 
scalemen4 however the presence of those same issues h the b a k u p t c y  
proceedhgs? which refated to the disposition of  properv and debts, would not 
present a conmet of hteresk. 
h2r. Bagdey lesWied in his depcrsiGon that the p a s ~ e s  were not "ion the same 
pagef% the baarkuptcy, Mr. Bagley Ifpxrther tes~fied &a& he did not see that there 
wodd be a eonmet of hterest and he did not consult with Mr, Erickson and did not 
disclose to Mr. Erickso-n &at ;a coaflbl.e& of hterest did or may have efisted. With 
even a cursoq understandkg of the chapter I1 ease, it is sbGaus that: there was a 
hpzdss&le  conBct &@tierest befgne Mr* BagiqIs represend-a~on of  KatMeen - - - -- -- - - 
- - - - - - -Erickson~smmeneedLa - -- - - - - - - - - -- - - -- - 
Although the biIILag stakemernts are not avagable for review, Mr. Bagley 
kesGGed &:hat he did not distinguish beween the b m g s  for Bryce Erickson and for 
Kathleen Ericksora, Even though there was no separate b W g  for s e ~ c e s  
p r o ~ d e d  for KatlrHeen Ericksor?;, Mr. Bagley tes~i"red that be belleved he had a 
nonverbal, express agreement with Bryce Erickson. that Mr. Erickson would pay 
for Kathleen's agomey fees and costs. F e  can  the^ smly assume that the secured 
p s o ~ s s o ~ y  note, executed only by Bryce Erickssn and not Kathleen EriEctisoaz, 
contakaas all of the legal fees and costs hcarrred in representa~ola of Kathleen 
Erickson. 
Mr. Bagley eoakaaed to represent both Bryce Erickson and PCathleenr 
Erlekslsn bel-weent the cfisrnissat af the Chapter 11 amd the r W g  of the Chapter IS;. 
Mr. Bagley did p~.o\~ide his statements for semlees bemnaittg $me 5,1999. The 
skatemen$ for sen6ees helirrded b m g s  tm a given day in which Mr. Bagley wodd 
communicate .Mith Bryce Ericksoa and on that same day esmmanicate w7ith 
Kathleen. Erickson. Bryce Ericksrsn anad Kathleen Eriekson are, at this t h e  period, 
c r ~ n ~ u h g  with their dissoluGo;n of marriage case, The hterests of each party were 
i~ertahly divergent at this h e  and there is no doubt that the confict @sf hterest 
was comGhuhgl It is h t e r e s ~ g  to note that from June 3,1998 tbrsngh October 27, 
f 999, whBe representing both Bryce Ericksrtn and a t h l e e n  EP-ickson iu ma&ers 
related to ctlgttact with creditors, the dissofution 06 marriage and prepilr8~0n for 
f m g  a Chapter 12 BPa&hpptcy, Mr. Bagley bilfred to Bryce Erickson a total of 2'7 
$ Q U ~  at $165 per hour for a total c~f $4,455. Mr. Bagley tesafied that all mpaid 
attorney fees and costs were roIiled into the prodssow note, payable to Sirins LC. 
- -- ---fofl29,173,3Qton-M0vemberH,-Ii994~ - - - - -- - - - -- 

Ba@ey could not recafl if he was able to obtah a confurmed gftam s f  reorgzanhaaon. 
h any of the Chapter kl, cases, Mr. Bla&ley testlBed &at he had ooldy handled one 
Chapter 12 ease prior to Mr. Erickson's Chapter 12 and ahat he had been 
successhf likl obtahhg conf"rrmrelion of a plan of reorganiizs~on, for the farmer, in 
that case, Mr. Ericksct-a% Chapter 12 case was the second and on& other Chapter 
12 case in which hir, Ba@ey served as aMerney for a debtar. 
The issue of damsges to Mr. Erickson h the Chapter 11 case is the crucial 
faattor to be eonsidered. Mr. Entickson was charged for two f h g  fees of $838) - one 
for Mr. Ericksoa's Chapter I1 case f w g  and another for KaitMeen Erickson? ease 
f h g  for a ~ B ) E S ~  of  $1,660. Mr. Erlckson suffered damages as a result o f  the kept 
handhg  of the moGon far use of cash eoHateraE in not havhnrg sufEcient funds to 
adequately care for his cattle and crops, Only Mr. Erickson would be able to 
a: those damages. 
In s Chapter l l , a s  weII as h a Chapher 12, if these is equi&y in the ecrHaberal 
seeurkg a loan, the secured creditor can recover all of tbe atlomey" fees and costs 
@%ed by the secured ere&tor7s ateosgtey in pprotee~g the cofiakerafi durhg  the 
- - - -- - Chapjer -- 81 case. - In Mr. Ericksonkgase&e s e x e d  ereditg-id &aye value in - - __ -- 
- - - - - -- - -collateral-h-excess of-6:Iae amount of-the loans, The a$torney-for Fksk-Seeari - --- -- -- 
B a d  was aggressive in both the Chapter %I and Chapter 12 eases and the total 
al-aomey's fees anel costs were $9,750 for the Chapter 11. 
First. Nakioeah Barrk, through its aeomeys, also played an active role in the 
representation sf the Bank's hterests h the Chapter l i P  case. Fkst Na~onsebi hFa& 
opposed the request for use of sash. collateral in the Chapter 111 ease, The Court 
entered an order in Firs(. National Bank's favor, First National Bank j o k e d  the 
U, S, Trustee's mergoa to disdss the Deblozs Ckapt-er I1 ease and the Court 
agreed and disdssed the Chapter f I. First NaGonal Bank fded a motion for relief 
from stay the Court granted the mot-;on. First Na~onal  Bank woarld also have 
heurred attorney's fees related to general ad istratlive mafters in the Chapter II 
case. IYitIaouC asa ite&ed statement, a conservative esemate sf the attorney's fees 
and costs added to the E ~ I c ~ s o B ~  note wodd be $8,500. 
%-ashhgtoicl Cg.r.hearQ Bank" proof of claim iur the Chapter 112 hcludes 
ab-lormey's fees and costs, heurred prior to the Chapter 12, of $338.46, 
VkIL Reasonable A&torney9s Fees for the Erickson Chapter 1% Case 
the understandkg that Bryce Erickson's Chapter 11 ease was 
d i sdssed  for cause, an esa aGom of the legal fees that would nornarauy result 
from the f i g  band prosecu~on of the case by the debtar9s aM.~mey h rela~onship 
to the pleadhgs fd"Ble by Mr. Baghey, are t ewg ,  and are set forth bejaw: 
E s h a t e d  
kaessosmwbfe T h e  
Aeend 341 Mee&g 1.5 hours 
MoGon for use of cash cohfrateral 
(3). appGcaGons for appoiintmenl of 
professionals hclu&g verified statements 
3.41 hours 
* Mr. Bagley testified in his deposiGcm that a reasonable amount of t h e  for 
preparhg the peGtiarp and schedules wodd  be four 4.0 six hours. Mr, BagEey had 
a b ~ i o t n s l ~ a l  abtabed fmancial d o ~ u m e ~ & $ r o ~ h e  debtcar, I s .  tax rehms9 reg@ - _ - -- - - -- - - - 
- -- fmaneiaE-stateoinentt~~eopies of hvoiceg9 ppriarta eeamplee~g the sehednlesfded on-- 
October 8,1998. Mr. Bagley prepared three amendments to the schedules - one 
extensive amendment on December 9,1998; another on December 28,19952 and the 
f"mal amendment on Pebruaq 19,1999. 11 is not unusual that 
of the schedules would be required followhg the m e e k g  of cre 
case occurred ou November 13,1998. However, three amendments of the 
schedules 'vultb more khan four months after the peG~on was rded is unusual, 
especiaEly since the plan of reorganhation should have been fied tvith 128 days o f  
the peGilkion T u g  date, 
HE, as stated by Mr. Bagey in his deposit-iou tesbony,  the acco9lapEslament of iMr, 
Erieksoo" Chapter l a  case was crbtairrirmg the automatic stay, then the value of Mr, 
Bagley's servi-ces in pursrrhg the Chapter II for Ms. Eriekssa was the six hours 
spent preparhg the peGaon and f ~ g  &a trigger the autonmnadc stay. Based upon 
that premise, the value sf servm'ces Mr. Erjckssn aclualIy received weald not have 
exceeded $990.00. With sa stretch in assesshg the vahe o f  sefices provided by Mr, 
Bagley to Mr, Ericksnn, 83.5 kasrikrs have been hskeluded above, The total attorney 
fees would be $2,227.58 and there would remah _a balance of the $5,000 retaker 
paid &a &&Is. BagIey by Mr. Erickso9t. 
Pleadhrags related to Kathleen Erickssn" smg of Chapter 11, kcIudhg the mgljHon 
islration, have not been helraded because the %"&g and mc~~orrm 
would not have been required had Mr, Bagley converted the case Po a Chapter 12, 
as a prudent S B M O ~ E L ~ ~  wou116-I have done. 
The preparation of the several &scEosure statements and plans also has not been 
- - - - -- - - - hduded-k- the* kdrmscenable " o g s  because the pleadkgs were not 
prepared in a manner ebae wsdd resultt Iln a coxrfwmation of a Chapter 1 I plan, Xn 
his deposfaiion tesbony,  Mr. Ba@ey cfahed respouslli>fill;y for not effechsang a 
pian, Likewise, the monlhfy reports were never accepted by the United States 
Trustee and the lack of accuracy and completeness was hclueded by the U S ,  
Trustee as a basis for the msaon to dis&ss, 
I t  is not reasonable for Mr. Baeey to charge for his Incompetenee in three rounds 
for preparhg the appEcaaons far employment of professionals, The requkements 
are clearly set f0rl.k in inhe Biarnbaxpky Rules, but Rlr, Bagey neglected to fsMow 
them, The sedces of the accoarartmt rand the realtor were necessary h this case 
shortly after f h g  By the t h e  the accountant and reantor were employed, by order 
of the court, the case was close to disdssaL 
CONCLUSION 
The best csurse of acGon in the Chapter 11 case wodd have been a 
conversion of the case from Chapter 11 to Chapter 62, Conversion of the ease 
could have beea accompfisbed m r i t b  the month after the Chapter 11 case was Bed. 
The appEcg~o~fogrofes&nraJ p3rsSons w08~iBca have SEE beea rq-wed in the _____- -- -- - - - 
- -- - - -- - ~Ittapte1--1-2--ease-a~ \vaufd a moCion-for useof a s h  eoflaterigt;--However, the joinder -  - -- - 
of Kat-bleen. Erickson h tbc Chapter L2 would not have neeessaray been an issue. 
Mr. Bat;Eey would not have had a eonEet of hterest sil-tgaGoaa if he had converted 
the case to a Chapter 12 with Bryce Erieksebm as the onlly debfor. The only 
requkeaaeat in the Chapter 1% tvould have been for Mr. Bagley to give n s ~ c e  of  all 
proposed sctlclns in tke Chapter 12 with the right of KatMeen Eriekson to object 
andl be heard by the Banhuptcy Court. 
A Chapter 12 is desjgned exclusively for fa g operatianti.. The 
procedures for a farmer ita ;a Chapter 12 are not as cornfslleated as ita a Chapter 11, 
The memood of obta g a confirmed plan h a Chapter 1% is greater, espeeiaHy 
in B q e e  Erickson's case which was arot a esmpllcated ease in terms of assets and 
debts. Because the Chapter It2 is designed for far g operations and the 
procedures are not as complex, "gbe costs, h terms of legal fees, would have beer?; 
substanaaHy less. 
Moreover, Mr. Bagley camnot even produce ite&eb statements to verify the 
r W g  of fihe fees to Mr. Ericksoa. The success sf the Chapter 13 case was deemed 
to fa% from the very b e g h h g  and the total fees charged by Mr, Bagley h the 
arnonnk of $34,f 7338 are not justified for the kept represenkaaon provided lo Mr, 
Eriek~o~r. TWO secured creditor sreomeys, h strccessfufity represen*g theha cfiiients, 
only hcurred 8tte)rney~ fees and costs in the lotit amount of appro 
$rs,s@o. 
I reiiedi upon the foFcntl@wing informatiion In prepaPiirzg the expert reps&: 
Review of pleadings flied Sin the Chapter 11 ease 
Review of pleadings filed in the Chapter 12 case 
Discorreq responses produced by Mr, Bagley in this case 
Ms. Bagleyv"s depasitioa tes~mony from nates taken at the depositioa 
Baxakmptq Code 
Bankruptcy Rules 
Rules of Professional Conduct 
Dated this 30& day of April, 20848. 
Respeeguliy sabmi.l-ied, 
Bryan D. Smith. Esq. ---. ISB No. 441 1 
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-REAL, PROPERTY D E S G m E D  AS FBLtOIyS: ) 
1 
CAiXE30U COLTNTT'I', IDAHO: 1 
TOWNSHIP 5 SOUTH, RANGE 36 E.B.M.. 1 
EETTION 27: LOTS 1 AND 2, T<l/2 1 
NWl l4. EXCEPT THEEFROM THE S $12 1 




.MFDh\TT OF B. JJ DHSCOLL - 1 
F \GLIEKTS BDS -453 PIeadmgi\O"3 Al'fED 306 
STATE OF DLMQ 1 
1 ss. 
County o f  Bormev~llc 1 
B. J. DRtSflOU, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
il j 1 an one sf the alaomeys for the defeedclilt in ?,he abuve-referenceii matter. 
(2 )  1 make thrs affidaxdit based on my own personal knowledge. 
(3 )  Attackd hereto and marked as Exhibit *'A9' is z ti-ile m,?d correct copy ofthe 
Response to De%ndmt Bryce Erdekson's First Set of hterrogatones to Sir!irs LC Requests 
for Pro&~zlicm of Documents. 
(4) Attached hereto and marked as E-dxibit "'B" is a tme and co1Teci copy of billings 
%om Wiiliarz D. Bagley to Bryce Enckson covering the t ime per;od from h e  3, 1999 to June 5, 
2001 produced by the plail~r~ffin nts verified diseovev responses. 
( 5 )  Attached hereto md marked as Exhibit "6'3s a true ;id conect copy of "khe Order 
Rescindillg Order For Debtor In Possession To Retain Attorney &om Case No. 99-2 1 500 of the 
United States Ba114ilq;cy Court 6; i l ie  District of Wyoilling. 
(5) Attached hereto and marked as Exhibit "-6)" is a true 2nd correct CCBPY o f  the 
docket report printed fioni PACER for Case No. 99-11 500 ofthe Uriited States Ba~z'mptcy Court 
for the District of JVyorni~zg. 
Fui"lSler yom affiant sayeth i ~ a ~ ~ h f .  
DATED th is  - day ofhlay. l O Z 8 .  
_WP;mAVI[T OF B, J. DMSCOLL - 2 
F:iCLIEFrS\BDSrJ453 9leadirrgs\O43 A3 BJD doc 
(SEAL') 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY elat on this day of May, 2008, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the forcgnil-ig AFFIDAVP , DntSSGOEL to be served, by placing the 
saline in a sealed elivziopr and depositing it in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, or hand 
delivery, facsimile trlulsmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the following: 
A. Bruce Lason, Esq. [ U .S. ~ a i f b ~  
Attorney at Law i 1 
E-iorizon Plaza Ste 225 [ 1 Hand Delivery 
1870 Hiline Road [ ] Ox~ernaght Delivery 
Pocateilo, Idaho 53101-2935 
Fax: 478-7602 

RECEIVED APK O 8 2005 
'4. Bruce Larson - ISB S o ,  2093 
Horizon Piaza, Ste 225 - 1070 Wiline Road 
Prrcaxeili~, ID 83201-2935 
Telephone: (208) 478-7600 
Fax: (208) 478-7682 
IN THE DISTTCIGT eouw OF TZE SIIITH JmIe IAL DISTHGT OF THE 
STATE 01: IDAHO, SN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANBOU 
SIRIUS LC, a %'y oxtbing Li~niced Liab3iq ) 
Company, 
) 
Pf aintiff, ) Case No. CV-2004-284 
1 
vs. ) mSPONSE T o  DEFENAPdTT BRYCE 
) EM@WON9S FIWT SET OF 
BRYCE B. FRICKSON, AND ANY PERSON ) INTERROGATORIES TO SIRIUS LC 
CLAIMING UNDER, BY OR THWOUGS QR PRODUCTION 
BRYCE M. EXUCKSON IN AND TO THE ) OF DOG 
REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBED AS 
FQLLOIVS: 1 
1 
Ci"nHh30U COUNTY, IDAHO: 
1 
TOWNSHIP 5 SOUTH, KkNGE 46 E.B.M., j 
SECTION 27: LOTS I PnED 2 ,  Nl;/zNW%, ) 
E X C E P T  T H E R E F R O M  THE) 
SvzNEYil";W%NiV%, J 
Defendant9 ) 
COklES %OW Plaintiff, pursuaat to the Idaho Ruks of Civil Procedure and makes 
the foilowing Answers to Defendant Bryce Erickson's First Set of Interrogatories to Sirius LC. 
Response to Defendant Bryce Eriebon" First Set of lis1erregatories to Siriu 
Request k r  hoduction of Docments % m"" 
Page L 
IPr'lBMOGATORY N u :  With respect to all witnesses that YOU ir~cend or 
expect to call at the trial of this action, please provide the foiiowing information: 
(a) The n m e  of the tvrtness; 
(b) The address and telephone cumber of the witness; 
(c) A brief surmnai-y of the respective expected teatbony of each such il'iliiess. 
&VSWER TO IWEMOGATORU NO, 1: 
(a) The name of the witness: Mrillim D. Bagiey 
(bj The address and telephurre r m b e r  of the witness: 1107 West 6th Avenue, 
Cheyenne, W 82001; 307-634-0446 
jc) A brief sumurrary of the respective expected testimony of each such witnrss. 
I will testify concerning ( I )  my represelltation o f  Mr. and Mrs. Ericksun wbicfi rc 
detailed in response to Interrogatory No. 7, (3) the execution of the note and mortgage, (3)  our 
SUGC~SS%I efforts to continue Court protection until a sale could be made, and (4) ccarnp~tation of 
the amount due on the secured note. 
LNTEmOGGTQlRS' NO. 2: Please state whether you have engaged ar;y experr 
witnesses in testi6 at the trial of this cause, if so, please state the expert's: 
(a) Name. 
(b) Address ar?d telephone n~r~ lbe r .  
Respame ro Debadant Bryce Erichon's First Set of I~~terrogatories to Sirius 
Request for Reduction of Docurere~ts 
Page 2 
(c) The substance of any opinion, or olher rsstimo:~y that the expert is expected 
to g:ve ah trial of this cause. 
id) The specific &cis md data on which such opiniuns are based. 
mSWER TO HNTEmBGATORY NO. 2: The Plaintiff has not yet identified 
persons who may be called as expert witnesses at the trial of this matter. The Plaintiff will 
disclose expert witnesses, if and when identified, in accordance with the Idaho Kuies of Civil 
Procedure an3 any applicable Scheclufing Order. This response will be supplement to comply 
with Rule 26jb)j4)(A)(1) and X E  705. 
INTEMOGATORPI NO. 3: Please identify a q  axid all documents that you expect 
to use at the trial of this matter, i.e., billings, cheeks, maps, drawings, photographs, sketches, 
reproduciions, wriicen staternellr;~ obtained mdl'or in the possession of [Be plai~ltlff and its agents, 
represeaatives and arrorneys yeralrzing m any sf the allegations of plaintiffs Complaint on file 
herein, 
&WSVlTER TO INTEmOGATOIRU NO. 3 : The Plabtiff has not yet determined 
which documents or things it may introduce as exhibits at a trial of this matter. The Piahtiff 
reserves the right to introduce sny document or thing produced or identified by either party 
through discover. Notwit&hstanding the foregoing, the following documents will be introduced as 
exhibits at the trial of this rnaaer: (I) the N~vernber 13, 1999 Promissory Note and Xlsrtgage, 
(2) Debtors-in-Possess60n's Application for Order Allowkg Retention of Attorney dated and Eled 
Response la Defendmt Bryce Erickon" First Set sf hterrogatcsries to Sirius 
Request for $rodaction of Docmermts SE 
Page 3 
December 29, 1999, (3) computation of  die amount due, (4) Mr , and Mrs. Erickson' s Property 
Settlement Agreement and Order in their divorce action and (5) the thee Bankruptcy Petitions and 
their dockets. Discovery in this mztier IS ongoing mci the Plainiiffresesi~es the right to supplemcnt 
this answei/iesponse if and to the extent additional responsive information is identified. 
nTTEmOGATORY N o ,  4 : State the stikqes and addresses of each and every 
person who has ho-vledge or purports to have my knowledge of the facts of th is  case and 
describe the facts and information which each such person purports to have, 
Ai*IS%VER TO IkTEmOGATORY NO, 4: William D. Bagley. 1107 iVest 6th 
Aveme, Cheyenne, WU $2001; Bryce H. Erickson, Kaaleen Erickson, 
BWEmOGATOIRY Pi@. 5: Please provide an zccolaatirag of m y  and afI mounts 
paid to you on t i le  Note identified in your Complallit as executed on November 13. 1999. 
iLP;iS&VER TO LNTEmOGATBRU NO, 5: No payments were made. The entire 
bakmce plus interest and accruing aMorney fees is due. 
INTEmOGATORY NO. 6: Please identie any and ail b 
which William D. Sagley has represented a party, nnd for each matter specificat@ including the 
following iafoi-matlon: 
( I )  The name of the parry Mr. Bzgiey represented in the bafzlr~uptcy matter; 
(2) The lypmof the ba t ~ y  mansr, i.t, Chapter 7, Chapter 9, Gkapzr I I ,  
Chapter 12, or Chapter 13; and 
Respame to Defendant Bryce Erickiscan" First Set of Interrogatories lo Sirius LC and 
Request for &aduction of Docments 32 
Page 4 
(3) Whether the party h l r  Bagley represented was a debtor, a creditor, or a 
third-put:;. 
ANSWER TO INTERBOGATCbRU NO. 5: 
(1) My practice is civil. 1 do not accept crin~inal, divorce and personal injury 
1 have no way to identify dle name of each creditor or debtor represented by me in the inst 19 
years. 
(2) 1 represent creditors in all matters. 1 represent debtors in Chapter 7 ,  11 and 
12 matters. 111 rhe past 12 months I have represented debtors in one (1) Chapter 11 and forty-three 
(43) Chapter 7 c a s e  This is probably typical. I filed the first Chapter I1  "Arraogement" in 
Wyoming for Tcton Homes in Carper, Wyomiilg in about 1970, and that company continues to 
manufacmre mobile homes m d  has about 350 employees. 
43) 1 represent debtors or creditors and for the rime B served as a Trustee 
INTEMOGATORY NO. 7: Please identie each matter in whricb William D. 
Bagley rendered legal advice or kgal services to Bryce Erickson, specifically identieing the 
foHowisag for e;ieh matter: 
(1 j Tte general nature of the matter; and 
(2) The time period during which Mr, Bagley rendered legal advice or legal 
services or: the particular r~rakaet: 
Response to Defendant Bryce Erichon" First Set of Interrogatories 60 Skius LC md 
Request far Production of Documents 33 
Page 5 
ARSWER TO ENTEmBGATBRY Nod: 
(I) Mr. Crickson, was the defendant en a pendkg divorce action tvben he was 
referred to nne bj his divorce attorney (now District Judge Demis Sanderson) to file proceedings 
in the Ba&upecy Court to stay a penrii~g bar& foreclosure on the family fzrn-:, which was 
ownedjointly by Bryce Erickscln and hs wife Kad~leen. T h e  to file was short and she was not 
tsrilling to join in rbe preiceedi~gs. The Chapter 12 opdon had expired and not yet been reinstated. 
Tile only choice we had was to file a Chapter I I b d m p t c y  ivirZluut the joint owner. Tine '"plm'" 
was to protect [lie substmtiaf equity by stopping foreclosure and selling sufficient fmd to pay fbe 
creditors. His Chapter 11 Reor,oankaticrrr Petition was filed October 8, 1998 as Case #38-2 1393. 
Subsequently, Mrs. Eriekson agreed that our actio~ m s  necessary to protect their 
cquity, x ~ d  I filed her Chapter 11 February 19, 1999 (#99-20 162). We sought to have the Court 
consolidate the actions, but &is was noe allowed, md after a year with nu sales, in September of 
1999, we dismissed both actiacs and attempted to work with tbe creditors without Court 
inrroltrernent . 
This worked for awhile, but unfor%naeefy there was no cash flow to support a 
iroluntxy workout and, as a resuit. of extznsive highway construction between Star Valley and 
Jackson, the anticipated real estate aarket did not: produce my offers, Mr. Erickson was best able 
to earn income ivorking 6s a truck driver. The rake  of  the land was in its potendal recrsationaf 
use rather than in agricu1luraI. 
Response to D e h d m t  Bryce Ericksun's Fist Set: of Interrogatories to Sirius LC and 
Request for Production of Docrm~ents 
Page 6 
34 
After a period of t h e  new foreciosure actions were breatened or brought and a 
new voluntary Chapter 12 was filed by M r  Erickson oil December 3. 1999 (#99-2 1500). Again 
the pian was rfi sell property, pay ail creditors in hill, and pieszrve a5 much equity as possible. 
These proceedings continued until the creditors and Court were frustrated, and rile stalding 
Chapter 12 Tmstee to& aver. A "Third m e n d e d  Plan" wan approved June 4, 2001, aid 
subseqn~ntly property was sold and the matrer concluded in 2004, within the three year term. The 
process took six yews. 
(2) Semvices began prior to October 1, 1998 and ended August. 28,2000. 
f W E ~ 0 G i a i r 0 R Y  NO. 8: For each of the matters you identified in yoltr 
response to Interrogatory No, 8 here&, please provide the ioIEowing: 
(4) Am accounting of the hours worked by Mr. Bagley on behalf o f  Mr.  
Erickson; 
(2)  -413 accountkg of &he a~nnunts charged by Mr. Bagley to Ms. Erickson for 
hlir. Bagley's services; anif 
(3) Amounts paid by or on behalf of Mr. Eriekscsn for services prc-vided by Mr , 
Bagley . 
ANSfVER T 8  INTERROGATORY SO.  8: The avaliable billng is attached. It 
reflects a pyrnernt by Note and Mortgage and a write off ~ f o f  $15,9C48.313 on h n e  1,2001. 
Response to Defendmerat Bryce Ericbon's First Set of hterrogatories to Shirrs 
Request for Bodnrc~on of Docmeats *?? 
Parre 7 
INTEmOGATORB" NO, 9: Please identify any and ail officers, directors, 
owners, employees members, and managers of Sirius LC fro% Jkouary 1, 1998 to the present, 
and for each person identified, please indicate the flsllow~ing: 
( 2 )  The n m e ,  address, and telephone nrsrnber of the person; 
(2) The capaciq or title of the person; and 
( 3 )  The period of t h e  that the person has been affiliated with Sirius LC. 
ANSU'ER TO IhTEMOGATORP? Neb, 9 : Sirius LC was formed July 13, 1 993 
by William D. Bagiey and Masrgaret A. Bagley , husband and wife, for fmify invesgsrreents. They 
;ere 50i50 partners or 'Members" wifhout further tittes. The office is 1 107 Wrest 4th Avenue, 
Cheqienne, !XiY 82001; 307-634-5446, Residence: 400 West 6th Avenue, Cheyenne, WU 82001; 
307-632-3232. 
NTS 
FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1: All documents relating to payments 
received by you on the Note identified in your Coqfalnt as executed on Xovember 13, l9953. 
: No payments have 
been made. 
: Any and all exhibirs and/or docmeats 
which you intend on. expect to utilize at the trial of this cause, 
Response to Defendnot Bryce Erickan's First Set of fnterragafories to Sirius B a n d  
Requst for hoductim of Docments 
: See response to 
Interrogatory N o  3. Ail docii~uents have been iur.?ished except the attached three Danhp tcy  
Pstitians and their Dockers. 
: Any and all documents referred to in 
or used to prepare pour responses to Defendant Brjce Bickson 's First Set of Interrogatories to 
Plaintiff. 
: See responses to 
Request No. 1 and the billing records produced in response to Interrogatory No. 8. 
: Ally and documents relating or 
pertaining to ail matter in which Willianl D. Bagley rendered legal advice or  legal services to 
Bryce Erlchsoa as idedified by you in your response to Inrerroga.ior). No. 7 o f  Dekndant Bryce 
Erickson's First Set of Interrogatories to Plaintiff. 
: See response to  
Request No. 3 and interrogatory Eo. 8 
+& 
DATED this 2 day of April, 2005. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Response to Defendant Bryce Erieksan's First Set of  hterrogatories ts Skius L3ynd 
Request for h~.odrretisn of Documents 
Paire 9 

GERTlFICATE dCPP SERVICE 
I BEmBli' CERTIFY that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document to be deli1 ered to the following tndi.tiidual(s) by the me&od indicated: 
Bryan D. Smith H l J  .S. Mail, Postage Prepad 
B ..I. DriscoX1 1 1  Nand Deiiveq 
McGrafA, Meacham BL Smith, PLLG [ 3 O~iernight Deiivery 
P.O. Box 50731 fi - Fax: 529-4166 
Edzko Falls, ID 831105-0'33 5 
Response l o  Defe~dmt Bryce ;EricBrsi:n5s First Set of Interrogatories to Sirius t g y d  




WILLIkF1 D. EXGLEY 
2107 WEST SIXTH AVEbJUE 
CHEYENNE, W'f 22301 
Telephone (307! 624-3446 
Fax (307) 6 J 7 - 7 4 4 5  
ZRI  "SON, BRYCE 
P.O. BOX 155 
FREEDSId, r,"SY 33120 
Page: : 
o s / e l / ? s  
AGCOb7;IT iiu'rl)  : i ~ ~ - " ' J ~ v ~  
'F36rrnL3 
Telephone conference xith Bryce :  call Brcce and 
First Security; call Kathy,  leave aessage. - 8 0  
Conference with Bryce and Dennis Sanderson on 
pending ma'tters , -60 
O f f i c e  conference w i t h  i3cyce regarding need for 
new lnformal plan. . 3 0  
Conference with Dennis Sanderson on needed 
inf ornation. - 3 0  
Telephone conference with Kathy regarding 
Washington County Bank and New Holland. 
Telephone conference with Kurt at Washington 
County Bank; letter to Kathy. .63 
Telephone conference w L t h  Washington County Bank; 
leczer  to Bryce; return call to Kathy* . 3 3  
Recieve and review Gotice of Incent to Forclose; 
conference with Dennis Sandereon; call Neil 
Clark; call i3oll;nd and Hart regarding ''what can 
we dou; report to Dennis; report letter to 
Sricksons. 1.80 
2eturn call to .Kurt at Washington County Bank, .30 
ERTGKSON, BRYCE 
Page: 2 
c i 8 / ' 0 ~ / 9 9  
ACCC?9XT NO: 101-7lIq 
HOURS 
~ 7 / ' : 3 / 5 3  Repor.: l e t t e r  to B r y c e  a113 Kathy; CC??, t~ J e r r y  
;nd D~; ,zn i s ;  research  T i t l o  ?I Ag Mediat isn .  .5i3 
97 i 2 ~ ~ 9 . 9  Cor-ferenci  with Bryce regarding F ~ r e c l n s u r e  and 
Waah:nz~~n Cocnty Bank and drs12-r. co s e p x a i - e  
prope r ty  &xd  refile, 
, /  5 t i  1 Q K t ;  conference w i t h  Kichy on 
;u get a ; ~ e l s ~  separated axd/or  w o r k  with 
bariic . 
~ 7 / 3 0 / 9 ~ ~ ' 0 n f e r e l i c e  with D t l l n i i  .'acdersc.n sn pezdiny 
matters .. 
TOTAL TUXRENT WORK 
06/26/99 (kdjastnent f o r  Mote f o r  Kortgagei 
EZALLYCE DUE 
PLEASE RETU2N A COPY 22 THIS STATEME!fT WITH YOUE REM1TY;JiiCE 





































ERI CKf ON, a R Y G b  
PLEASE XETURN A COPY OF FTBI SSTkTZM31r'T WIYB YOUR EEMITT.XqCE 
* * *  TH&VK YOU * * *  
WILLIN4 D . BAGLEY 
1107 WEST SIXTH P.*JEWUE 
CHEYEtJNZ, WY G2005. 
Telephane (307) 634-0445 
Fax :307j 637-7445 




PREVIOUS B A L m G B  $1,766.07 
BOURS 
Telephcne conference w i t h  New Hollan3, -30 
N e w  Hollend: Call from Michelle Federer. . 3 0  
Gonference'with Dennis Sanderson regarding 
deadline; prepare copies Chapter X I  documents. 1.80 
Coi~fererlce w i t h  David st New Holland credit; 
office conference with Bryce; revise Chapter 12 
Petition and Application to Appoint Actorney and 
Zealtor, 3. O r j  
Review files, rework Petition, letter to Bryce. 3.03 
R e v i e w  file, work on Petition; letter to Bryce; 
telephone ccnference with Bryce; send draft 
Petition and letter tc B r y e e ;  telephone 
cocference with Dennis. 4,08 
Telephone conference w l t h  Kathy Erizkson and 
Trustee; fax waiver to T r u s t e e .  .30 
Message from Dennis regarding 33 day extensi~n in 
foreclosure. .20 
_ _ _ _ _  _ - - _ _ - -  
FOR CUXRENT S SP.71 CSS P.EKDZREC 2 2 , 3 0  2123.51 
AGCOWST NO: 101-7LK 
SRI CKSCllJ, BRYCE 
P.Q. BOX 155 
FptRDQM, WY 83120 
WILLIAM G .  2kGLEY 
3.107 WEST SIXTH AVENUE 
CHEYENNE, WY 82001 
Telephone (3371 634-0445 
Pax 13571 c37-"444 
STATEMEST OF SER1;I ZeS 
Page: I 
1 1 / ~ 1 , ~ 9 9  
ACCGt"Ii-T 153 : L33-7*!~3 
10/06/99 Telephone conference with Dennis Sandersor.; fax 
statutes to Sandersonis offlce. 
10/12/99 R e - ~ l e w  Eilg; call Denn~s Sanderson; letter to 
3ryce. 
L0:'15/99 MEW HOLL-WD : Telephone conference w i t h  Laura 
Bryant, le",ter to Brycfli. 
23/21/99 P-evrew file; call Dahlsten Trucking. 
13/27/99 Confireree with Dennis Sanderson on New Holland, 
Divorce, property division, p o t e n t i a l  5i:lancing 
and forec losure  status. 
FGR CURRENT SERVICES RENDERED 
TOTAL CURRENT WGEK 
PLEAS3 P.ETUR1.T A COPY 33 TdIS STATEMENT WITH YOUX XEMLTTmCE 
* * *  TKP-YK YOU * * *  
47 
WZLLL-Ufl D. BAGLEY 
11.07 WEST SIXTH AVElFJE 
JHE-fENNE, W'f  8 2 0 3 1 
Teltphine (3":) 634-0446 
Fax (337) 637-7445 
E R I S K S 3 N ,  BRYGS 
P . 3 .  BCX 155 
FkEEDOL4, W-f 8 3  129 
P a g e :  1 
i2/03/'43 
1 C i  3_ - 7216 
HOURS 
11/7~3/99 W3y.k on petition; cffice conf2r"nce with Bryce; 
f ~ ~ a l i z e  P tition. 3.09 
1 5 / 9 5  Conierence with Dermis Sarderson regar3'rng 
foreclosure c a ~ t i n u a i c e  and inforrnatxon f r o m  
divorce; receive and r e i l e w  di~orce docurnen~at iun 
for DenniG Sanderson; incorp~rate new information 
2.00 i n  Petition. 
11/27/33 Review pleadings; call Dennis Sanderson; call 
aryce. srn ~ . 2 *  
12/03/99 Telephone conference with Eryce; finalize and 
file Petition; send c ~ p y  to Bryce: n o t i f y  Bank 
attorney of filing. 2.00 - _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ -  
FCX CURRENT SERVICES RENDERED 
TOTAL CURRENT WORK 
21 / 2.3 / 9 9 REGUL$X PAYI4ENT 
CREEIT BFFL&I;iCE 
PLEASE F.ETURq A COPY OF THIS STATEIrlENT WITH YO'JR 'nEliITTP23CZ 
* * *  TH1;1:dK YOU tt * *  
ERICKSQN, ERYCE 
F . 0 .  B3>1 155 
FP-ZEDOM, W U  9312G 
;;,/C,IC/?~ r ev rew Petition and S t a t u t e ;  conference witn 
Eryce;  complete and file Petiticn; conference 
with Holland and Hart, Bank F - t i ~ ~ n e ~ ;  conference 
with Trusfeeis office regarding location for 
2.00 hearing. 
12/15/99 Receive and review Trustees Directive; make copy 
for Bryce, cffice clnf erence with Eryce . 1.90 
12/2~/99 Psvirw file, pleadings and correspondence. 2.90 
12/29/99 Office co.;ference with Bryce; research; review 
reporting requirements; prepare reports; prepare 
and file new Application and Order far Attorney; 
call Tom Davis on I R S ;  call New Holland; call 
Artorney Bluinel; Hearing; organize file. 7.00 
12/31/99 Csnferenre with Attorney Blumel cn law sair. - 3 0  
- - - - . -  _ _ _ _ _ _ -  
FCR CURRENT SERVICES RETqDERED 12.39 2629.53 
r-l mr : Q L ~ j  CUXREKT WORK 
- T f r t  34.LP23CE i i -~r ;  
PLEASE R E T ~ ~ R N  A ~ 3 r - y  OF THIS STITEMSICT WIT3 1OCR REMITTPIJCE 
* r  * TyJkTr- YQTJ * * *  
' r y e  V Y - ~ J L I F S ~  D. BAGLEU 
1107 WEST S I X T H  AVENGE 
CHEqfENNE , KY 8 2 0 6 1 
Telephoce (JO") 534-0446 
Fax (3Q7) 637-7445 
ERICKSOTJ , BRY JE 
P.O. E3X 155 
'Js,EEDC.[4, Wy 83122 
PREVIOUS BALPJgCE 
01/13/00 R e v i e w  material from Attorney BLuemel; i e r t e r  to 
Dennis, copy to Bryce. 
01/18/80 Finalize apd send Dennis  Sandersan l e t t e r  on Law 
s u i t .  
O L / ' 3 1 / 0 0  Conference with Dencis Sanderson on pending s u i t .  
FOR CUZRENT SEXVICES RENDERED 
TOTAIL CURRENT WORK 
BZ-,LAJVCE DUE 
PLEASE RXTCXj$ A CO2-T OF THIS STATEMENT WIT3 YOUR RSKITTmCE 
+ *  * TzmTK YCU * * *  
PREVIOUS BkLMtCZ 
WIELTklcq D. BAGLEY 
1107 WEST' SZXTR AVENUE 
CHEYENNE, WY 62301 
Telephsae (397) 634-6446 
Pax (32'7) 637-7445 
02/14/00 Prepa re ,  file and serve mcnthly report for 
December. 
FOR CLRREWT SERVICES ZENDERED 
TOTAL GUi7RENT WORK 
PLEASE RZTURN A COPY OF THIS STP.TEMEP\'T WITH Y?UR XZI"ITT9JZCE 
* * + TK4TQ;$K YGTJ * * * 
WLLLEm D. BAGLEY 
1107 WEST SIXTH AiTEfSliE 
CBEYEhTS3, W-i 82001 
Talephone (307: 634-0445 
Fax (307: 537-7445 
STATZMENT OF SERVICES 
P a g e :  I 
o ; l , , / ~ s / C ?  
101 -73_!4 
PLEASE ?.ETCRK ,& COPY OF' THIS STATEMENT WITH YOVR ?E!.IITTPBCZ 
* * *  TX&NK YOU * * *  
3x1 CESOIJ, BRYCE 
P , 3 .  BOX 3.55 
FREEDOM, WY 83120 
PREVIOUS BALANCE 
WIliLIAiJi I?. EAGTLIESf 
l i 3 7  WEST SIXTH Aij"ENU2 
GHEYEWNE, WY 8 2 0 g i  
Telephcr ie  (507) 6 3 4 - 3 4 4 E  
Fax (337) 537-7445 
TIOURS 
04/05/03 Review Pleadings, w o r k  on P l a n .  2.50 
04/96/00 Work on propsed Plan & Disclosure Statemsnt. 3 . 0 2  
04/~0!30 Call Tom ~avis regarding insurance; teleph~ne 
conference w i t h  Neil Clark; prepare Objection to 
H o t i o ~ :  to Dismiss and to Lift S t a y ;  work an Plan. 10.00 
04/11/00 Work on Plan and Objection; review a l l  
documents; prepare new draft; teleph~ne 
conference with Neil Clark regarding letter and 
agreement. 10.1310 
04/12/00 W ~ r k  cn Plan; fax copy to Mr. 3ass; telephone 
conference with Bryce; finalize Objection to 
Stay; finalize draft of Plan; office conference 
with Eyrce; fax new copy to Iq r .  B ~ s s .  1 0 . 9 0  
0 4 / 1 3 / 0 n  Make additional 'If lnaln revisiocs on prcpcsed 
Plan; prepare new draft of Plan; do Affidavits 
for professional persens and letters; Hexring;  
fax revisions tg !qr. Eass: ?repare and file Order 
alicwing extensicn; finalizs and file Xrnsndrnent. 3.30 
3 4 / ' ~ 4 / 3 ~  3rgazize and review ~aterials; teleph~ne 
sonference with Xs. Sass. 
Page .  L 
05,/03/551 
101 -7135 
C4/15/36 Premare drafc c f  Resistanze znd OI3jection to r Mstlori to Dismiss;-work on P l a n  cnacges and 
Budget Projection; prepare draft of R e l i e f  fror 
S t a y  sn First S e ~ ~ r l t y  Bank. 
4 7 ,  Work 22 PLan; -;ilxzferer?ze 5;1th Bryce;  fi~alize; 
s e r ~ d  DJ Fe6 Ex to B y r c e .  
HOURS 
7. oi l  
~ 4 / 1 9 , ' 0 0  FLPS1: SEC"sr1T'f 3; l i i :K.  Called recjardrng John Deere 
TI. a z s f  zr-Edward and Linda Jeck~ns nave t r a c t o r ?  
k o ~ g k t  it? W5rk on ?:an, wcrk cn Ob-jeztlcn t3 
MGZLCZ to D i s n i s s ,  w3rk 33 F i n c h  Norlon for 
Rellc~ and Order. 5.09 
03/20/'00 Paepzr- and file C e r t i f i c a t e  of ServL~e cn Z r d e r  
a i l r ; w i r l g  2 x t ~ n s ~ o r . i  and on Plan; f i n a l s z c ,  and f i l e  
Plan; s e r v e  Order and P l a n ;  prepsre  N ~ t i i c e ;  f i l e  
and serve Notice; ?repare,  file and serve  
Qkjee5iori to Motion co C l s r n i s s ;  p repare ,  f i l e  and 
serve Motion to Confirm. 10.00 
04/21/00 Telephone conferences with 2yrce on claims f o r  
caxes tin3 o t h e r  claims. - 4 C  
04/24/00 C3riference with Dennis Sanderscn cn Finch suit. . 3 0  
34/27/00 ~cheduling' Hearing with Judge; conference with 
counsel; prepare Motion and Order to Continuance 
to May 24, 2000; conference w i t h  Allen Turner 
regarding Affidavit an2 t a x  returz; finalize 
Motion an3 Crder ;  f a x  to BeLcher f a r  review; file 
and serve Motnon. 2.50 
05/32/03 Letter to Bryce regarding May 2 4 t h  Rearing; 
review pleadings. ' 3 0  
- - - - -  ....---....--- 
FOX CURRENT SERVICES RENDERED 7 3  - 3 0  12094.53 
04/13/00 X e r c x  and mailing costs 
TGTAL CDSTS 
TOTAL CUR2ENT WORK 
18. El 
-....--- 
18. i l l  
PLEASE 23TGkN A C9PY GF THIS STATE!$ZNT WIT2 YOUR ?'EMSTTANCZ 
* * *  THLWK YOU * * *  
PREVIOUS BALPLdCE $12,771; .31 
ilOURS 
ri? 
95:94/00 Prepare and file M ~ n t h l y  'Report; s a v e  copies. . i u  
c i / l : / o o  Call Dennis regarding nuzbir; czll JB Eunt and 
Leave message. -52 
0 5 / l 8 / 0 0  Call JB sunt and leave second message. .40 
35/24/00 O f L i c e  conference; telephn~e conference wlth Ton 
Da- is; conference with Jim Belcher on exhihi~s; 
organize exhibits; preparation for Hearing; 
Hearing; conference with Trustee Bass. 6.09 
5 / 2 5 / 0 0  Coaference w l t h  Cindy Harnett regarding State 
Farm Loan Board question. 
( j / j i / i ~  Co:lferance with Mr. Bass; fax documents 
7- r JR ':'URP,ENT SERVICES RZIJGEKED 
5 / ? 7 / ~ 0  Fed Ex charges 4/18/00 $13.52 
4/23/00 $13.52 
'i'3T.L"u C9STS 
r-,- 777, .L J ,L CUXF.ENT WGRK 
BkL&J!i'GE 13UZ 
PLEASE RETVR?: A COPY CP THIS STATEKENI WITH YOUR RE14iTTP3CE 
* x  * TK'JQ'JK YOU * * *  
ERI CKSCIC, 9Xqf6E 
P . 3 .  BOX 155 
FREEDOM, K Y  63120 
WLLLIXfL1 D. BXGLEY 
1157 WEST SIXTH XbTEKUE 
CHEYENNE, WY e2032 
Tele~hane !30?) 634-0446 
Fsx 3337) 637-7445 
PREVIOUS BALXSCE 
O G / O i / O i i  Telephone conference with C a r l  i i r l cksnn ;  revi~w 
Court  O r d e r ;  organize files, 
06/33/00 Prepare ,  file and s e r v e  May Financial  R e p o r i .  
06/16/00 Conference with Bryce and B i l l  3ass; priority 
mail b e t t e r  to Bryce with C3ur t  Orders, copy to 
B a s s .  
36/33/00 Cofiference with B i l l  a s s  regarding how 1 can 
help. 
FOR CURRENT SERVICES RENDEXED 
TOTAL CURRENT WORK 
E5ALmCE DUE 
P a g e :  i 
O ~ / S O / ' C O  
PLEASZ R~TTl'RN A COPY OF THIS STATEMEZJT WIT3 YOUR RXMZTTXLTCE 
* * x TF:?JJ<K * "" 
CRXCli.SON, ERYGE 
P . * 3 .  BQX 155 
F R Z E L J ~ M ,  %Y 63 120 
WILLIAM 3. BAGLEY 
11Q7 WEST S I X T H  A72ENUE 
CHEYENNE, WY 62681 
Telephone i 3 6 7 )  534-0445 
Fax 1307] 627-7445 
STATEEENT OF SERVICES 
07/12/Q3 R t i - l e u :  Trustee S t a t u s  Report;  letter to Bryce and 
letter to Dennis Sanderson abcut what needs to be 
done. 1.00 
37/28/05 Letter to aryce with bank statements. . 3 0  
--...- - - - - - -  
FOR CURRENT SERVICES RENDERED 1.30 214.53 
07/31/00 Fed Ex cost cn 4/17/2000 
Fed Ex cost on 4/18/2000 
TOTAL COSTS 
- 
TOTAL CURRENT WORK 
BAL-QiGE DUE 
WILLEirLrq D. EAGLE'; 
1107 WEST SIXTH AVENUE - w - r  sZHEvfENNE, f i  1 3 2 0 3 f 
Telephone Tt (307) 639-9446 
fa>: (397) 537-"445 
c 5 / 2 8 / G O  Confe re r -ce  with B i l l  bass regarding need t 
hear from B r y c e .  - 
F 9 K  CURRENT SERVICES RENDERED .29 3 3 .  6Ci 
TOTAL CURPENT WORK 
BAL>JJCE GUS 
PLEASE RETUPJf .F. COPY OF 73IS STATEMENT WIT3 YQU.9 RZMITT-MJCE 
* * *  TXSJfK Y9J * * *  
V;ILLIMq D. BAGLEY 
13.07 WEST SIXTH XVEhVE 
CHEYEE4E, WY 620 03 
PREVIOUS BALPBCE 
05\01/01 CANCEL PER WDi3 
Bi-rLX?JCIE DUE 
PLEASE IIETCP-N A CCPY CP THIS STATEMENT WIT3 YO3R REMITTMTCE 
$c -k THMJK " " X  

FOR THE D1STaCT OF IxJV86t"LTPaG JUN - 6 2000 cP" 
BXYCE EHCKSBN, ) Cast: No. 99-21500 
z CHAPTER 12 
Debtor, 1 
On December 3, 1999, the debtor in possession o f  this chapter 12 estate, Bvce H. 
Erisksan, filed rn &plic&Ian i'or Order Allowkg Retmisn ofr4aomey. The debtor sought 
crserrt trerthori~ kn employ Wiflim Bs~gley. 
In the application, Mr. Bririchoa stated that the aEomey heEd no inrerest adverse to xhe 
estate. In m applie&ion Eled December 29, 1999, W. Ericbcssn disclosed that thc ak&rPmey 
w a  a secured creditor of the eg&te, hotding a mortgage ~n propem of the estate to secepre 
aprepetitiisn claim in the momf o f  $29,175.00. The court ordered that counsel rnust file an 
effid~vie and Rule 2016 disctosure sbtement, 
On Jxfiuary 3,20630, the court indvei%ent& entered the order autkroriaing emp'boyment 
of Mr. Bagiey, even thou& counsel had not Gted the requisite and proper affidavit and 
diselosur~ statcmcnt. rin reInIewesiBzrriness:Equ@menf, lnc: 23 F.3d 3 1 1 (18"" Cir, f 994), 
No objec~an was filed by the United States Tmstee, 
A istcr r6;vicw of the fi le by the court, reflected &,hat a ~ c 2 ~ ~ r e d  cr itor sf the estatc, 
Sirius, LC, was served in care of Mr. Bagley. The cone ordered the debtor lo file a statement 
regarding the nature of h%r, Bagleyk selatlcnsbip to Skius, LC, The; debtor did not eompiy. 
Nobntit a hearing held hiay 24,2000, did the coun realize its enor in authorizing Mr. 
Bagiv's empiopeat. Tire court coneludes Tvlr. Bagiey is d i s~aI iBed  &am representing the 
debtor. 
Pwsarmt lo 14 '&",S,G. !j 327, the trustee may, with the court" approval, ernpHay an 
attorney that does not hold or rwrcsent. an interest adverse to the esiale m d  tvhro is 
disinterested. A chapter 12 debtstor in possession is a fiduciav of the estate, and liIiewise, his 
~atlnsei cmaot halid m intcrcst adverse to the estttte a d  mmf be dishterested. It? re Bwke, 
147 B.R. 78'7,800 (B&. N.D. Okia. 1992). The provisions of 5 327 are applicable to the 
profkssionds employed by a debtor irr possessiofi of a chapter 12 estate, 
Under $ TO lC14), the Code defines rr dis~terested person srs one that is not a creditor. 
Mr. Brzglq is a creditor. claim is for prepetlla-ion a,tb:arnt=j, fees kcuaed, at least in p w ,  
in B previous chapter 1 3  b pky case filed by iW. E ~ c b a n  and his fonner spouse, T%e 
s c c u ~ i y  Lqteresr, in estate property could possibly be a preferential transfer. The divorce of 
the E~C~CIMS may impact the extent t~ wwhj~h the cIkm is valid against t h i s  estate. 
Accordingly, it is OmEmD &at the court's J m u q  3,2000 order a u t h o r ~ n g  Pvlr. 
Erichsn ra ernploy Mr, Bagfey is vacated, and &e application is denied. 
Caf;,c. 9*2!460 Form ~ d :  122 Mtc Date: ObiObjZliifO Of?: 2 Pege : 1 
Tctei mtices mlled.da 3 
Oabtar Erirkson, Bryce N. 5272 Itrstelim Ro&, PO BOX 155, F r e m ,  ifb 83123 
APY Bcsqtey, V I I L i m  a, $107 Ueot Bixth Avem,  C h q m e ,  W BZOCiZ 




Bryce H.. Ericrkson 
5272 Stateilnc Road 
PO Box 155 
Freedom. %Y 63 1 39 
67 
dba 
E Flying 3 Ranch and Farm 
G.S. Bankuptcy Court 
District of Wyoming (Cheyenne) 
Bankruptcy Petition #: 99-21500 









represented by Bryce 8, Erickson 
5272 Stateline Road 
PO Box 155 
Freedom, VvT 83 120 
TBMliZiX TED: 05/22/2000 
Judith S ~ v e t y  
Slitrely & Derncrs PC 
1660 Lincoln Street, Suite 
223 0 
Denver, €33 80264 
303-860-7724 
Ken Mecarhey 
- The Law Offices of Ken 
McCmney, P.C. 
P.O. Box 1364 
Cheyenne, IVY 82003 
307-635-0555 
Fax : 307-635-0555 
Email: 
b~@cyrepgacl. c o n  
M'ifKam D. Bagley 
1 1 07 Sixth .hii.i-eaue 
Cheyenne, RT 820iii 
307-634-0446 




FViiSSittm 3%. Bass 
Chapter 2 2 Slsidiizg Tmsece 
P,O. Box 5 00035 
DenrFer, CO 80250 
303-353-4006 
1 
Filing Docket Text i 
Datc I 
I 1 I -----"--- P- -t---- 
I 1 i 
1 12!03i1999 i - i I'oluntiiiy Petition ail schedules and statements. [ Fi!isg Fee R 210.0'1 1 
t / Receipt ii 424681 [ch] I i 
w-- --r---------- 
- -*--- 4 
t 
1 , 
I 12/03/1999 I 2 j Notice to Consumes Debtor Filed. [chi j I -
-- A&- 1- I i 
1 I 
'i",;03/19(?9 ; - 3 1 Disclosure o f  Compensation By Attorney For OcStor hi the Amount of $ I  
i ; 3,000.00. [chi 
1 
1 
Debtor Bryce W. Erickson To Ernploy William D. i 
i -- 
i red Proposed Order RE: [4-'I] Appfication To E~nploy I 
ley by Bryce H. Enckson [cI.l] I 
*-"- 
I -------- -- 
I 
I 
i Pdeeting of Creditors Ssi~eduled For 1 :00 13/29/99 At F~nmdal Center, 
1 200 West 17th Street Suite 3 10, Chzyeme. Last Day To Oppose i  1 Discharge: 2/28/00 [lk] i 
I I 
: i A~nended Meeting o f  Creditors S~hedrtled For 1:OC) 12/29/99 At 200 1 
r -West 17th Street Suite 3 10 Cheye~snle :Last Day to File Proofs O f  Claim: 




T-M-w-L--A -A- --- 
I 
7 Clerk's Csrtificate af Mailing Re: [O-01 Aixet~ded Cred~tor h4cetlilg sf - 
, Notices: 35. [ch] 1 
I --- -+---A --. " -&"-- I - --.". -- -------- A- -*---- --- 
I 
8 ! Coc;rfs BNC Cert-15c;rts of Sewice Re: [c?-01 Creditor Meeting . F o f  I -




i 12/09/1999 1 9 Courts BNC Czrti5c;:e of Service Re: [O-?] Creditor Meeting . of 
-- i a"-.-.- -, p--d----*Au--------------- A 
*-"-."--*-A& /-- --------- . ----, 
i T-- -- 
I t Notices: 27 wei; sent out. [adkt] ( E n t e z i )  
" - 1 %  - - . - - -  . .-a- ----*--'-------.- J 1 
I I i ! 
1 1 3 9 9  ,HJ I Notice of Appcaraiicr And Reqtiest Poi Service Of Notice By James R' 
/ Belchei for Creditor First Sccurit? Bank. [aoj 1 I i i 
, M ~ - - - ~ - t _ _ _ _ r _ ~ l _ - ~ - - . . - _  -_ __! I
i 




Employ Wiiliain D. Bagley by Bryce H. Eiickson : Compliance Due 
1 
I 
12/28/99 . [chi I I 
I l?i?iji 1999 1 2 1 pplication By Debtor Bryce H. EI~;IC~IOII To Employ iViili8in D. I -
1 Bagley . [chi (Entered: 2 2i3011999) I I 
---- i I - - P ____-A 
I ! 
'1110312000 ; - i 3 1 Order Granting [!2-11 Application To Employ Wiliiain D. Bagley by 
! I Bryce H. Enchson . With Certificate of Mading. [cb] I 
I J 
i I -- 
FM..-",--w*-.-- ----,- -A --A 
I i 
02'15 '2000 - 1 5 i Cer~ificatzte Of Senrice By William D. Badey for Debtor Bryce W. 
, 1 Ericksan Of December 1999 Monthly Report. jch] 
1 t 
1 i 1 
I 03!20/2000 1 1 6 Motion By Debtor Bryce H. Enckson To Extend Time To file Chapter , - i 1 12 Plan . [&I I 
_& A , "- , ---" 1 
By Wiiliani D. Bagley for Debtor Bryce H. i / Enckson Of Monthly Repsrt for 1~2000 and 2/2000. [ch] i 
1 1 i .-- -----..& 1 A-~-%.-" ~ ~ - M & ~ - & A  . . --.--__. e*-.",&A--m--/-h -4 
I i : 03/20/2000 . Notice Pursuant to Local Ba3hptcy Rule 2002-1 RE: [ I  6-11 Motion To 1 
I J i 1 Extend Time To file Chapter 12 Plan by Bryce H. Enckson ; Last Day to I i I File Objections: 3 i 3  1/00 [ch] (Entered: 0312 11'2000) A - - i  -p4.-p I 
I i i i 
O i i 3  112000 : - 19 Objection R y Creditor First Security Bank To [ i 6- I] Motion lo Extend 1 I i 1 Time To Eie Chapter 12 Plan by Bryce H. Enciison [chj I 
I 1 I I 
031'3 1 '2000 20 i h4otion By Creditor I'irst Secunty Bank To Dismiss Case . [ch] i 
-* _- ," -,,~~w ----.-- L ,,------ ..l ------" -----..---.-------.."--  - -.--- 
I I I 
03:3 1i2900 , 31 1 Mot~on By Creditor First Securrty Bank For Relief Fmm Stay [chj I , - 
1 Filrng Fee Pbid in Full RE: L2.1- 2 j Mctan For Relref From Stay by First j 
1 Security Bark [ Pfliilg Fee $ 75.00 Receipt # 633 551 jch] 
1 
i i 
03 3 1 /?009 1 ;12 1 Notice Pursuant to LBR 4-00 1-1 RE: [? i -1 ] Motion Far Relief From Stay 
I 1 by First Seexity Bank . N o h e  Sewed On: 3i3 1/00 : Objec5ioi.i~ to 
i i I 
__LI__---"L- M--
r- - --- --- - -- - A ---- ---------- 
2 ---- - -:---------------------- 
-------- 
I 
i Motion Due: 41 12/00 [cQ 
I 
I 
I -  I -+--&---A "-A i 
i- ---I I (1313 112000 1 23 i Notice Pursumi to Local Rankiuptcy Rule 2002-1 La: [20-1 j Mot~on To I 
I i. foils: 1 Dismiss Case by First Sccunry Bank ; Last Day to File Ob~r-t' 
1 I 1 1/24/00 [cq 
! 1 - - I 
i 
I H e z u ~ g  [If Objecitons filed] Re: 120-11 Moti011 TO 1) 1 
i First Security Bag& Scheduled For 10:30 5/16/00 a s  
1 Courtroom, 2 120 Capitol Avenue, 8th Floor, Cheye 
24 i Notice o f  Hearing Re: [ 16-1 'j Motion To Extend Time To file Chzpter 112 
&
1 Plan by Bryce H. Erickson Scheduled For 10:00 4i i  3/00 at Telephone 
1 Conference [ch] 
i -- - 
-J=e -- ~i Sewi=ag!Cy foriebtoi  ;;G: R. 
E~ckson Of Mon&ky Fiamcial Report for 312000 . [ch] 
4 + . ,, -p - ,, , , - - 
26 1 Application By Debtor Bryce ti. E~ckson  To Employ Edward L. Nelson -
1 Realty . [chl 
I i I 1 
t 04/07/2000 27 1 A4F"pLication By Debtor Bryce H, Erickson To Employ T m e r ,  
I i -- i 
1 i Accountmt . [ch] i 
I i 
I 0411 1!2000 1 a Order Regsirding Complimce IVith Rules Re: [26-3 1 Application To 1 
I Employ Edwzrd L. Nelson Realty by Bryce K. Erinnckson ; Con2pfimce 1 Due 412 :/00 . [chj 1 
I 
1 
r 04/13/2000 -- 20 j Amended Schedrsles D, F, S ary And Certificate of S(=r\'ice. [chj I 
i 
! Pilicg Fee Paid in Full RE: [30-11 Anended Schedules [ Filing Fee R 
q 3.00 Receipt X 4347'71 [ch] i 
1 ! 
04,i?iZOC3 i '_! 1 Objection By Debtor Bryce He Erickion To [?I-I] Motion For Relief 
i From Stirb. by First Secihrity B a ~ k  . [chi 1 1 I 
1 I 
i We;iring Held Re: / 16-1 3 Motion To Extend Time To fife Chapter 12 i 
i 1 Plan by Bryce ti. Eri-kson . Lao] I 
I 





%fotion By Debtor Bryce H. Erickson To Continue Hearang Re: t30-11 1 
Mo"iion To Dismiss Case by First Secui-;ty Bank, [2 I - 11 M o t i ~ n  For 
Relief From Stay by First Security Bank . [ch] I i 
i 
45 Order Gimting [?7-11 Application To Employ Allen Turner, Accoantmt 1 -
# 
I 1 by Rrgcc H. Ericksc:~ . With Certificate o f  Mailing. [ch] 
i 
L 1 
O5/02'2000 - 46 1 Order Granting 126-ij Appiicatien To h p l o y  Edward L. Nelson Realty 1 I by Bryce W .  Erickson . With Certificate ofla; i ing.  [ch] I I 
i I 
(i5i04i2000 i 47 / Order Requiring Coinpli=ce RE: j39-I] Motion Fur ReliaCFroln Stay I 
I - 1 
; by Bryce H. Eri~kson .With Ccnifisate o f  Mailing. [lk] I , 
95:041200!) 1 $f-f I Order Scheduling Hearlng RE: j? I-: ] Motion For Relief From Stay by ' 
I 
I / First Security Bank Scheduled Far 2 :30 5/24/00 at Bankmptcy I 
1 I Courtroom, 8th Floor, 2120 Capitol Avenue. Cheyenne, my. [ik] I 
I & 
I 49 / Order Grmtiiig j44-11 Motion To Continue He&uing Re: [20-I] Motion 05/04/2000 1 -
I 1 To Dismiss Case by First Securrty B d ,  {21-11 Motion For Relief From ! 
i ty Bank by Bryce H. Erlckson Hearing reset To 1 :30 1 
i tcy Courtroom. 8th Flosr, 2120 Capitol Averme, I 
i 
1 / Cheyenne . Wtii Certificate nfMai"i!ir;g. [Ik] 1 i 
I 
05/08;2000 ; - 50 ) Certificate Of Scn-ice By 'filliam D. Hagiey for Debtor Bryce i. 
1 Enckson Of MontbJy Report for 4/00 . jch] 
1 
I 
I I I 05:23/2000 I 51 Tlec t io rz  By Creditor Internal Revenue Service To Coniimaticin of I 
i - 1 1 [36-I] Chapter I2 Plan . [ch] (Entered: 05~4/2C)OCi) i i 
i Hearkg Held Re: [%-I] Motion To Dismiss Case by First Security 1 
i Bank, [2 1 - 13 Mot~on For Relief From Stay by First Security Ba&, Court 
took both matters "under advisement." [aoj (Entered: 05,'25/2000) 
i / 
95 '26i2006 - 52 aa7Jec"~osn By Creditor First Security Bank TO Co~~fir~xatiiion of [36- Ij 1 
I 
i ; Chapter 72 Plan . [ch] 
I I 
05 2 112900 ! - 53 , Gbjection Creditor State i;f fJjyorr,ing Farm Laan Board To 
I : r Ca~~firrxation f [36-I] Chapter 12 Plan . [ a ~  j 
i 
06/06,2090 i 54 i Order Vacating Pexiag RE: Corafim;ition oSChap'cer 112 Plan IV'itb 
i - 
i i  Certificate o f  Mailing. [ch] 





! 06.108;'2000 ; 3 1 Certificde Of Service By William D. Bagley for Debtor Bryce H. 
I 
i I Erickson Of MonthJy Fkar~cial Report for 512000 . [ ~ h ]  
i i 60 1 Status Repart and Request by Tmstee William Murray Bass to Hold (he ; -
1 Filing of a Plm of Reorganrzation in this Case in Abeyance Until 
/ October 15.2000 . [chi i I
- -- -- -- 
i 6 4 Notice Pwsumt to Local B - icy Rule 2602-1 RE: [60-i j  Motion to 1 I Hold h e  Filing of a Plan of Reorgmizaiion in this Case in Abeyance , 
1 Until October t 5,  2000 by JVillim Mlrrray Bass; Last Day to File I i 
1 Objections: 8/10!00 [Ic] (Entered: 07ii 8/2000) i 
i 
62 1 Status Report filed by Trustee Uriiiiam M 3 - i 
---.-&L - 
1 ----Y 
63 Motion By Trilstec Williail~ hlmrj, Bass for Debtor to Obtain New - I j i Counsel . and To Compel Debtor to file an h e i i d e d  Plan o f  I 1 Reorganization [ao] - 
----I... ," ,,,. ,' -.- 
i 
_/l* A&-&&&)_--- -'---'+ 
63 1 Order Suggesting Debtor Obtain ?Jew Counsel and File an Amended 3 - J I Plan of Reorganization RE: [63-I] Motion for Debtor to Obtain New 1 
1 Counsel and [63-21 Motion To Compel Debtor to fife an Amer~cBeJ Plan I 




I Update Deadlme; hmended Chapter 12 Plan Due on 12!15100. See order 1 
/ eod 10:19/00 [nil 
i I 
! 1 E3!2000 1 5 j Disclosure of Conpasation By Aticrney t a r  Debtor Iil :he Amount of S 
1 
i ) 185.0 0 per bow. [cb] (Entered: I 1 '39111009) I 
--e---s.".-* : -- w ,  --- r- ' -  " ' '- -- I 
, 1 1:28/2000 1 iipplication By Debtor Bryce Ii. Erickaon To Employ Judith SMvely I 1 
7-d---d 
- * - - - -  
7 - i i 
I \ and Ken McCadney . [ch] (Entered: I Ii29/2000) 4 "---.- 
t I 1 1/29/2000 , a , CrrtiBcate Of  Setvice By Ken McCmney O f  [64-1 j Veniied Statment 1 
1 i and 166-11 Application To Employ Judith Shivel! and Ken hlcCvrrney 
i 1 by Bryce W. E~ckssn . [ch] i 
t 4iL 1 -_-___-A 
68 Order Granting [6h- I j r\pplication To Employ Ken McCmmey by iir)rce l2iOIi2000 , A
1 Eriekson With hCle&Lficate s f  Mailing. [&J I I 
P ,  ~ -- -- 
I 
12,'OI Q,OL.O 1 hi) I Order Regarding Compiimcc With Rulcs Re: [66-I] Application To 
i 
i 
i Employ Judith Shively by Bryce H. Erjcksoa ; Cornpiimce Due 
1 1 121'2 5/00, [ch] 
1 i 
12:10/2030 i \ hlotion By Ken McCartney for Dcb;or Bryce H. Erickson for Sliivciy & 1 
I t 
j 1 Demos, P.C. To Appear Pro Hac Vice . [&I 1 
r-- -- - 1 I 
i 1211 '112000 27 Cel-tificate Of Senrice By Ken McCartney for Debtor Bryce H. Enckson , 
I i 01-'[71-I1 -Motion for Shfvely & Demos, P.C. To Appear Pro Hac Vice i 
I 1 by Ken M c C m e y .  [ch] i 
i i 
i - i 12.'?0/2000 73 / Order Granting [71-1 j Motion for Shiveiy 81 Demos, F.C. To Appear i 
1 I Pro Hac Vice by Ken M c C ~ n e y  . With Certificate oEMaiiing. [ch] 1 
I 1 
13'2 i:'?000 i 74 1 Affidavit RE: [71-I] Motion for Shively 6 Deinos, P.C. To Appe;ir Pro 
I - 
i r Hac \'ice by Ken McCdney [ch] i 1 
i 
12/21/2000 75 1 Cchficate Of Senice By Iudirh Shiveiy for Debtor Bryce H. Enckson 1 
I 1 1 Of 174-11 Affidavit . [chj I -
! I 
7-7 -, - ,  , A I 
i 
' 120  1~2010 : - 76 Mobon by Debtor Bryce 3. Enckson To Confim [70-11 Amended Pian 
12,'2"1'2000 j - "'7 1 Eotice Pursuant to Locat BxLbprey Xule 2002-1 RE: j76-11 PJTotion To 
I Confilm [70-1; Amended Plan by Bryce FI. B-ckwn : Last Day to File 
i ! Objections: I/IS;OI [ch] 
I 
1 
/ Hear i~g Re: [76-11 Motion To C o o h  [TO-I] Amended Plan by Brjrn-c 
I H. Eriekson ; Confirmatian Searing Set For 8:36 2! 1/31 dc Telephone , 
i Gcsnkrence [chj 
t I 
i i I 




i i 04/02!2081 I e H, Erickscsa To  can^ [88-11 Amended Plan 
I i i 
i I 
8511 5/200! 1 / Nillute Entry IRE: [S&- 2 1 Amended PIm. Confimsriun of ths  plan 
i 
1 1 denied. [ao] 
96 1 Minute Entry Order Denying [8 8- 11 Amended Plan. 13!m amendmends i 05/15/2001 1 
1 required for confirnation: I / 3-year period to sell m s t  include any I 
1 i 
I 1 auction proposal, 21 after 3 years, all secured creditors may proceed wrth 1 




I stated clearly. amount, when, etc., 41 attorney kes - 58Ci[l?] submitted to 
1 court with oppo ity to objection, 51 acreage and lo~atlctn to be sold 
1 must be clearly set forth. Ten days to file amended plan. if csnfimed, i 
I debtor uriil be reqadrred to senre plan con5rmation order on all t 
i I 
I creditors. wttb Certificate of Mailing. [ao] 
# 
1 
E 0 3  0 1 j Thrd PP+l"iended j36-ll Chapter 12 Pim [ch] 
x I 
I 
I 06!04/2(1C 1 1 98 i Order Granting Motion to Co~ifinn [97- I ]  h~endildsd Plan . [ch] I 
I t t 
L-P-P -- , ,  - --- ,~ ~ , 
74 
i 
06~84i200 1 Order Requiring that Notice be Given Xe: [Y 8- 1 j Order Coniini~ing 1 i
, Chapter f 2 Pln Notice Due: 6ilZiOI [chi I  
1 
I 06/20/2001 i Ceitificate Of Smrice By Judith Shiveiy for Debtor Bryce H. Enckson 
i 
s ! I Of f47-11 Ahnended Plan, [%-I 1 Order Chapter 12 Ptn . [ch] 1 I 
1 
05302/2003 
I M~tice of Change of Address Filed by % y i i l i ~  M, Bass . (Deputy Clerk, 1 
ao) (Entered: 05;06/2002) 1 
I 
F:nal Appi~cation for Coapensa"lion for Judith Sbivetyl Attiirnej. I 
Period: to, Fee: % f 1798.6 3,  Expex~ses: 3. Filed by Judith Shkvely. (degh, 1 
) (Entered: 0710232002) I 1 
d
Cover Sheet for -4;lpplication for Profess-local compensation Filed by 
i 
1 
Judrth Shively attorney i"9r Bryce K. Erickcorz (related elacunner~tis)~). i 




Notice Pursuant to LBR 1002-1 Kc. Fiiicl @piicanonfoi. Ccf?zpenraiior: 
for Juditfz $:hive& Atromey Filed by Bryce H. Erickscjn (related 1 






Affidavit Ke:First md Final Application to Pay compensation, Notice 1 
ancf cover sheet Filed by hdi th Skxively attorney for Bryce H. EIZckson 
# 
(related documenl (s)~,  m. PJ-3). (dcgh, ) (Entered: 07102i2002) I 
I : 
I 07!01/2002 106 1 Affidavit Re: Application ibr attorney fees, notice and cover sheet Filed 1 
1 / by Judith Shively attorney far Bryce H. Enckson (related t , 
i i document(s)m, 102, ;031. (dcgb, ) (Entered: 0?!112/2002) I I 
I f i 0711 512002 1 107 i Affidavit of Alias Service Filed by Bryce H. Erickson (related I -  / documei~tjs) 104. 05, 106, 102. 103). (dccs, ) (Entered: 0'711 6/2002) 1 
-- i I_LCw-- - --- 
h e n d e d  Notice Pursuant to LBR 2002-1 Re: Firtal d~ppiieatSonfo~ 1 
Com9ensation for Judith Shtiiely, Filed by Bryce H. Erickson (related I 




Order Granting Application For Co~npenrstion (Re!ated Doc 5 m>hs j 
Judith SSELively, Fee awarded: S 1 1 798.13, Expenses aivardsd:$ Signed on 1 
8!: 94%32. (dcao, ) 1 I 
I .,-&I_- I I_---- ,-.- -, "I -il _ ' Y I . . " . - I ~ ~  ---& _V---_ i--d--&d,- --- ----L-A-- - 1 
I i I 1 
I 09iO3/2902 1 110 1 Objection to Claim i"2 IRS $3 Carl H B.ichcn. 94 Bonn.i-iile C g u n . ~  
~ ~ ~ L C _ ~ ~  
1 Implemenf, 8.5 Ac'ti~n Avotor Sports, &7' Anrhkiony Finch el al, #8 Firsl 




) Qfikiice, Y i i  K e l j e l ~ t r a i ~  E teljlrises. I ~ c ,  # I d ,  Wyoming Oljice ofstate j i I i Land & Investrraenrs, $ I S  Jf~ashington GtOun~ Bank $16 Kcndail 
I i I 
i ; Jerzh<ns, P I  7 Kath-y Epiclaon, # J  9 First Securi& Bank; w~ith Notice of i 
I i ; Erne to 0bjec1; EDFO: Y D/I,"Oll Filed by Bryce I-I. E~ckson. [dcao, 1 , 
# 1 
a - ,  -*-, - ' -
i 
09ii?3/20&"2 I / Objection,Respansc Dzadliile Updated (related d o c u m e n t j s ) ~  Debtor's 
1 
1 Objectioa to Claims j. Objections due Sy I Oib:2QU2. "ciio. ) I i 
I I I 
09/04.'3002 ( Anended Notice Pursuact to LRR 3002-1 Re: 0hjca.m ;o Claims Filed 1 
I j by Bryce M. Erickson (related docment(s)m]. 0"ngections due by j 1 1 10:'7;2002. (dcao: ) i 
i 1 i I 
09!13/20Q2 j I I L k ~ e n d e d  Affidavit of Sewlce Fiied by Bryce 6-B. Edckssil (related 1 1 1 d o c m e ~ ~ t @ ) m ,  [I). (dcgh9 ) i 
I 
(i0/25/2002 1 - i li ppligation &r Campenaat~onfor Prc-Peiibiirr and Post-Pefiriun (loits I 
L i and Atrurneysf Fees for James R. Belcher. Creditor's Attorney, Pel-nod: ; 
1 ' to, Fee: $22043.80, Expenses: $ i 693 9 3 .  Filed by Jmes  R. Bsicber. 1 
i i 
I (dens, ) (Entered: 09/26/2002) 1 
I i i 
a 89/27/2002 V 114 ' Ordcr Regacting G ~ m p ~ i x ~ c e  Mrltlil Rules re: Application for 
1 Compensation (related d a c u m e r . l ( s ~ ~ / .  Compiimce due by i - - - /  
I 
I 
1 10/15/2002. (dcns, j 
i 1 
09/29/2002 1 i;i 1 YNC Certificate of h4niiii1g. Scivicc Dale 09/29/02. (Related DOC d 114) : 
I i 1 (Admill.) (Entered: 03130/2002] I I I 
I f i f O/92;,12002 1 16 1 Notice Pursuant to LBR 2002-1 Re: App I - -  L 
I i Pre-Petition and Post-Petitinn Cosrs Filed by Urciis Fargo Bank 1 
1 I 
I I Wyoming, N.A. (rekited dosument(s)m). Objectior~s due by i 
i 
i r 011 sizooz. (dc&, J t I 
-*---- -*---- 
i 
Order Regarding Coinpiia~ce Wirh Rules Satisfied P.c: App!isaiiun Ccr i 
I ; Compensatbn (related document ( s )~) .  (related docu~nent(sju), i 
i (deb: ) I 
I 
I I 
101072002 ; II: Response toObjsction to Claim ?2 RS, Piled by Inte=ai Revenue 
I 
I 1 i Service (relsted document ( s )~) .  (dccs, ) 
I 
1 101 i 9/?002 Order Scheduling Hcanng on Debtor's Objectirn ts Clriil o f  IRS and 
I 1 creditor's response thereto, (related document(s)U, E l .  Hearing 
i i I 

1 i I i 
I 3 / 2 2  1 Order Gmting Motion Re: Debtor's Motion fcir Eale Filing, (rlcjm, I 
i I I 
4 2/043X00 2 - i 13 0 i Motion for Late Filiilg ofMotiunfor Approvab oj-Stipulatim Resoti~ll~lg i 
i 1 Debhrk Objpction to -Alloillance ofeliiim qfhternsr! Revenue &mice , 
1 Filed by Bpce H, Er̂ ll&scan. (dzns, ) I i 
I 
12/04':002 ; I Motionfor- Approval ofSt@uiahon Resohdng Debtor's Objeaion :o I 
i 1 
I 1 Alio14nnce of Claim qfinfrmni Revenue Ssmice wrrh Notice qfl inre to 
I 
I 1 Object 040 116/01) Filed by Bryce H. Enckson, idcns, ) Modified on 1 
i 
I j 1216 '2002 to correct Idfo date [dcic, ). ? , 
I i 
5 32 1 h";tlosr_for Order E;L.tabilshingAllo~ved Claims Filed by Bryce H ' 12/04/2002 1 
1 
I 1 Ertckson. (dms, ) 
12!04/2002 1 - I33 1 Certificde of Service Filed by 3ip-c Fi. Encksoii (Pmposcd Order on , 
1 1 Wells Fmgo $a& 14Tyrr;mke - NA's Request for t"iliorsi"ance o f  Pre- ! 
1 1 I petit~on m~d Post-petition Costs rind Attorney's Pees and the Debtor's I 
! i Objection Thereto), (dcns, ) Correct aBachent(s) added csn 12/5/2002 1 i I (dclc, 1. ! 
1 I I 
I l2iOSI2002 ! Ccrmetfve Ents",; (related docura~ent(s)~) .  (dslc, ) i 
1 -- ,--- i -. , . , , , .'&--J 
I 
. Senrace Date 12/05/if2. (Related DOG ## J29) 1 
1 
I 
I 12;OQ12002 t Corrective Entry (related d3cume:1t(s)u). (ddc, 1 
i 
12 'I 7 '2002 i Supplemental Application for Ceopnpensation Pre--petition and Post- 1 
i 
i pedfion and Costs for J m e s  R. Belcher, Albmey, Period: to, Fee: I i i 1 
i 1 $22843-00, Expenses: $16573.93. Filed by James R. Befcher. ( d e b ,  ) ! 
I 
Objediion Ceadlinc Updated re: Suppinne~~tal Application hi 
1 
I 
1 Conapensatio3 Pre-pe"Liliom ar~d Past-petition m d  Costs for J m e s  R. ,  
1 Bef cher, Attorney, Pexiod: to, Fee: $22043.00, Expenses: S t  693.543. 
l I 1 Filed by James R. Beicher (related docuiueilt(a)m). Objections due b y  
1 32,'30/2002. (ciegh? ) i 
, Joint Objection to ,";mended and Supplemental i i ~p i i c i l t i~ i~  fCSr I  
Compensation Pre-petition a id  Post-petition and Costs Filed by W ~ l l i a , ~  1 
Id. Bass . Bryce EI. Enckson (related doc;lement(s)m). (dcns, ) 
--- ---..-.." --- i --.-' 
I 
Joint OQ~-lectioi~ to Supplemental Application for Gompensat~on Pre- i 




151 / Motion fir ReSeae of Modgage to Secwe Payment of Prumlsscr~ Note -
I to Sirius LC Filed by Bryce R. Erickson . ( L 4 ~ a c h e n t s :  X 1 1 
"JoposediTJnslped Order) (dccs, ) (Entered: 07/22/2003) i 
i 52 2 Order on Mudun for Release of Mortgage (Related Doc "$:I (dccs, j / 
I --- --I 
153 1 BNC Certificate of Mailing - PDF Document. No. ofNoticcs: 5. Senrice 1 -
! Date 07/24/03, (Related Doc # - 1 s )  (Admin.) (Entered: 07/35E003) i I 
I 
Resistace to Motion (related d o c u ~ a e n t ( s ) : ~  Motion For Release of 1 




i)8~01/=1903 1 Order Vacating Order on Motion for Releasc: o f  Modgage (related I 
i I 
a d o c u m e n t ( s ) : ~  Order on Generic Motion). Hearing on Motion # 
i I Resistance to be heid by Telephone Conference on h p s t  13, 3003 at 
I i 
I 9:00 a.m. (dcjm, ) i 
i - --" , --- &-& 4 
i I 
09.03,'2003 156 1 BNC Ccutificate of Mailing - PDF Docuilient No. ofNotices: 6. Service j 
t ! 
1 t - 
i 157 / Hcdnny Heid: Minute Order Denying Motion for Release oC54aiiyage ' -
1 (related docurnen t ( s ) :~  Generic Motion). (dcao, ) 
I 
'5fi 1 BNC Certiecate of Mailing - PDF Docummt. N o  of Notice: 5. Service 1 
/ Date 08/16/03. (Related Doc -k! (Admin.) (Entered: OSi1?/20(i3) j 1 
i 
/ Application for Compensation for Ken McCmtncy , Debtor's Attorney, 
Period: 1 1/27/2000 to 8/14/2003, Fee: $8 13.50, Expenses: $2 1.50. . I 
Filed by Ken McCar*;ney . LBR 2002 Ci'ujediun Deadline: !@I 5i2003. ; / (Attachments: 8 1 ProposediCinsigncd Order) (dccs. ) (Entered: i 
i osir siaoos) 
i I 
I 
J6J 1 Order Crmting ;-application For Cornpensstion (Related Doc k m) for i 
Ken McCamq, Fee awarded: $813 .SO, Expenses awarded:$3: .iO j 
I (dc&, 1 i 
I 1 i I ! 161 1 BXC Cehficete of Mailing - PDF Document. No, of Notices: 5. Serfice , 1 6  1912003 
1 1 Date 2 0119'03. (Related Doc if m') (Admin.) 
[- -...--- ~ ~ - - " .  i - - . - - p i i - - - - d , - -  .i 
i ! 
I 1?9/21320Q4 162 ! Objection to Clam with Notice of ?"me to Object. Filed 71~. Brjce H. 
i -  
1 Erickson Objections due by 101 1 6 '2001. (dcdl. ) Addiiio~al I 
I 
1 1 
1 attachent(s) added on 9/2@/2004 (dcdi, ). I 

i'?ryan 1) S ~ ~ i t k ,  Gsq. - ISB Kc. 441 1 
B. J. Dnsec~il. Esq. - ISB No. 7019 
!a@C;&%TH, SMITE1 & LASSQCBL~TES, PLEC 2068 A! 13 Ri"l 3 
P 0 Box 5073 1 
4 : 4 Shoup .A\wen~e 
ilia110 Fails, Xciahil 83405 
T ielcpt~one: (208 1 524-073 1 
;dci"ax. (208) 529-3: 66 
?-HE DISTRICT COiilRT OF THE SIXTH JVDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
ST?\TE OF IDAHO, IX Ah33 FOR THE GC)I2W?'U OF CAIUBOL' 
SiRI'C'S LC, a 'ix~yoming Linzrted 
Li ib i i i i~  C O ~ F ~ I ~ .  J 
i 
Plaintiff> ) Case No, GV-04-284 
! 
vs ) OBaCTION TO ALLeBbiEWG 
) \3'lEkEAk% BAGLEY TO TESTIFY AS 
1 EXPERT AND MOTION 'TO 
13RI-CE 1-1. ERICRSOLZ'. -4XD ASY PERSON CONTINUE TMAL SETTING 
CiA1Mli"i'G L3-DER B'rT OR TIlROUGH i 
BRUCE II* ENCKSON rn AND TO TRE 1 
RE 4L PROPEiiTY DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: 1 
i 
d'ilRfB0L.J GOLKTY. IDAHO: I 
J 
TOM SSRXP 5 SOUTH. RmGE 46 E.B M., 1 
Pr' SLCTIOF 27: LOTS 1 ,&YD 2, XI  '2. \ 
:<I471 14, EXCEPT TI-IEEFROM TIRE S 1 
,*;El '4 ?<tikr\i 7'4 S"J4Ii.4, i 
OBOTCTX$BN 10 ALLOWING MTLLaCAbZ BAGLEY "IT3 TESTIFY A S  EXPERT AND 
_WOTZON 'TO CBNTPNUE TRIAL SETTING - 1 
F 1CLIES.i;TS1BDSi745\\Pieadmgs04& Obj Expert Monos Contmuc d:~c 
COR'IES NOW defendar~t, Bryce 11. Encksors iLEncksua"r. h> and ~I-~rough i a ~ s  cvtti:sel of 
ie~ord ,  B. J. Driscoil, Esq., of rise fir111 c)f McGW+Til, Sh4ITX1 & ASSOCLAiTES, PLLC, and 
j'urcttant to Idaho Rules i?f Ciml Pmcedwe 'ltXbi(4). 20!e)(l,1. axid 37, ant: the Order for 'I'rral, Pre- 
Ti.,tf Sci~edule, and Prte-TriaI tlo~~ferinnce filed in rhls case 0~1,4tlgust 9, 2!&7. objects to the couii 
* *  
ailowmg il'rll:a:n Sagley ("Baglcy ) to test& at trra! as an expert for the plaiugtrff. 
This Objectinn a d  h4n;ion i s  made 011 Lt!i;: grol;ncjs and for the reasuns that tile coun 
111d1c;;ted at tile hearing Iield on June 6,2008 tliat it would ailiow Bagley lo testif) at rriaJ as a1 cxpe:? 
cr en ttzougil 111s plaiiziiff r"ai2ecl to disclose Bagiej as an expert witness i : ~  "tie plaintiffs d lsco i re l~  
i-i responses and failscli to rdet~iilnq him as an expert witness in its trial w k ~ ~ e s s  1 t. >pecjiicalIy, the 
piaiztiff fiiileci to provide '?be sisbstalce of arzy iipini311, or other testrmer;~ that tile expert 1s 
expeetecl to grve at trial of this cmse" arid the ""specific facts hnb data or1 M hich such i)pi~:io~~s are 
i based" as Erickson requested iti discot~ery. Tfis plaimir%f&iJed to ""disclose in w~iting" Bagley as a11 
expeit witness "'togetlrer with a summary of "lye testimoizy" Bagley intends to offer. ,See Qsder for 
Trial. Pre-'Trial Schedule, and Pre-Trial C'oi~ferznce filed in tkis case on Akdgust 9, 2007. 
In Idaho. a court's failure to exclude expert tssrimonj that itwas not properly disclosed a1d that 
pre-jud~ces the oppasisg party constitutes arr abuse of diserecrcz;.. GtlZ7ak I' ,?a,?., 137 Icld~o 243,347 
(Ct.App. 2002). f he Clark court explained as follcws: 
[Flailure to meet the requirerrie~~ts of Rde  25 ""vpis"caI@" results in exclusion 
iil tile proffered evidence. The potential forprejuclice lo the opposlng party fr3m tile 
a&~~ission f elkisnee that was :lot discrliosed in drscovery isparticular& ncrcr'e wirh 
respect to expert testinzony. for as the cowt naied ir! ii"au7nzcr, -"[eKfective eross- 
See ir~terrogamn No. 2 m the Res2onse to Dzrendant erycs E.-:c~son's Frrsi Set of I n t e r r o ~ ~ t o r ~ e s  ra Slrrus LC 
alcl Reqsests for P rod~c t~oa  f 9ocu11zents &ached as Exh~iilb:? ".2" "i orhe Affidavit of "u 9il)risco" !axed iclq 9, 
2008. 211eady cn file with the coun. 
OBJECTION TO ALL0\%3KG S,%'ILLlA4M BAGLEU TO TESTIFY AS EXPERT AND 
MOTION TO CONTZNUE TNAL SETTIKG - 2 
F CLIEXTS\BDS 7452 P!eadmgs\048 Obj Expert Mcitmn Coi~tmbe doc 
excrntr'raation CIJ- un e-xptlrt ~vi tn  ess requires i~~ltdvalzce prepamtion, 'kid "effective 
rebztfric~;l requires adva~tce bsnnwbedge rfllize Cine offesnti~jeofg. ofthe ofher side.'" 
id  iciiclng itacJr?wr Ford 5i4iloior (' i t , I70 Idaho 86, 89 (1 991 1) (emphasis added). 
The Radifser court expiairaed as foflova s: 
1-i i s  f ~ ~ a d a n e n t ~ l  that opportusliry be had far full cross-exminatio~~, m d  this 
cdn~aot be dn~re proper!) in n ~ a i ~ y  eases without resort to prenizii Jiscoueq-. 
parhicu1a1-1~. when expen uatnesses are invcrlved . . . Before an attorney can even 
hope i-o d:al on ~ross-i.xa~~~~itaation wi21 ar; unfavorable expert opinion be [or s i~ej  
inus: iiati: solne idea o f  the bases of that opinion and the data relied upon. If an 
.~tkorneq.. IS required to awart examination at uial lo get this information, he [or she] 
often .tviil have too little tirncr to recogt~ize and expose vulnerable spots in thc 
testiln0:lv 
Sta11.L.x:~. 455.485 (1962)): see td,>r j;l;i;l?$:11'~~ v i)2n0-~~asi Corp , 123 Ida110 205.217-2.1 8 (1933) 
rpsting that 1.it.C.P. 26ie)il) obligates cour~sel to s t ~ p l e m e ~ ~ t  discovery responses, par-ticblarly the 
0:le of tile main i s s~es  cil trial in this case will be Baglep's rnalpractie:: in representing 
Eniicsoi~ despite concurrent coi~flists of interest and by faiiirag to represeat Ericicson nit11 the 
re~uisite stzndard of care in b a ~ ~ u p t c q .  Betern~ination of ~ i ~ e  ; ~alpraclice issue requires expert 
tesiirnony. Based on the plaintiffs failure to suppienle~rt its discovery responses re~xCIng its 
ir?rte~~eiorz lo call Bagtey as an expert witnesses. I.R.C.P. 26(e)(i i. a r~d  its failure to disclose Bagley 
and ' i s  opinioi-as in the plalntrff s trra! vi7itness d~scl~sures zs required by the order f i r  T:-lal, Pre- 
7 rial Schedu1.c. 531d i3re-Trial Cordzrerlce., Ericksort will be prejudiced Ltt trial if Bagley is i?lJovved to 
:cs".fj as a:il ex~-el"i because Enc:,son has beer1 pxei tnted fZ.3111 ilisci;?v~ri,~g the opinions Bagley :nay 
OBJECTION TO RLLOMIYG SAGLEY TO TESTIFY A S  EXPERT AND 
~PO"PICPK TO CONTINVE TRIAL SETTIKG - 3 
F ~CL:En'TS sSDS\7d5iiPleadrngs~0S8 0b; ExpeT,.h4otion Contmua 2oc 
offer a14  1;"ie basis ifiir those opinions. Erickson ixiiil be prevented from effee-tir.eEy cmss-exzumiiling 
- 
i:agicy and rebutttng his "ies"ii;;loi:y at trial. 
Furtl~er~. Er~ckson moves this c o x t  prsuanx to Xdahi~ Rule of Civil Procedure U e i ( 3 )  fr?r 
C(PR",;IIU~~"~'PC~ of tile trlai m tELs miitter until such t ime 3s the plall~riff cozqiies wit11 Ruic C6 a ~ d  
tl~iclti.scs 'FSapiey a\ ail eslpcrt, 11;s 0;3iiiiou;s, aild tile facts rehed upon to firvar rizose opinlo~~s, 2nd 
~:i:cr! Erlc,\so~r has m opportncrnlty to depase Bagis> regardmg hrs expert npin~ons 3x1s Lw:~o~i :s
made or, rhe grour~il~ and for the reasons Ilia: Errcksorr mill slifli3r S U ~ L I Z ~ ~ I ~  prtq',id~ce ~f nor 
per;-rct~eA io discovilir Efagiey-s opinions and examins Bag1e.v regardrx~g those opin:nns 2s part of 
EIIGLS~JII~S prepibra~ion for ~rikl. 
This 3bajecti;c 315d hriotion is based or1 i l ~ ~  Objectiii;? and -Motion, the ;3ia:ntifCs tVltness 
D:sc!osure dated \Gay 2 ,  2938, and the Response to Defendant Brqce Erickso.il"s First Set o f  
;i~re~-ror;atiir:es lo S~rius LC and Requests for P;odui;trnn of Doc.umerils aziaciied as Exhibit '-A"' to 
the Affidr~itoof B. 5. Driscoif dated May 9,2008, already cn file with the eour;. md the court ~ C C O I ~ S  
mcI fiiz herein. 
Errcicson requests oral argument. 
DliTFD this ,/a day of Jonc. 2008. 
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2u;i-l exhibit: lists clad expert: rej3or"lo him athie May 2, 20638 pretrial corderenee illstead of 
maiilng those same doculnents to hi121 on the hfay 1.2008 deadline because this wcj-iiid save both 
parires the delay mcl cast of naailicg. Mr. Larson agreed eo exchange the docirmer~ts at the 
(7) -bit thz pretr-is! cr;nferc:~cs hfay 2. 3008. ii~e panies excl~aa~ged their trizi 
cxkibits a d  :mess lists and R1r. Larsor~ reccIi.cd a copy of Shiveiy's expert report. 
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1. RAG1,EU CANNOT =COVER ON THE PROMISSORY NOTE AND 
SECIJFC1'TY AGREEMENT BECAUSE TME 'TUNSAGTION IS 
PKO-wLAWFT_TLAND VOID CWDER WSOMXNG LAW. 
111 1999, %'yomirig followed l&?yonning Rule of Professional Conduct 1 .S(a) that 
Xiule 1.8. Conflict of interest: prohibited transactions 
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transactio~i with a a l i e~~ t  or 
lurowingly !:acquire ari otvnerstGp, possessory, security or other pecui~iary i~lteres~ 
ad~erse  to a cIie~it unless: 
(1) tl-re tra~~saction a d tenns or1 which the lawyer acquires the 
interest are fair atid reasol~able to the client and are hfly disclosed arrd 
trrtrisinitted ill writing to the client in a marmer wfiich can be reasonably 
uriderstood by the client; 
(2) ale client is given a reasor~able oppor-tunity to seek the 
advise of ilidepende~~t counsel in the trarisactiol~; and 
(3) the client cotlsents in witing thereto. 
The "m~iting" requiremer~t of % W C  1.8 iiiust be a writing separate from any 
rvritings i~lvolved iri the tra~rsaction itself. See I17 re Eslnte qfBral.r)n, 930 A.2d 249, 253 
(D.C. 2007) (holding tliat cfient's '"merely sigiiirig the listing ageement'. was insufficie~zt 
to sfiow client's infonned consent in writing); In re Stephens, 35 1 N.E.2d 1256: 125 8 
(fnd. 2006) (holding that fee agreeiilent signed "without separate rn~ritten consent froin the 
client" violated professional rule 1.8); Lawyer Disc@linary Board v. Barber, 566 S.E.2d 
245, 25 1 (MT.Va. 2002) (holding that client's signature on a check was insufficierit to 
satisfy the requiremerits of rule requiring client's informed consent in writing); and 
,'Clatter qfCha~@os: 1 53 B.R. 13 1, 136.1 37 (I3arkr.E.D. h4ich. 1993) (disagreed wit11 01.1 
otl-rer grounds Sii other cases) (holding that lawyer "failed in krs affirmative obligation" lo 
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obtain clie11t"s coilse~it i~n a xniriting "separate &on1 m y  ofthe papers c'i'idcn~ing the 
bansaction itself '). 
Here, Bagley testified that 11e did not comply wit11 Rule 1.8 beca~~se it did not 
apply to this case. Bagley testified that be did not co~lsider the security agreement 
  bad verse'^^ Bryce. According to Bagley, Rule 1.8ia) applies only where the interest is 
"'adverse." Bryce does not ur~derstmd Bagley's claim that the security interest it1 his 
property is not "adverse." 11 is axiomatic that my security interest in Bryce's real 
property Bagley got tl~rough Sirius rlecessarily decreased I3ryce.s i~~terest in his teal 
property. Bryce submits that Bagley's illcreased ir-rterest in Bryce's property at the 
expense of decreasing Bryce's il~terest in Bryce's real property is by definitioll "'adverse." 
Mor-eol~er, Bagley lnisreads Rule I .8(a) to require a11 "0xa7nership," ""possessory," 
or "security" interest to be "'adverse" before the rule will apply. But this is 11ot tlne case. 
Rule 1,8(a) addresses "oxlilership illterests," "possessory interests,'""'security i~iterests." 
or '-otlter yecurtiagl, i~tterests nrlverse to n clierzt." Rule 1 .%a) necessarily assurrtes that 
all "ownersfiip interests," "possessory interests," and '"security interests*' that a lawyer 
gets it1 fiis client's property are adverse to the client. Not to limit its applicatiox~ to just 
these necessarily adverse interests, Rule 1 .&(a) coritains a ""ctcch all pixase"' to cover ail 
otlterpecurzinry i~llerests adverse to a clierzt. This "catch all pivase" is obviously 
designed to head off some creatively tl-ririking l a y e r  trying to avoid the requirelnertts of 
Rule 1 .S(a) who says that his pecuniary interest may be adverse, but it is neither an 
"ou~~lersltip nterest," -'"possessory interest." nor a ""security ir~terest." Therefore, the 
'"catcln all phrase" is necessary to encompass nkl otlzer pecuniary irzlerests nherse to (2 
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clie~zt besides just il~fierently adverse "ommership interests,'"""pssessory interests," and 
""security illterests." 
Gi~e i i  Bagley's posi~ioli that Rule 1.8(a) does 11ot apply, it is not surprising that 
Bagley admilted that he did not fitlly disclose the terms on wkcli Bagley tlxougli Sirius 
wotlld acquire his security iiiterest baismi~ted in writit~g to Bryce in m y  fasliion let alor~e 
in a 1xialmer that B r ~ c e  could reaso~iably u~ide~starid. The only tvritten conserit Bagley 
could point to for colnpliaiice trnder Rule 1 .@,a) is the h4arriage Senlemer~t Agreenient 
the divorce lawyers prqared and that Bryce signed oil September 14, 1999.' However, 
Bagley adrnitted that tlie Marriage Settlement Agreement contains none of the teri~is of 
the tra~~saction a d specifically does not even identify the property in which Bagley 
would claim a security interest tlxougli Sirius. Bryce submits that he caxiot consent 
"hereto," (i.e., to the security interest .ih~Iiose terms Baglep was required to fully disclose 
and tra~is~mit to Bryce i11 bvriting). given that Bagley did not comply with Rule I .S(a)(l). 
The importzlce of Rule 1.8(a) is that by its express terms it renders the security 
agreemela and transaction ill this case a "prohibited transaction." Bryce subiiiits that 
'prohibited" means Viiyomix~g law precluded Bagley from taking a security interest in 
Bryce's propel-ty tlrrroug1-r Sirius. Bagley could not enter the transaction in tliis case 
because wider Wyoming law applicable to Bagley the transactio~i was "rullawful." In 
%Tyomi~lg, as in most states, an uralawful transaction is void. Tnkal'zashi v. Pepper Tank 
& Ccitzlrueting Co., 131 P.2d 339, 354-355 (Wyo. 1942); Flecht v. Acme Coal Co.. 113 P. 
788, 790 (Wyo. 19 1 1). Accordingly, the security agreement and transaction Bagley seeks 
to eriforcc tl~rortgh Sirius are "'prohibited," kunla&ul," and *-void.'- 
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11. V;IUOMmG LAW PILLOIJJS BRYCE TO M1SE TEIE AFFIMATIVE 
DkFENSE OF SETOFF TO BAGLEY'S UrRONGFtJL CONDUCT. 
In %i~yomirig, ""rcoupment, which by defi~iition arises out of the tra~sact~o~ial  
strbject of the suit, when used only to defeat the claim sued upon is not bmed by a 
iirnitatioti period if tile main action is timely. . . . The p~zrpose of limitatiori provisions is 
to bar actior-is a~zd not suppl-ess or deny matters of defense, and the gel~eral r~rie is 
litnitations are not appIicable to defenses but apply only where affirraative relief is 
sought." Har.r~keye-See. Ins. CO. V .  Apodaca, 524 P.2d 874, 879 (Vdyo. 1974). Miyo~iiiiig 
co~trts use tlie terrz~s ""stoff - and "recoupmerzt" interchangeably. id. Sec tzlso 
Rzq:penlhnl v. State, 847 P.2d 13 16 (Wyo. 1993) (\nilrere BTyomirig S~~preme Court 
pcrinitted a party to rely on its setoff defense even tfiougli the govermiieizt clairned tliat 
tlie setoff was precluded by the govermae~it's sovereigi~ irnmunity .i 
Courts have applied the setoff defense after the statue of limitations has run in tlie 
context of professional malpractice claims. See Monustru v. D 'Amore, 676 N.E.2d 132, 
139 (01zio.,4pp. 1996) (stating tliat even if the statute of limitations bas expired 011 the 
defenda~it's Legal malpractice counterclaim, tl~e claim is relevant as a defense to the 
attorl~ey's clainl for fees as a setoff or recoupment): Willoughby v. Bowda and Fields, 
Chartered, 643 So.2d 1098 (Fla.App. 1994) (holding that even if clierzt's counterclai~n 
against a"ctomey for malpractice were time barred the malpractice claim could ~ionetheiess 
be asserted as setoff or recoupment against attorney's claim far fees); and Cooper 1. 
Xeaves, 365 So.2d 670 (Afa. 1978) (holdiilg that aitllough patient's time barred 
znalpractice claim barred as a counterclaim. such claim was not barred as recorrpmenr). 
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Here, Bagley tlirough Sirius seeks to recover unpaid attorney? fees. Altl-tough 
Bryce's malpractice claims are time barred, Bryce may nonefieless assert his clairns as a 
setoff deferlsc to reduce any amounts ke may owe 
Ili. DAGLEY K4S NOT PROVE3 THAT THE $78,668.57 FOR ATTORNEY'S 
FEES HE CWRGED FOR THE CHAPTER I1 PROCEEDINGS 1S 
REASONABLE. 
117 Wyoining, ''k] lawyer shall not make an agreement for. cliargc, or collect 
~ ~ ~ x e a s o t ~ ~ ~ b l e  fee or an unreasonable ;UII~OUIX for expenses." 'GVyo. K, Prof Conduct I .S. 
In I d d ~ u ,  the law is identical. See I.R.P.C. 1.5. Thus, whether under M'yorning law or 
Idaho law. Bagley cannot ""charge, or collect an ulveasonable fee." Id 
The bwden rests on Bagley, not Bryce, to show the reasonable~iess of liis 
ztttorney's fees. See -nii(ondu~ v. Robert J. Aizderson, P. C., 77 P.3d 855, 857 (Colo.hpp. 
Golo. 2003 j (citing li'estaternent (T2zird) ofLaw Governing Lawyers Section 42 clmt. c 
(2000) (tile lawyer has the burden in a suit by the client for refund of a fee)); Bowex v 
Suzuki ,'1ilotor Co., Ltd., 217 F.S~lpp.2d 610 (D.'\iirgin Islands 2002) ("After the fiduciary 
relatiolzsl-zip is established, the attorney has the burden of establishing the seasonableness 
and faillless of fees"); Climuco, Seminutore, Delligutti & Holtenbaztgh v. Carter, 653 
N.E. 2d 1245, 125 1 (O1sio.App. 1 995) ("[I]11 action for attorney fees the burden of 
proving that tlie tirz-te was fairly and properly used and the burden of showing tl-te 
reasorsableness of work hours devoted to the case rest on the attorney"); McKenzie 
Consi. Inc. v. hllaj.nnrd, 758 F.2d 97 (D.Virgin Islalids 1985) (the burden of proof is 011 
the attorney to prove the reasonableness 01 his fees even if the client is the plaintiff siri~ig 
to recover fees atready paid): Matier ofkdarine. 264 N.W. 2d 785, 287 (Wis. 1978) 
("'Gel-zerally. in disputes in~olving the reasonableness of attortiey's fees. the burden of 
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proof is upon tlie attorney to prove their reasonableness"); and Rock v. Bcrllozi, 205 S.E.2d 
540, 541 @.C.App. 1974) (The burden of proof is up011 the attorney to show the 
rcasoitable~~ess and the fairness of the coii~act, not upon the clietit to show tile contrary"). 
Here, Bagley cflarged Bryce $28,668.57 for his services he rendered in the 
Cl~apter 1 1 case. Althougl~ Bagley has no billings to identify the services he perfo~xied 
(he ca~mot Llnd them), the court can deterniine the mount be charged as follows: First, 
Bryce paid Bagley $5,000 at the outset of the representation in October 1998.' Second, 
Bagley does have billings that start Jtrrze 3. 1999 tliat show a previous balance of 
$23,668.57."ince the court dismissed the Chapter 11 on May 11, 1999, the smz of the 
initial retai~ler and the previous balance in the amount of $28,668.57 appears to be tlie 
a~i~ourtt Bagley cliarged fur his services in the Chapter 11. 
The court knows full well that the bdauptcy court disniissed Bryce's Chapter 11 
case f ir  failure to pr~secute .~  NO plan was ever even close to getting confirmed. The 
plan and disclostxe statemeizt were not filed timely, No reports were filed accortr~ttir~g for 
use of tile cash collateral. The reports were not filed timely. Reports that were filed 
omitted the majority of information needed to acliieve reorganization, sucli as balance 
sheets and prefit and Loss statements. The fees were paid late to the U.S. Trustee. Bagley 
engaged in little to 110 contact with the creditors. Eve11 Bagley agrees that there was no 
apparent progress from what he initially filed with the cour?, but Bagley ciairlls "we were 
worlci~ag or? it.'" ' 
' Bagley Depo., 2 I : 15-20. 
' EIIG~SOII Exhibit C-17 1, 
4 Erickson Exhibit A-87. 
"agley Depo., 172: 18-21. 
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Accordbigly, the ba~~kruptcy ourt dismissed Bry ce3 s Chapter 1 1 proceedings 
u11der U.S. Code Section I f  12(b) far cause that included (1) inability to ezectuate a plan; 
(2) urireasonable delay by the debtor ~v%ieh is prejudicial to creditors: (3) failure to 
prosecute a plan under Section 1 121 within tlie time fixed by statute; md (4) failure to 
pay clua~%erty fees. Bagley even agrees that dismissal u.as wasranted under these 
provisions hccaase these are thlngs that should have been i f ~ i l e . " ~ i e ~  accepts 
respo~~sibility for not having gotten these tilings done.' 
Clealy, Bryce should not have to pay Bagley for his failure to prosecute the 
Chapter I I case properly. Bagley admits that the only value his services provided to 
Bryce was (1) ohtailling the automatic stay; and (2) -'time to work wit11  creditor^."^ As 
for the automatic stay, Bagley adrnits he could have filed the b ptcy and obtained Q e  
antornatic stay for Less ilia11 $1,000 in attorney's fees.9 This means that Bagley cllarged 
Bryce $27.668.57 for attorney's fees for "time" to work with creditors. However, the 
ttx1t11 is that tlie automatic stay prorrided "time" to work with creditors. not a ~ q ~ h i i ~ g  
Bagley did after the autornatic stay was entered. 
If Bagley did anphing to get additional "time" after the automatic stay was 
entered. he just delayed tlie entry of tile dismissal. Delaying tlie entry of the dismissal 
conferred ria value or1 Bryce because this just caused him to have to refile as a Chapter 12 
where lse ultitnately got a plan successfulIy cor~firmed. Its this regard, Bagley shorrld 
have converted the Chapter f 1 to a Cfiapter 12 just 13 days after he filed the Ghaprer 11. 
See I 1 U.S.C. Section 11 1"Cd). Bagley testified that be would have initially filed this 
' Bagley Depo., 176:3-13. 
' Bagley Depo., 178:14-16. 
8 Ragley Depo., 191:21-23; 195:6-11. 
Bagiey Depo., 3721-23. 
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case as a Cf~apter 12 if it had been available because Chrtpter 12 is less cozxplicated and 
10 xiore debtor fiiendly than a CI-rapter I I where Bxycc is a farmerirancher. But Bagley 
never co~isidered coriverting tlie Gfiapter 1 I to a CIiapter 12 until after the CCtiapter 1 I u7as 
dismissed." h fact, Bagley never evert krrleur that the Ctlapter 1 1 could have been 
cowe~-teC/ to a Chapter 12. 
Judith Shively testified that she took over Brycc's Chapter 12 case after the 
ba~dir~ptcy ourt dischaged Bagley. Ms. Shively was able to get tlze Chapter 12 pla~ 
aj3proved, and Bryce successfitlly eolnpleted the plan. Bryce uf fimately received a 
Chapter 13 dischage order. Tllis proves that if Bagiey had convel-ted to a Chapter 12 and 
perfortlled cvmpeteritly, fie too could have gotten a Gfiapter 12 plan approved, Bryce 
could have successfully completed the plan, and Bryce ultiinately could have received a 
discharge order. As it turns out. Bagley did not convert to a Chapter 12, but instead was 
responsible for the Chapter 11 getting dismissed, In the end, Bagfey charged Bryce 
$27,668.57 for a "'no value Chapter 11 dismissal" xYjr)en he should have got-ten a valuable 
Cliapter 12 confirmation just like Judith Sl-rivety. il. Chapter 12 conkmation would have 
gotten Bryce the "time" Bagley claims he got Bryce but ~rithout having to incur the 
expeiise of doing it twice as occurred in this case. 
Bagley has not met IGs burden to prove that his attorney's fees of $28,668.57 for 
the Chapter 1 I proceedings are reasonable. Specifically, Bagley has never testified that 
$28,668.57 is a reaso~lable mount for attorney's fees for the work he performed in the 
Chapter I1 proceedings. Bagley has not identified the work he perforined in the Chapter 
11 proceedings. Bagley has ~zo attorney biiiirzgs to document what services he performed 
10 Bagley Depo., 7:f)-16; 41:20-422 
: '  Bagley Depo., 475-8. 
12 Ragley Depo.. 42:12-24. 
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-V6n, 
*%+-& gaz:* 
I&> .hd r ,h .>-w *-3 -a& 
111 the C'llapter 11 proceedings.13 I3agley can provide no iternkutiorz or show ~ I i a t  he 
actually cllargcd h r  the work in tlic Chqter I I r)oceedings. l 4  Ragley can provide no 
accowzeil-zg or brenktlawrz for what he charged to arrive at the total figure of 
$25,668.57. " Bagley simply cannot Locate his billings to justi& his attor~~ey's fees for 
the Cfzapter 11 proceedings and has made no effort to recreate tfle work he performed for 
his sertices. 16 
A4ri*llfio~lgl-r Bagley cllarged Bryce for all tlie work Bagley per-formed iri the Cliapter 
1 I proceedings, ' Bagiey admits that he did not perforn~ some of his work "efficiently"' as 
is the case wl~ere Bagley filed multiple u~~successful perfunctory applications just to 
1 S retain professiorials. Bagley furtlier admits that it would not be reasotzable for hini to 
charge Bryce for the successive applications to retain But Bagley did 
charge for ail tlie successi\'e applications fie filed in obtaining the orders to appoint 
Bagley also charged $165 per ho~rr when the barkuptcy court approved hi111 for 
only $140 per hour. Bagley's charged Rrj.ce $165 per hour for the work he performed in 
the Cliapter 11 proceedings." Yet, Rag!ey's application for ernplojr~~~ent and the court 
order allowed 01-11 y $130 per liour." Bagley well f led a verified statement tlmt '.p~~rsuant 
to rete~~tion agreement.' ~ 4 t h  Bryce he was cbargillg $140 per how.'"herefore, Bryce 
" Bagley Depo., 69: 1 9-24. 
14 Bagley Depo., 70:15-19. 
15 Bagiey Depo., 70:ZO-25. 
i 6 Bag!ey Depo., 69:8-11. 
17 Bagley Depo., 146:20-22. 
i E Bagley Depo., 14321-22. 
19 Baglep Depo., 146:15-19. 
20 Bagley Depo., 141:8-11. 
21 Bagley Depo., 22:24-23:s; 37:2 1-223. 
" Esickso~~~s  Exhibit A-25 and A-36. 
" Erickson's Exhibit A-33. 
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is elititled to a credit of $25 per I~our for all. thc hours Bagley Iias charged for se~liPces 
perfornled in the Chapter 11 proceedings. Stated diEerently, Bagley cai  charge only 
$140 per hour for any hour Lze pro\.es was reasonable in tlie Chapter I 1 proceedings. 
Bagley also testified at trial tliat because of problems he encomtered retailling the 
accouratant that 11e personally filed the accou~~tiiig reports. 'The tinited States Trustee's 
Status Repol? dated April 19, 1999 refers to the March nio~lthly fi~laiciill report and states 
that '"tlll-re debtor states on the report &at Mr. Bagley is owed $7,000 in fees over the 
relrtifter."" 'Tliis means that t l~ougb  March, Bagley's attors~ey's fees, according to the 
finalcia1 report that Bagfey prepared, were $12,000 far the senices be performed in the 
Chapter I 1 proceedings. (The $7,000 in the Mxch report plus the origitlal$5,000 
retai11er.j Yet. by May I 1, 1 999 (the date the court dismissed Bryce's Cllapter I I 
proceeding), tlie total aeorney's fees lie cliaxged for tile services he performed in the 
Chapter 1 1 proceedings was $28,668.57. This means that for the month of April 1999 
and for I 1  days ill May 1999, Bagley charged Bryce $17,668.57 for services, A review 
of the Chapter I 1  banitruptcy file shours that Bagley did precious little during this tirile. 
More i~i~partant, Bagley provided no evidence at trial to carry his burden that $17.668.57 
ibr attorney's fees was reasonable for my services he perforlined between April a id  May 
11. 1999. 
111 the end, Bagley Iias not carried his burden to establish that his attoixey's fees 
of $28.668."; iiicuired iii the Chapter 1 1 proceedings are reasonable. According1 y, this 
court must find ihat Bagley through Sirius is not entitled to any attorney's fees tluougfi 
h4ay 11. 1999. 
" 4Ecksorr Exhibit A-83, 9. 3. (Emphasis added.) 
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1"c. SAGLEY 'S C G O W F L f C T l  
PrEPESENTTNC; BRUCE IN THE CHAPTER 12 BEGAN AS E A a U  AS 
JUNE 3. 1999. 
Bagley - obviously liad a conaicl of interest that prevented hi111 &om represerzting 
Bryce in the Cfiapter 13. The ba&suptcy cou1-t dismissed Bagley relying on I I U.S.C. 
Sec t io~~  327. Tlie order dismissing Bagley states, "'Pwrsuant to I 1  U.S.C. Sectioll327. the 
trustee Illlay, with the court approval, emplay an attorney that does not hold or represeiit 
an interest adverse to tile estate and who is disi~~terested."" The court further relied on 
1 1 U.S.C. Section 101 j13). '9~be court continued, "Under Section 101 (141, the Code 
clefil~es a disinterested person as one tl~at is not a The court found '*fC.fr. 
Bagley is a cl-editor."" The court then dismissed Bagley from furlher representation. 
Bryce subinits that this creditor co~iflict lrat preveltted Bagley ii-om reprcsentil~g 
Bagley iri the Chapter 12 prevenkd him fro111 even filing the Chapter 12 or fro111 
performing work necessary to prepare the Cfiapter 12 for filing. If a client's attorney tias 
a co~d i c t  in representing a client after the 5Iir1g of a Chapter 12 because the al-tor~ley is a 
creditor representing the client on creditor-related work out issues. tIie attorney I-ras the 
conflict at the time the attor~~ey beconles tlie clierit7s creditor representi~ig tlie client on 
creditor-related work out issues, not at the time the petition is filed. LI other words, the 
attorney's cor~flict arises from his creditor status, not from him filing the petition. The 
filing of the petition merely makes the conflict open and obvious. 
" Ericicson Exbibit D- 156- 15'7. 
Erickson Exhibit D-156-157. 
17 
-' Erickson Exhihibit 0- 156-1 57. 
" Sickson Exhibit D-156-157. 
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111 this regard, Baglcy agrees that he actually had a conflict as a creditor in 
representing Bryce iri the Cl~apter 12 b&or.e Bryce signed the psomiss~ry note." This is 
i~nportmt I'CCBIISC tlx Chapter 12 was filed oil December 3, 1999," and Bryce signed the 
. 
promissory llote on November 13, 1999." Tlius. by Haglcy's own testimony, the Chapta 
12 coilflict actually arose before fiIis~g the Chapter 12 and even before Novelnber 13, 
1939. The Chapter 12 conflict arose when Bagley became Bryce's creditor while 
represellling Bryce in creditor-related work out issues. 111 fact; Bagley agrees that lie had 
a conflict -for filing the Chapter 12 petition as early as June 28, 1999 because he defrliitely 
was one of Bryce's creditors at that tii~~e.~"fn actuality, Bagiey's conflict started as early 
as dui~e 3, 1999 because Bagley admits that by that time he was '"repxing and 
orga~~izing to file the Chapter 12 petition.'*33 
Not 0121y did Bagley have a11 actual conflict as of June 3, 1999 tliat prevented hi111 
from preparing and organizing to file the Chapter 12 petition, but Bagley was also 
required to disclose to Bryce that 11e worrld have a eo~iff ict representing Bryce in a 
Chapter 12. Bryce could then decide whether to keep Bagley as counsel lmowi11g that 
Bagley would get disqualified after filing the Chapter 12 petition. Bryce testified that 
Bagley never disclosed his Chapter 12 conflict, and Bagley presented no evidence to 
cor~ttradict Bryce's testisliony on this isstre. 111 fact, Bagley admits that he did not disclose 
the co~~flict to Bryce belitre he filed the Chapter 12 because he did not even see it.'4 
Bryce also testified that he would not hasre used Bagley as his attorney to file the Chapter 
12 if Bagley had disclosed to him the corzflict that Bagley would have in the Chapter 12. 
29 Bagley Depo., Depo., 54: 12-17. 
30 Erickson Exhibit D-20. 
3' Bagiey's Exhibit I .  
32 Bagley Depo., 8123-82:5. 
3 3 Bagleq Depo., XO:22-8 1 : I .  
34 Bagley Depo., X8:7-14. 
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If Bagley had disclosed his conflict, Bryce would not have used Bagley, and Ragleg 
would not be elltitfed to any aeomey's fees for preparation of the Chilpter 12 petitior-r. 
Tlzis is innpodalt because alhough Bagley is not seekii~g to recover tfrrough Sirius for I is  
attorney" fees fix represeliting Bryce after filing the Chapter 12, the prolnissory note 
incltrdes attorney's fees for Bagley's pre-petition Chapter 12 work that he can~lot recover. 
As a matter of lam-, Bagley cannot charge Bryce ablurriey's fees for time periods 
that Ire is performing services wider a conflict of interest." Thereibrc. Bagicy iras the 
burden to establisli ary attorney's fees he cliarged after the dismissal of the Chapter 11 
were both rettsoriable (as explained above) and not incurred under a conflict of interest. 
1-Iorvevcr- Bagley has testified that be cainot quantif:~ the ti~lie he spent prepaing and 
ol.ganiring to file the Chapter 12 petition.36 Iii fact, Bagley cannot differentiate between 
tlic time lie speiit preparing the Cliapter 12 petition and other things that ire was doing.j7 
TI-tere-Fore, Bagley camrot satisfy his burden to prove that any of the attorney's lees he 
cl-iarged after the disnzissal of the Cfiapter 11 peti'ciotl were reasotlable and not ix~curred 
under a co~iflict of interest. 
V. BAGLEU HAD ,4 CONFLICT OF INTEREST AS A GENERAL CREDITOR 
TFfAT BEGAN UPON DISMISSAL OF THE CHAPTER 1 I. 
Iihile Bagley represented Bryce ill tile Chapter 1 I proceedings, Bagley was one 
of Bryce's creditors. Bagley did not have a co~rflict during tile pendency of the Chapter 
11 because Bagley's agorrrey's fees were subject to cou1-t approval. Howe~rer, once the 
Chapter 1 1 was dismissed. Bagley became a general creditor. Once he becanie a general 
35 See p. I0 of Brief in Support; of Motiori for Sut-ptinary Judgment dated May 9. 2008. alreadl on file w ~ i h  
the court. 
36 Dagiey Depo.. X0:22-8 1 :6. 
j i  Bagley Depo., 81 :7-14. 
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creditor, l-ie had a conflict llnat preverited l-ilm from represellling Bryce in con~~ectiori wrl-1 
the creditor ciaitns that arose against Bryce once the autoniatic stay in the Chapter 1 1 tvns 
lilted. After all, Bagley could not be expected to negotiate with himself to work out 
pzymerlt of Bryce's debt. This conflict is sepxate and apart from &e conflict o f  
preparing and organizing to iile a Chapter 12 petition that Bagley could nor file or 
represent Bryce in after it was fjled. 
Bagley has failed in his btlrderi to establish that ariy of the aaorney's fees he 
incurred afier the disn~issal of the Chapter 1 I petition were incurred for something other 
tlix~ creditor-related work out issues wlletl~er elated to the Chapter 12 or riot. 
Accordingly, Bagley cannot recover any attorney's fees incurred after the Chapter I I 
peritio~~ was dislnissed s~hi lc  he had a conilicr of intere~t.~" 
VI. BACLEY ELZD ilNOTHER CONFLICT OF mTERESCI' THAT BEGAN 
BEFORE DECEMBER 14,1999 AND GONTNUED UNTIL OCTOBER 12, 
1999. 
Bagley prepared and filed a motion fbr Katlnleeli Erickson while represerlting 
Bryce and wlnile the Ericl~sons were going through a divorce." The motion soligilt to add 
ICatll~leen as a codebtor.'"<atlileen signed the motion on December 14, 1998.~' 
Following his u~lsuccessf~~l motion, Bagley filed a separate Chapter I1 petition as cou~nsel 
for Kathleell while Bagley still represented Bryce and while the Ericltsoas' divorce was 
still Both Bryce and Kathleen weue represented by separate cotu~sel in their 
divorce acriol-i. Barley represenred Kathleen at least as late as September 27. I 999.43 
38 See p. I0 of Brief ia Support of Motio1-t for Sumnary Judgment dated May 9, 2008, already on file will1 
tile court. 
39 EI .~C~SOII Exhibit A-35. 
'' Ericlcson Exkkibit A-35. 
4' Erickson Exhibit A-35. 
42 Ericlison Exhibit B-2. 
" Erickson Exhibit C-55. 
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Bryce subnlits that just as one aeorney could not represe~~t both Katlileea a~d. 
Bryce in their divorce, Bagley could not represelll: both Kathleen m d  Bryce ill two 
Cl~apler 1 I proceedings addressing propcfiy issues ~ l l ~ e r e  both Katfnleeti and Bryce were 
dividing up tlieir property in the divorce. The fact that Katbleen and Bryce were 
represe~lted by separate coui~sel does not resolve the conflict because Bagley was 
connicteil on tl-horn he could take marclitling orders from: Katl~leen's counsel or Bryce's 
counsel? Bryce subrnits that Bagley co~rld represent Qem both at the same time only if 
Ratl~Ieen arid Bryce agreed on how to di\.ide their property. In this case, that agreemelit 
did not come until ICatkieen signed the Marital Settlelnent Agreement on October 17. 
1999. Thus. Bagley had a conflict of interest in represe~~tirmg both Bryce and Iilatlzleel~ 
that stated before December 14, 1998 and continued wilil October 12, 1999. 
111 this case, Bryce testified that be wanted to retain as 1nuc1i of t11e farm and ra~icii 
as possible tvliereas Kathleen wanted to cash out. This testimony mused my potential 
cordlict Bagley had to an actual conflict. And Bagley offered no testimony to rebut 
Bryce's testimony. In fact, Bagley admitted on cross examinatiori that from day one 
there was an issue in the divorce court that Bryce wanted to retain possession of the 
fart~iing or ralching operations whereas Kathy did not want to do that, and this is fairly 
typicaI. 44 
Bagley's conduct in representing Rryce and Katl~Xeen while the parties were 
~ o i n g  tlxough a contested divorce constit~~tes a conflict of iz~terest, Bagley courld no 
G 
more represent both divorcing parties in bankr~ptcy than lie could represent both 
divorcing parties in tlse divorce itself. Both divorce and b ptcy involve the divisioil 
44 Bagley Depo., 172-18:l. 
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aitd distribufiion of p r o p e e  beblecn the parties and their creditors. The undisp~~ted 
evidence at trid proves that Bryce and Kathleen ne~essarity and in fact had adverse 
ir~tterests. Despite the cod i c t  bet~ieen the p a ~ i e s  evidenced by their pending divorce, 
Baplej represented them both, 
As ct result of Bagley3 representing both Bryce and K~thfeen in bak t~p t i -y  while 
their divorce was pending, as a matter of law Bagley c m o t  recover his aeori~ey's Cees 
ct~asged from December 13, 1998 t l~ough October 12. 1999, the period that the col~fiict 
exi~ted.~'  
1 .  BACLEY' S PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE CAUSED BRYCE DAMAGES. 
Judith Shively testified that if Bagley had converted to a Chapter 12 Bagley 
would not have needed to file any b t c jyd l jon  for Katl-tleer~. Bagley charged 
Bryce $830 for the cost of filing Iier Chapter 1 1. Judith Shively testified Bagiey's failure 
to corivert li.o~ii a Chapter 1 1 to a Cliapter 12 was conduct falling below the staridad of 
care. Accordi~~gly, Bryce iricurrrd $830 in damages. 
hi addition, Juditli Sl~ively testified that Bryce paid $9,750 iri afionley's fees that 
First Sec~~rity Balds charged Bryce for its attorney's fees and costs in the Chapter 11. 
Juditfi Sliively testified that Bryce also paid First National Bad< $8,500 for tfie work that 
bank did in co~vrection with tlie failed CIiapter 1 I proceedirigs. Judith Shively testified 
that Bagley's failure to prosecute Bryce's Chapter I 1  restilting in dis~lnissal was conduct 
falling below the sta~idard of care. According'iy, Bryce i~icurred motl~er $18.250 in 
45 See p. I0 of Brief in Support of Motion for Sumn~ary Judgment dated May 9. 2008. already on file with 
the csult. 
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VlIf, -WES BRYCE A CREDIT 0E-$3,000 BECAUSE HE HAD -4 
CONFLICT OF XNTEWST THAT PWGLUDED HIS WPESENTING 
BRYCE W E  CH-.
The law is clear that a lawyer eair~ot recover aaorney's fees for services rendered 
wl~ilc the attost-tey lias a co~ifiict of interest. One court, explained, ""  [tlhe refatiorzship of 
attosrley and cliezlt is an extremely delicate and fiduciary one . . . . [Clourts jealouslq. hold 
[the attorr~ey] to tile utmost good faith in the discliarge of his duty.' Misconduct in 
violation of a statute or acts against public policy, or in breach of an aeolxey's liciuciay 
cluty to his client, rnay support a complcte forfeiture of fees." Cr.a%~ford v Logan. 656 
S.tV.Zd 360,364 (Term. 1983) (quotation and citation omitted); Gal PcxkDeliverit; inc. v 
UkZlcd Parcel Sewice, Ivlc., 52 Cal.App.4ti1 1, 14 (1997) (stating the general rule in 
corxflict of irzterest cases that ~v11e1-e an attorney violates Iiis or her ethical duties to a 
client, the attorney is not elititled to a fee for his or her services); In re Spanjer Bros , 
Irzc., 191 B.R. 738 jBlutcp.N.D.Il1. 1996) (if a debtor's attonley does not satisfy t11e 
disinterestedlzess requiremei~ts, then the banlcruptcy court must deny attorl~eyk fees for 
the period that the conflict existed). 
Wyomilig has aclulowledged the widely accepted rule that an attorney 
representing a client under a col-tflict of interest cannot recover attorney's fees during the 
period of time the conflict existed. See Sinzpson Performaace Products, fr?c. v. Robert I.1: 
Norrz, P.C., 92 P.3d 283,287 (Wyo. 2004) (recognizing the widely accepted rule t11at 
forfeiture of attorney's fees iticurred while the lawyer has a conflict of interest is 
appropriate) 
Moreoi.er. "a client need not prove actual damages in order to obtain forr'eiture of 
an attorney's fee for the attorney's breach of fiduciary duty to the client." Burrorv 1. 
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rlrce, 997 S.W.Zd 229, 240 (Tx. 1999); J-runk- 11 Bloom, 634 F.Zd 1245 ( 10th.Cir. 1980) 
(where a11 attorney represents cl ie~~ts with actual existing co~iflicts of interest, the 
attorns~r's compensation may be withheld even ~rllere rto damages are sl~ouin). 
filere, Bagley has admitted in testimony both at trial and in deposition that Bryce 
paid Iiizi1$3,000 in cn~mection with Bagley's representing Bryce in the Chapter 7 2 case. 46 
it is also urndisputed that tlse b d ~ x p t c t -  court entered an order dismissi~lg Bagley 
because as the owner of Sirius lie mas oile of Bryce's creditors and therefore had a 
conflict that preveilted him from representing Bryce in the Chapter I? case.47 
According1 y. Bagley callnot recover atlort1ey.s fees during tlne Cliapter 12 because of his 
collflict of interest md therefore owes Bryce a $3,000 credit against any s~rnls Bryce may 
owe him tlxough Sirius. 
IX. CONCLUSION, 
Bagley tlxougl~ Sirius ca~mot recoper 011 the promissory note and security 
ngreetn~ent because it is s prohibited trarssaction. 
Wyomitlg law allows Bryce to assert a claim for setoff as a defense even tl~o~rgli 
the statute of limitations has run because Bryce is not seeking a judgnne~~t against Bagley. 
Bagley has the burdell to establish that h-is attorney's fees are reasonable. Bagley 
has not proven that $28,668 are in fact reasol~abie attorney's fees for the services he 
provided in the C11apter I 1 proceedings. 
As Bryce's creditor, Bagley clearly had a conflict of interest that prevented him 
from representing Bryce in the Chapter 12. Bagley's creditor conflict of ir~terest hat 
40 Bagley Depo., 88:25-39:s; Erickson's Exhibit C-58 
" Esicksoll Exhibit D- 156-157. 
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prevented him fro112 representing Brjce in the C11ap"cr 12 began as early as June 3, 1999 
because Uagley then stwed to prepare and orgarizs Bryce's Chapter 12 for filing. 
Sepitrate a ~ d  apart: &om Bagley's creditor conflict that prevented him &urn 
preparing and organizing the Cfiapter 12 for filing, Bagley had a conflict of interest as a 
general creditor that begar-i upon dis~~iissal o f  the Chapter I 1  beca-crse lie charged Bryce ro 
reprcsel?.fi Bryce in com~ection with creditor claims wl~ile Bagley himself was a creditor. 
Bngley liad a~iother conflict of i~~terest that began before December 14, 1999 
wtieiz Bagley represented both Bryce and KatNeeri in b a ~ h p t c y  while they were in a 
divorce with separate attorrreys and that conflict colitinued until October 12, 1999 wlien 
Bryce and ICatllteen settled their property disputes. 
Bryce lzas a daxnage claim against Bagley that he could seek a judgrne~it for (but 
that can only be set oEagaitist any sums owed Bagley) in tlie total arnomt of $19,080 as 
follows: 
Filing i'ee $830 
Chapter 12 payment $3,000 
First Security Bank Fees $9,750 
First Natiolial Bank $8,500 
'Total: $19,080 
Accordingly, for aI1 the reasons set forth above. Bryce respectfully recjt~ests that 
the court enter judgment 011 Bagley's claims though Sirius' complaint in the amoulrt of 
zero. 
RESPECTIVELY SUBMITTED this day of July. 2008. 
McCKil'I'H, SMITH &: ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
ttorney for Bryce Ericksoli 
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CERTIRICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY tinat: on this day of July, 2008, I eitused a me 
md correct copy of the foregoing CLOSING BNEF to be served, by placing the smie 
in a scaled envelope and depositing it in the United States Mail, postage prepaid. or 11ai1d 
delivery, facsimile transxnission or overnight delivery, addressed to the followir~g: 
A. Brt~ce Larson. Esq. [ Ju. S. Mail 
Attorney at Law I f FAX 
1 55 South ?"?~ve. [ J Hand Delivery 
P.O. Box 6369 [ 1 Overnight Delivery 
Pocatsllo; Idaho 83305-6369 
Fax: 473-7602 
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-- 
Bryan DD. Siiuth, Esq. - 1SB No. 441 1 
B. J. Driscoil, Esq. - fSB NO. 7010 
R~CGKATH, SMITH tk ASSOCIATES. YLLC 2008 RUG 1 " ~ f i  5 2q 
P. 0. Box 50731 
4 14 Shoup Avenue 
Idaho Falls, Idabo 83405 
Telephone: (208) 524-073 1 
Telefn: (208) 529-4166 
Attorneys for Defendaint. 
Bryce H. Erickson 
rr;i TEE DISTRICT COURT OF SETH fUDIGm OF 
STATE OF fD,WO, IN AND FOR ComTY OF CARLBou 
S LC, a Wyoming Limited ) 
Liability Con~pany, 1 
\ 
1 
Plaintiff, ) Case No. CV-04-283 
VS. ) DEFENDANT'S CLOSING 
) mPLYBREEF 
BRYCE H. EKTCKSON, AND ANY PERSON ) 
CLAMmG UNDER BY OK TEROUGH 1 
BRYCE E-t. ERICKSON LN TO 1 
REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: ) 
1 
CARXEOU COt%TU, IDAGIO: ) 
TOV\iNSHP 5 SOUTH, Rlr,hJ'GE 46 E.B.M., 1 
SECTION 27: LOTS I AND 2, N112 1 
m i 1 4 ,  EXCEPT T ~ K E F R O M  TKE s YZ ) 
NE1I4 NW ?4 RVII4. 1 
1 
Defendants. 
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I. 
"&An attorney's freedom to con&act with a client is sub-iect to the constrants of 
ethical considerations.'" Petit-Clair v. N ~ ~ S O F L ,  782 A.2d 960, 962 (N.J. Super. 20611; 
citations omitted. "Any transaction between an attorney and client is 'subject to close 
scrutiny."Vd. at 962; citations onsitted. ""'An attorney in his relations with a client is 
bound to the highest degree of fidelity and good faith. The strongest influences of public 
policy require strict adherence to such a role of conduct. "' Id, at 962-963; citations 
ornitted, "Consequently, an otbemise enforceable agreement between an attorney and 
client is invalid 'if it runs afoul of ethical rules governing that relationship.'" Id. at 963; 
citations omitted. See ulsa kizlbe?i/5Uf'\4il~enue, L.L. C. IJ. Stewar-d, 153 P.3d 186 (Wash. 
3,007) {"'Attorney fee agreements that violate applicable rvles of professional conduct are 
against public policy and unenforceable"). 
Accordingly, an attorney fee transaction in which the attorney secures payment 
with a pronlissory note and a security interest that violates Rule of Professional Conduct 
1 .S(a) is void md unenforceable. 1.%111eY/50"~verzue, L.L. C. v. Siclr,ar.d, supm, 153 P.3d 
at 186 (holding that lawyer's note and deed of tmst securing payment of past attorney's 
fees are void and unenforceable unless lawyer stringently complies with Rule 1.8(aj; and 
Petit-Clail~.. Nelso~z, supra. 782 A.2d at 960 (holding that note and mortgage securing 
attorney's fees were invalid where the lawyer failed to comply with Rule 1.S(a)), 
. TEE A m O R W Y  BEARS BURDEN OF PROVIPJG FAR-SS, 
EQUEY, AND COMPLIANCE Wl'CH RULE 1.8(a,. 
'" [A]n attomey-client transaction i prima facie fraudulent..'. ~ni le~ /50 ' "  Avenue. 
L.L.C. v. Steward, supra, 153 P.3d at 190; citations omitted. See also P & hl Enter. 1.: 
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&furrat., 680 A.2d 790, (N.J. App. Div+ 1996) (holding that a ""trmsaction between a 
lawyer and client i s  presumptively invalici"')). Consequently, '""the burden of establishing 
hirness and equity of tke transactions rests upon the attoxmey."' Peril-Clair v. Nelsorz, 
sup~zz, 781 A.2d at 962-963; cilatioas omitted. 
Specifically, "Djhe burden of protying cornpiiar-tce with Rule of Professiond 
Contiuct 1 .S rests with the lawyer." ~aliej(50" hwenuc, L.L. C v. Srewjard, supt.ai i 53 
P.3d at 190. .'[A] lawyer must prove strict compliance with the safeguasds of Rule of 
Professional Conduct I .%a); full disclosure, opportunity to consult outside counsel, and 
consent must be proved by the coamsunications between the attorney and the client," id. 
at t 90. ""The disclosure which accompanies an ilttorney-client transaction must be 
co~nplete. Attorneys, to defend their actions, must prove they complied with the 
'stringent requirements imposed upon an attorney dealing with his or her client."" Id. 
A lawyer seeking to prove compliance with Rule 1.8(a) does not meet his burden 
n here involvement of independent counsel is not meaningiixl. "The burden is upon the 
lawyer to demonstrate that a real and meaningful oppor~unity to seek independent counsel 
was afforded to the client." lialleY/50'" Avenue, L.L. C. v. Stewad,  supra, 153 P.3d at 191. 
"Tbe opportunity to seek independent advice must be real and meaningful, It is not 
enougl~ that at some moment in time an opportunity existed no matter how brief or 
fleeting that opporzunity might have been." id. at 190. 
at. RLrLE 1.8iAI APPLES TO ALL SECTIREY INERESTS AND TO AYY 
PECUNL4RY fiTEREST ADVERSE TO .A CLENT. 
By its express terms, Rule 1.8ja) applies to all '%security interests" a lawyer 
knowingly acquires in his client's property. Although the "adverse" requirement of Rille 
1.8(a) applies only to "other pecunixy interests," case law holds that a mortgage on a 
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client's property given to the lawyer as sccurity is "kclearlL;' a security tnterest adverse to 
the client. Pptli-Clr~ir V. hi'e1~01z. S ~ J ~ ~ L L ,  782 A.2d at 963. See also In Re: Ta?ilnr, 741 
fu' E.2d 1339 (hd. 3001) (holding that a note and security interest in favor of an attorney 
in his client's residence to secure the payment of attor~iey's fees is "an interest in the 
client's pproperc) adverse to the client"); and Itz r-e DougEass. 859 A.2d 1069 (D.G. 2004) 
(hcrldmg that a note that requires the client to pay money to a lawwyer is quite naturdly 
understood as an interest ""adverse" to the interests of the client) 
IV, RULE X .8 APPLES TO ALL BUSmESS WNSACTIONS (NOT JLTST 
SECURRY mTERESTS), AND A BUSLNESS TRANSACTION n'J'CLtTDES A 
LAWI%R TAKLNG A NOTE AND SECURTPY m E E S T  TO SECURE 
P A m E K r  OF PAST An0RIVEY.S FEES. 
By its express terms, Rule 1.8(a) also applies to all -%business tr*ansachai-ts" 
betwecrz a lawyer and his client. In this regard, a lawyer who takes a security interest in 
his client's real property to secure p a p e n t  on a note for payment of past attorney's fees 
engages in a "business transaction" with the client that invokes the protections of Rule 
1.8(a). ~ullc?~i50'" Avenue, L.L. C. v. St~rval-d, supra, 151 P.3d at 186. Such ;ul 
agreelnent is not a fee agreement between a lawyer and client but in reality an agreemer~t 
between a creditor and debtor that rises to a "business transaction" within the meaning of 
Rule I.S(ai. Id. 
In 1999, Wyoming followed Wyoming Rule of Profcssiond Conduct l.&(a) that 
read as folows: 
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Rule 3.8. Conflict- of interest: prohibited trarrsaetions 
(a) h labvyer. shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or 
knowingly acquire an o~rnersh~p,  possessory, security or other pecunizy interesr 
adverse to a client unless: 
( I )  the transaction and terns on wflich the lawyer acquires the 
interest are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and 
transmitted in writing to the client in a mmner which can be reasonably 
understood by the client.: 
(2)  the client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the 
advise of independent counsel in the transaction; and 
(3) the client consents in writing thereto. 
At trial. Bagley testified that be did not comply with Rule 1.8(a) because he said 
his note and mor-tgage were not "aailverse." However, as explGned above, a mortgage on 
a client's property to secure the payment of fees is '"clearly" adverse. Petit-Clair v. 
Nelsarz, ~upr-a, 7811. A.2d at 963. Even jrtst a note payable to the attorney is "quite 
naturillly understood" to be an interest "adverse" to the iriterests of the client. Ir7, Re: 
Dauglass, sldpra, 859 A.2d at 1082. There is just no question that a note and security 
interest in lcavor of an attorney in his client's residence to secure the payment of 
attorney's fees is "an interest in the client's property adverse to the client" In Re: 
Taylor, sccpru, 74 1 N.E.2d at 1242. Moreover, the note and mortgage Bagley obtained 
from Erickson through Sirius was a "business &ansaction" within the meaning of Rule 
1.8Caj. See ~alle~y/_~li~"A~ienue,  L.L.C. v. Steward, supr.a. 153 P.3d at 186. i?rccordingly, 
Bagley was required to cornply with Rule 1.8(a) and in fact bears the burden of proof at 
trial that he did comply with Rule 1.8(a). However. as set forth below. did not comply 
with the requirements of Rule 1.8(aj. 
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1 ,  The transaction and terms on which Bagley acquired his interest are nut 
fair and reasonhle to Erickson. The Real Estate R'Io~gage Erickson signed mortgaged 
! 72.35 acres 10 13agley. This property is hlowri as the 'Desr Creek Propefly'bwith a 
stated value on Decen~ber 9, 1998 of $Ci88,000%d a stated value on Becen~ber 3, 1999 
of $603,00~).' The bankmptcy documents stlow only two secured creditors other than the 
Sirius note on the Deer Greek Prope~y at the time Bagley filed the Chapter 12 on 
December 3 ,  1999.~ One creditor was First Security Bank uihose secured claizn in the 
Deer Crcek Property was $1 15,000, and the other creditor was lr\iryoming Fasm Loan 
Board whose secured claim in the Deer Creek Pfoperly was $70.000.' Using the i o ~ ~ e r  
$602.000 value for the Deer Creek Property, Bagley obtained at least $417,000 of 
unencumbered collateral to secure a note in the amount of $29,173.38. 
TI-re picture of Bagley3 over secured position is far worse considering the reality 
of the situation. Ln this regard, Erickson had assigned a $97,000 receivable to First 
Security Bank ufbo was applying the $97.000 receivable to pay off its $1 15,000 claim." 
Giving credit for this $97.000 receivable increases Bagley's over secured position to 
$5 14,000 on the $29,173.38 note. Even worse, the total value of Erickson's real property 
mias $1.3 million in which First Security Bank and Wyoming F m  Loan Board dso held 
security for their $1 15.000 and $70.000 claims r e ~ ~ e c d v e l ~ . ~  This means that once First 
Security Bank and MTyoming Farm. Loan Board were paid from the other properties sold 
in the Chapter 12, Eagley would be the lone remaining secured creditor with security 
See Ragley Exhrbrt 2 
' See Errchson Exhtb~t PI-27 
See EricE.son Exhblt D-30 
' See Erickson E x h ~ b ~ t  D-36 
"ee Errckson Exiubrt D-36 
See Enckson Exhbit  D-32 and 35 
See Enckson E x l b ~ t  D-30 and 36. 
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valued at $602,000 for his $29,173.38 rrote thus m&ng Bagley over secured hy as much 
as $572,000. And, in fact, Baglcy adnnits in his closing brief that "[rilo other party with a 
pi-iority greater than the Plaintiff has claimed an interest in the real propen!. that is the 
st~b~ject to this action"" 
-ti\ fee agcernent between a Lawyer and a client, revised after the relationship has 
becn eslabIrshed on terms more &rrorable to the laviryer than originally agreed upon may 
be void or vo~clable unless the attorney shows that the contract was fair and reasonable, 
free from ~rndue ~nfluence, and made after a fair and full disclosure of the facts on which 
it is predicated." ~hl ie~/50" '  Aveizldc, L.L. C I .  Stenfar-d, siipm, 1 53 P.3d at 1 8 9  A 
mortgage to secure a note for past attorney's fees has been found to be unfair and 
unreasonable where it expands a clicnt's liability far beyond the terms the lawyer and 
client originally agreed to. Petif-Clair r.. ,nietsorz, supra, 782 A.2d at 960 (finding that 
i~ldependcnt counsel may have convinced the client not to execute the mortgage securing 
a note for past attorney's fees where the original debt was owed by corporations, not 
individual clients personally). 
Here, the original agreement with Bagley was that Erickson was to pay him $140 
per hour plus costs. The original agreement did not include any terms for security. The 
origi~ial agreement certainly did not include giving Bagley a security interest over 
securing Bagiey between $417,000 and $572.000. ittny independent lawyer not wanting 
to c o r n i t  malpractice would have advised Erickson not to pledge his entire 172 acre 
farm with a net equity tia2ue between $417,000 arid $272.008 to secure Bagley's 
$29.173.28 note. Erickson submits that such an over secured position heavily in favor of 
Bagley is ne~ther fair nor reasonable to Eriekson. 
See Bagiey's Closing Brief p., 3. 
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I;. Bagley did not -Fully disclose the transaction and terms in writing to 
Erickson at dl lei alone in a rnallner Ericksnn could reasonably understand. The only 
dosurnents that contain the transaction md ierrns are the note and mortgage Er~ckson 
signed. Bagley was unable to identify any sepzate writing fully disclosing the 
cransactron and the tezms to Erickson that he could then consent to as Rule 1.8(a) 
requlrcs. Ir? re Eslale yfBrowrt, 930 A.2d 249, 253 (U.C. 2007); XFZ re SrepFzerzs, 851 
N . E . 2  cl256. 1258 (hd. 2006); Lntr~er. Discipliaar~y Board v. Burl7er. 566 S.E.2d 245, 
251 (%l.Va. 200111; and f i t ter  ofCf.tal3"oos, 183 B.R. 131, 136-137 (Bankr.E.D. h'iich. 
1994). 
3. Bagley did not give Erickson a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice 
sf independent counsel. These was no evidence at trial that Bagley gave Eriekson a 
reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent counsel. As explkned above. 
Ragley hears the bm-den of proving his compliance with Rule 18(a). iiuliev/5dh Avenue, 
L.L.C. .il. Sfentar-d, smpr.a, 153 P.3d at 186. Although Bagiey testified that Erickson had a 
dlr~orce lawyer who included the debt to Bagley in the Marriage Settlenient Agree~xnt ,  
there was no evidence that Erickson ever had the opportunity to seek the advice of the 
divorce lawyer with regard to the transaction. In fact, the Decree of Divorce was entered 
on October 19, 1999.~ But Erickson signed the promissory note and mortgage on 
Novenlber 13, 1999. '" Therefore. by the time Erickson signed the promissory nore and 
mortgage. the divorce case was concluded. Bagley failed in his burden to present any 
evadence that the prorrrissory note and mortgage were even in existence during the 
divorce for Ericksorr's divorce attorney to review to provide advice on. 
See Bagley Exhibit 6.  
l o  See BagIey Exhibits 1 and 2 
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4. Eriekson did not consent m writing to the terms of the trmsacrion. 77ne 
only written consent Bagley could point m is the Mmiage Settlement Agreement the 
liivorcc lawyers prepared and that Bryce signed on September 13. 199'1." Kowc~es, 
Nagley admits that the Mxriagc Settlement hgree~x~ent contains none of the terms of the 
transact1011 and specifically does not even identifj, the property in which Bagley would 
claim a secunty interest "Ihrotxph Sirius. Given these facts. Bagley cannot rxteet his burden 
of proving "strict con~pliar~ce with the safeguards of Rule of Professional Condx~et 
1 .&i a)." lfciliev~5!)'" Aveiluc, L.L. C. i j .  S i ~ ~ l i l r d .  supra, 153 P.3d at I 90. 
Moreover, Erickson submits that Erickson's simply affixing his name to tlie 
hilarriage Settlement Agreemeni that references the debt to Bagley is not "ijiformed 
consent" just as r-rrerely srgnirtg 3 listing agreement is insufficient to show a client's 
"~nfornied consent" in ~ ~ r i t i n g  (112 I-e E.stare o f B r o ~ ~ r z ,  supra. 930 h.3d at 249) and merely 
signing a check is insufficient to show a clierxt's "'inkrmed consent" in writing. Lawyer 
Discipliiz~ry Board is. Barber., supru. 566 S.E.2d at 245. 
VI. ERICMSON WAS FOUND TiVO GASES THAT HAVE ADDRESSED THE 
VERY ISSUE P W S E N E D  HERE AhTD BOTH HOLD THAT A N O E  AND 
SECURJTY A LPIWYER OBTAZNS ID VIOLATION OF RLJLE 1.8 ARE NOT 
ENFORCEABLE. 
,4t least two COUI?~ have held that a note and secuiity agreement to secure payment 
of attor~~ey's fees cor-tsijtute a ""business utra~isaction" a d  or "security interest" subjecting the 
lawyer to the mandatory prinkions of Rule 1.8(ai. In ~al lc~ /50" '  Averzue, L.L. C. tl. Sfewar-t, 
suprPa, 153 P.3d at 180, the Supreme Court oSMrashington retiewed a secured transaction 
between a firm its client. 'The firm required the client to sign a promissory note and 
deed of trust as: security for past attorney's fees. At the time they entered the agreement. the 
* ,  
" See Bagley Exhibit 3. 
DEFENDAXT'S GLOSLWG REPLY BRIEF - Page 9 
F \CLIENTS\BDS\7453\p1ead~ngs\OO.i6 Reply to Bagle\'s Clus~ng Brief doc 
clicnt owed the firm $1 60,000.W. After the client dehulted, the fim sought to foreclose on 
the deed of mst. In its defense, the client agued tS_lli;l the semrity ageement was 
unenforceabfc because the attorney obtained i t  in violatron of Rule 1.8ia). The trral court 
and court of appeals ruled that the dleged violalion of Rule 1.8(a) did not render the security 
agreement unenforceable. However, The Supreme Court of %Tashington reversed both thc 
trial court and court of appeals, reaoning as foltows: 
The deed of trust [i.e., the security ageemnt]  at issue in this case 
has the character of a busirzess lrarrsactio~z betweerz a kaw$m arzd its 
elierzt. Though described as a fee apement  by the Erm, it was, in fact, 
relevant to a sigfzificarzf exish'lzg debt. . . . The relationshp was rzot nzerelj 
atlorfzey-clittlzt; it was also credifar-debtor. . . . [Ift was in reality m 
agreement between a creditor and a debtor. Furthermore, the fee ageenneni 
entailed tlze corzveyarzce oJla securig irzteresf irz llze clierzt's propem, a 
tr-arzsactiorz absent safeguards specifically pmhihited by RPC 1.814. 
Finall), we note the Firm advised its ow11 client on a method of paying the 
debt owed to it--a rrzet-lzad a disirzterested altorrzey might rzaf have 
erzeouraged. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Concluding that "the note and deed of trust was more Like a business transaction than 
a fee agreement," the lialley court applied the mandatov requirements of Rule 1.8 (a). 
knportantly, the Iklley court never questioned whether the security interest was "adverse." 
Rathes, the court focused on the "character" of the security agreement and the "ereditor- 
debtor" I-elationskip between the pasties concluding that the lawyer had entered into a 
"'business trmsactc&on'" requiring compliance with Rule 1 &a). 
Ln Pelif-Glail- v. filson. sup!-a. 782 A.2d at 960 (N.J. 2001). the Pjew Jersey 
appellate caurt held that a lawyer's mortgage on the client's residence constituted a securi~y 
interest under Rule 1.8(a). The court explained, "'"[A]n attorney's freedom to contract with 
a client is subject to the constraints of ethcal considerations' and the Supreme Coua's 
supenision." id. at 962. The Petit-Clnir court continued, '"[Aln attorney in his relations 
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with a client is bound to the highest degrec of fidelity m d  good faith. The strongest 
iniruences of public policy require strict adherence to such a role of conduct. Consequentl>r, 
an olher#ise enfc~rceabfe agreement between an attorney and client 1s invalid 'if it mns afoul 
of e thcd rules governing that relationsEp. "' I;% at 963 (quolalions onitted]. In concluding 
that tine lawyer- had violated Ruje 1.8ia), the coux-t noted, "By its very terns, [Rule 1.8(a)] is 
nlandator-y'" unless a lawyer follows the provisions of Ruie 1.8ia~. Ici. at 963. Based on 
these obsex~adons, the court held, 'Xere, it is clear that defendants' mortgage on their 
personal rcs~dence given to plintiff [attorney] was a 'security . . . interest adverse to [the 
defendants] . . .'" Id. Because the lawyer could not prove compliance with Rule 1 .%a). the 
court heid that the note and security agr.eement were unenforceable. 
The Valley and Petii-Clazr cases are strikingly similar to this case. Just like thrs 
case, both Valley and Petit-Clair involve a11 atrorne?'~ obtaining a promissoq note and a 
mofigagc/=/dced of tsust from their clients as vehicles to secure the palnlent of past attorney's 
fees. Just like this case, both Valley and Petit-Clatr involve the Issue of whether the 
attorney could foreclose on their respective clients' real property. Just like this case, the 
lawyers it1 both Valley asld Petit-Clair did not comply with the requirements of Rule I.?,(&. 
Just as the couvts m both Valley and Petit-Clair* hold that the pronnissor?; notes and mortgage 
and deed of trust constituted a "business transaetiodsecurity interest" within the meaning of 
Ruie 1.8:a). this court should rule that Bagley's note and mortgage he obtained through 
Skius constltitte a "'business trulsactionisecuriQ interest" within the meaning of Rule 1 .$(a). 
And just as the courts in both Valley md Petit-C'ktir. hold that the attorneys' f'arlur-e to 
conlply ui th  Rule 1.8!a) rendered the promissow notes and mortgage and deed of m s t  
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tn~altlid and unenforceable, this court too should rule that Bagiey's failure to comply waih 
Rufc 1.8(a,1 renders the prorrnissory note and moagage invalid and unenforcerible. 
Vfl' 
R BY WAY OF HIS O W  SLaMARY J U D G m K  OR 
OPPOSmG BAGLEY3 S U - M M U  JUDGmNT. 
Bagley raises many legal issues the p;trties have already responded to m their cross 
LW judgment. Rather than recite all the legal authority Erickson has 
;tiready proa~ided the court, Eiickson will simply identi@ the issue, provide a s u m a r y  
response, and refer the court: to Erickson's briefing that already addresses the issue. 
1. Bagley claims be is not a party to the action and therefore has nor had a full 
and fair opportnniy to litigate issues. Bagley further claim the court has no jurisdiction 
over ivln thereby deprivrng him of due process including a jury trial. Bagley's ar-gument 
misses the point that Erikson has not sued Bagley, and Erickson seeks no affirmative reLief 
against Bagley. Certainly, due process would require personal jurisdiction over Bagley if 
El-ickson sought some affirmative relief (like a judgment) against Bagley. But Erickson is 
awase of no law that be c m ~ o t  assert an aff~mative defense unless the court has person& 
jurisdiction over Bagley, who. by the way, appeared at trial and testified in kis own behalf, 
u~bo appeared for deposition, and who responded to interrogatories, etc.. Therefore, it is 
disingenuous for Bagley to e l a h  that he has not had a full and fair opportunity to litigate 
issues." Finally, Bagley is not entitled to a jury trial in this equitable foreclosure action that 
he caused Sirius to file. In fact. Erickson sought a jury trial early on in the case and Bagiey 
tbough Sirius objected. 
7 -. Bagley clain~s that the Idaho Supreme Court has already ruled (therefore 
making it the Iaw of the case) that adequate considerahon exists for the promissory note. 
12 Errcksun's Brief In Opposiuon to Bagley's Mot~on for Summary Judgment. p. 4. 
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This is simply a distortion of the Supreme Court's holding. The Supreme Court held that 
consideration need nor come from Sirius but that S m u  could "borrow" or "rely" on 
consideration from Bagley Jibe Supreme Court: speci5cally remmded the case for this 
court to test the adequacy and sufficiency of the consideration that Bagley "loaned"' to 
Sirius. This court 1s well aware of the ""footnote" the Supreme Court inserted in its opinion 
that references this very issue.'" 
3. Bagley claims that "the Bmhptcy  court directed the Debtaddefendant to 
file an adversay proceeding to avoid the lien of the moagage." l 4  Bagley's a ~ u r n e n t  is 
that this "'direct~ve" operates with res jud ica i~~ effect to bar E~ickson from raising his 
defenses in the present case because Erichson did not file an adversary proceeding. 
Ho~lever, Bagley's argunient ignores the facts and reality of the case. Erickson objected 
to Bagley's lien. The court overruled the ob-jeetion stating "if mortgage lien is a 
preference, the debtor must file an adversary if he wants to avoid the lien."I5 This 
language does "direct" Erickson "to file an adversary proceeding to avoid the lien of the 
mortgage." Also. the court's ruling does not resolve the substantive issue on its merits 
and is not a -'final judgment"; therefore, it cannot have any res judicata effect.16 
Moreover, before Erickson's time to file an adversary complaint had even run 
(before the court entered the discharge order), Bagley filed this case in Caribou County. 
Aware of this action pending in Caribou County, and as part of the discharge order, the 
bankruptcy court specifically ordered that Erichson is discharged from all debts except 
"the Sirius claim with a latvsuit pending In the District Court of the Sixth Judicial Distrlict 
I3 Er~rksun's Brtef ;n Opposrt~on to Bagley's Moiron for S u m a r y  Judgment, pp 3-4. 
14 Bagley's Closing Argument, p., 16. 
'' Bagiey's Exhlb~t 18. 
'%rickson's Brlef rn Op2osrQon LO Bagiey's Motlon for Summary Judgment. pp. 5-6. 
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of tile State of Idaho, in and for the County of 6uibou."" "7 other words, the b a n h ~ p t c y  
cottrr recognized the jurisdiction of tbls court to resolve the Issues in this case and 
spccific~~ll~ made provision in ~ t s  order thus m&ng this case the equivalent of an 
adbersxy proceeding. If the bankruptcy court beliesed Bagley" argument, then the 
banhuptcy cowl would have ruled that this cclurt does 1s without jurlsdictiun because 
Erickson had not filed an adversary proceeding: instead, the b a n h p t c y  court ruled that 
this court is to declde the very issues it 1s litigating. 18 
Bagiey seems to claim that an adversary proceeding -Falls within a 'nankrtrptcy 
cottrt's "core" jurisdiction and therefore falls w~thin the banb~prcy  court's "exclus~ve'' 
jurisdiction. I-Xowever. "core" jurisdiction is not "exclusive"' jurisdiction as Bagley 
suggests. See, e.g., Nol~kins is. PEav~t hsul'ai-ion Co.. 349 B.R. 805 (N.B.Gal.2006). 
-'Bankruptcy judges nzuy hear and determine all cases under title I 1  and all core 
proceedrngs arising under title 1 I." 28 U.S.C. 157jb); emphasis added. Under the 
express language of the statate, the banhuptcy court's "core" jurisdiction is 
discx-etioniu-y, not "exclusive." Therefore. the bmhuptcy court was correct when it 
ordered that Erickson's discharge order is subject to this action that the bankruptcy court 
specificdrlly referenced as the fomm to decide the issues challenging the validity of the 
note and mortgage. 
4. Bagley's claim that the rx~les of res judicata and/or judicial estoppel bas 
Erickson's litigating Bagiey's wrongful conduct is misguided. Bagley claims Er~ckson 
never disclosed kis malpractice claim against Bagley in the b x h p t c y  court groceeding: 
therefore, Erickson cannot raise it now in this proceeding. Bagley is wrong on at least two 
i 7  Errckson's Exhibrt "F." 
'' Enckson's Bnef ~n Oppos~tron to &agle)'s Motion for Summary Juogment, pp., 5-6. 
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levels. first, E~lckson did object to Bagley's note and rnorlgage &clang the court to review 
Bag1ey.s fees he claims be mcuned in the Chapter 11. Olhem1ise. the b 
never livould have specificdly included the outcome of thts case zn ~ t s  discbxse order. 
Thex-efc)re, Erlckson did JiscIose by way of objection I-us challenge to the S~rius note and 
mortgage. Second, Ericksun is not anenriptin:: to assert an affirmative c I m  aga~nst Bagley 
to recover soxnerhing from Bagley. Enckson ts rdising Bagiey's malpractice as an 
affimlative defense ar~d set off to the claim at issue here. Bagiey bas cited n3 law that a 
defertdant cannot raise a clam of set off ~f that defendant did not first iist the clam1 as an 
asset m the defendant's prior hanhptcy.  For these reaqons, the law of I - e ~  jl~dicata andior 
judrcrd estoppel Bagley relies on does not apply. 
5. Baglea seems to suggest that Erickson c~mnot raise Bagley's wrongful 
conduct 111 conncctioa v\lith its set off defense against the Sirius note. However, the Idaho 
Suprenie Court's opimon did not rule that consideration from Bagley to Srriils was not 
subject to chaljenge. In fact, the Idaho Supreme Court held that "'while Erickson received 
consideration far the note [Bagley's services]. we do not opine as to the adequacy of the 
consideration.'Tks statement together with the Supreme Cour-t's remand for thrs court to 
conslder Erickson's affirniative defenses opens the door to Ericlcson's challenging the 
adequacy or sufficiency of the consideration for the note, i.e., the adequacy or sufficiency of 
Bagley' s sen lees. 19 
Obviously, Erickson nxst be allowed to challenge Bagley's services; otheuu~ise, any 
de~ious ind~vldud could provide no consideration for a note or any contract (perhaps even 
eggaging :n fraud) and avoid legal consequences (like defenses to the contract) amply by 
shrewdly conduct~ng the transaction through legal entities. For example, m rhis case, 
Errckson's Reply Brlef ~n Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, pp.. 3-4. 
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Bagley breached his f iduciq  duty when he ttid not cornply with Rule I.& a). Bagley 
st~ould not be able to insulate hl~xself rom the legal effects of his wrongkl conduct simply 
by using hrs fiduclcq status to causc Erickson to sign a p r o ~ s s o r y  note with Sirius i a  
Iir~liited liability conipmy that Bagley owns) rather then with Bagley persondly. 
6. Bagley ciainns that Er~ckson has agreed that plaindff has proven its case as to 
the "vahdity of the note and morrgage.772%s i s  not true. Elickson stipulated at trial that 
Baglet wins this case unless one of Erickson's affimative defenses applies. Stated 
differently, Eriekson agrees that he signed the note, 17ie agrees to the mount of the note, he 
agrees he bas paid n o t ~ n g  on the note, etc. In other words, Erickson agrees that Bagley has 
proven h i s  case but that his case is subject to Erickson's affmative defenses. This 
stipulatjon is not lfie same as Bagley's characterization that Erickson stipulates as to tile 
"validity of tfie note and mortgage." 
. CONCLUSION. 
For af1 the reasons stated above and in Erickson's Closing Brief and tlis Reply 
Brief, Erickson respectfully requests that this court find the note and mortgage 
unenfo~eable. 
RtSPECTRELY S U B M m D  this / dzy of August. 2008 
Bryan D. Smith 
Attorney for Bryce Erickson 
LLI aaglej's Closing Argument. p.. 9. 
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CERTIFZCA4TE OF SERVICE 
I BEREBY CERTFU that on this 1 3 day of August. 2008,T caused a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT'S CLOSING m P L Y  BmEF to be 
served. by placlrzg the same in a sealed envelope and depositing it in the United States 
Marl, postage prepaid, or hand delivery, facsimile transmission or- overnight delwery, 
addressed to the foliowmg: 
A. Bruce Larsan, Esq. 
Attorney lit Law 
15"Foouth z~~ Ave. 
P.O. Box 6309 
Pocatello. Idaho 83205-6369 
Fltxl: 478-7602 
r Mail 
I I FAX 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
Bryan D. Smith 
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BRYCE i-I. ERICKSON. AND ANY 1 AIND OWER 
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Defendas~ts. 1 
THE MATTER BEPORE THE COURT: 
This case comes before the Court on Plaintifrs complaint to foreclose on property 
Located within Caribou County. This Court's prior decision in this matter was affirmed in 
part and vacated in part and remanded from the Idaho Supreme Court saying 
consideration was given for the note (although the Supreme Court declined to answer 
v,ihether it was adequate), and the case was remanded as to the issue of the affirmative 
defenses of the Defendant. Defendant argues the property should not be deemed as 
Plaintias because the transaction transferring the property to Mr. BagIey was prohibited, 
unlawfu1, and void under Wyoming law. Defendant argues that he ma). raise the setoff 
defense as to Mr. Bagley's wrorigfiil conduct. Furthermore Defendant contends that 
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PlaintiE l~as failed to prove the mount  Mr. Bagicy charged Defendant was reasonable 
and his conflict of interest in representing both Defendant and his wife ixz a b 
despite a pendit~g divorce prevented chargeable representation of Defendant, 
In response, Plaintiff argues that the property was properly transfened to him as 
consideraion for legal work perfor~ned on bel-talf of De fenda~  and then the properly was 
properly transfened to them. PLaintiflf argues they have conclusively proven their case 
and the claims and defenses raised by Defendant are inapplicable here because they are 
based on Mr. Bagiey's conduct whicli was not at issue here or fails on the grounds of res 
judicata. PIaitltiff further argues no conflict existed because Defendant and his wife had 
sepasate counsel representing them in the divorce proceedings, both parties had the same 
goals in the bankruptcy proceedings, and the representation of Defendad was not adverse 
to 11im. 
This Court agrees with Plaintiff and finds that the property in question is subject 
to foreclosure and Defendant is obligated to pay the full mount  of the note plus interest 
and attor~iey's fees as provided in the note and mortgage. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
I .  The Plaintiff Sirius LC is a Wyoming limited liability company and at ail material 
times pertinent to tbis action has been in good standing with the state of 
Wyoming. 
2. Mr. Baglsy is not a nasned party to tbis action. 
3. At all times relevant to this action William Bagley and his wife are the sole 
owners of Sirius, LC. 
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4. At all times relevant to this action, Mr. Bagley is an aBomey licensed to practice 
law in %Tyo~ning. 
5. 'I'hc Defendant Bryce H. Er i~kso~i  was a resident of Stillwater, Oklahoma on the 
date this action was filed and at various times pertinent to this action the 
Defendant Bryce H. Erickson has been a resident of the state of Mryoming. 
6. XR October 1998, Mr. Erickson was dirrorcing his wife, Kathleen Erickson. 
7. Mr. Erickson began an attorney client relationstlip with Mr. Bagley in Wyoming 
in October of 1998, procuring his sewices for representation in bahup tcy  
proceedings. 
8. Mr. Erickson first retained Mr. Bagiey to represent him in a Chapter 1 1 
barikruptcy. 
9. Mr. Erickson again approached Mr. Bagley and requested representation for a 
Chapter 12 bankruptcy proceeding. 
10. Mr. BagIey agreed to represent Mr. Erickson provided he sign a promissoy note 
payable to Sirius LC in the amount of $29,173.38 to be secured by a mo&gage on 
real property owned by Erickson in Caribou County, Idaho. 
1 1. Mr. Bagley asserted $29.173.3 8 was the amount of overdue Iegal fees Mr. 
Ericlcson owed for his services in the Chapter 1 1 proceedings. 
12. Mr. Erickson did not retain independent counsel as to whether he should sign the 
note however he did have his divorce attorney review the fees. 
13. That on or about November 13, 1999 Mr. Erickson, while residing ixi rhe state of 
Wyorning, executed and delivered to the Plaintiff a ""Pomissorgi Note" payable to 
Sirius, provided. '"[flor value received, the undersigned Bryce H. Erickson 
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promises to pay to SIHUS LC . . . the sum of Twenty Nine Thousand One 
Hundred Seventy Three Dollass aid Thirty Eight Cents ($29, 173.38 j bearing 
109.6 interest due arid payable on June 1,200 1 "' 
14. Irzterest is calculated through September 30, 2008 as: $33,173 3 8  x . f 0 = 
$2,917.34 i~iterest per year i 365 = 7.9927 per day. $2,917.34 x 8 (eight years 
1 liZ31'1999 through 11/12/2007) = $23,338.72. $7.9927 x 349 days (1 1/13/2008 
through 09/30,'2008) = $2,789.45. Total interest accrued through 9/30/2008 = 
$26,128.17. 
Z 5. On or about November 13, 1999 tile De fenda~  Bryce H. Erickson executed and 
delivered to the Plaintiff a ""Real Estate Mortgage" securing the note with real 
property located in Caribou County. Idaho which i s  more paflicularly described 
as: Towrlship 5 South, Range 46EBM, Section 27: Lots 1 and 2, N1/2NW1/4 
except therefrom the S 1 I4NE 1 i4NW 1 l4NW 114. 
16. Thereafter, Mr. Bagley did file a Chapter 2Qroceeding on behalf ofiliifr. Ericltson 
in Wyoming. 
17. Tlie note became due and payable on June 1,200 1. 
18. Defendant has not paid the amounts due and owing oil the note. 
19. The note and mortgage provide that the Defendant "agrees to pay all expenses of 
collection including a reaso~abte attorney-s fee". 
20. The P1ailzti-f-i." filed a Co~npltrintfor fireclosure on September 3: 2004 and also 
recorded a i'biotice cfLis Pendens in Caribou County on September 7, 2004. 
Recorded as Instrument Number 171 823. 
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2 1. No other party with a higher priority or security interest in the described property 
Iias claimed title or an interest to the properly involved in this action. 
32. There are real propeey taxes accruing on the real property for the year 2008 
together with real property taxes, penalties and interest which have not been paid 
from prior years. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
1.  This action was brougfit to foreclose a mortgage on real property located in 
Caribou County, Idaho, the Court therefore has jurisdiction over this action under 
the provisions of Idaho Code section 6- 10 1 et seq. and other applicable provisions 
of Idalzo Code. 
2. Venue is proper in Caribou County, Idaho pursuant to Idaho Code section 5- 
401 13) wl~ich provides that actions for the foreclosure of real property shall be 
brought in the couxity in whicli the real property is located. 
3. No conflict of interest existed i11 Mr. Bagley representing both Mr. Erickson and 
his wife in the bankruptcy proceeding despite their pending divorce. 
4. Judith SXiively though qualified as an expert witness, is also an interested witness 
as she represented Defendant and therefore is not an independent expert. The 
Court will weigh her testimony accordingly. See IRE 702, 703 and LTaited States 
v. Greenwood. 796 F.2d 49 (4 'k i r .  1986). 
5. The note is valid with a principal balance of $29,173.3 8 together with interest 
accruing tl~sreon from November 13, 1399 at the rate of 10% per amurn until the 
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date of jtidgment herein with interest accrriing thereafter at the statutory interest 
rate for judg~nents in the m~outst of 10% per an~ium. 
6. Interest which has accnted on the note through September 30, 3008 i s  equal to the 
sum of$26,128.17 and will continue to accrue in the alnoutlt of $7.9927 per day 
until the date of judgme~it and will continue to accrue thereafter at the rate of 10% 
per m u m  until paid. 
7. The rnortgage is a valid lien upon the real property described above. 
8. Judgment is entered providing that the mortgage is hereby foreclosed and the 
proper?y encrmbered thereby sold at a foreclosure sale in the malxier by 
applicable law, with the proceeds thereof applied on the judgment. attorney's fees 
arid costs, and sue11 additional amounts as Plaintiff can prove was advanced -for 
taxes and other items as may constitute liens against the property together with 
insurarice and repairs necessasy to prevent impairment of the security, together 
with interest tilereon fkorn the date of the advancement. 
9. PlaintifPs lien as evidenced by the mortgage is forever foreclosed. 
LO. As to the claims raised the Court finds the following: 
a. Urhether the consideration given for the promissory note is adequate? 
This Court believes that the legal work perfonned in behalf of Mr. 
Erickson is adepate to support the promissory note executed to Mr. Bagley. 
This conciusion is supported by the facts showing that Mr. Bagley did 
perform legal work on behalf of Mr. Eriekson. Mr. Bagley filed the Cha;?ter 
Z 1 on behalf of Mr. Eriekson. This entailed meeting with the client, 
conducting an inverltory of assets. and filing scores of documents with the 
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bankruptcy court. JDef,'s exhibit A) Mr. Erickson voluntarily signed the 
promissov tiole w i ~ o u t  duress or coercion. (Erickson Bep. 25 : 10-25,26: 1-4) 
He did nut meet the burden of' proving the note was signed under duress or 
coercion. Pittard v. Great takes Avialiorz, 156 P3d. 964, TVYSC 05-320- 
042407 12007)- Goodr~arz v. Lofhrop, I43 Idalio 622, (2006) (citing) Enjgires 
Refineries v. Jones, 69 Idaho 335,339 (1949). Mr, Erickson had the ability to 
seek illdependent advice as to owhher he should sign thc note or not. EIe did 
not elaim that the amount was excessive at that time, but rather to the contrary 
""At that time I trusted h4r. Bagiey 100 percent." (Erickson Dep. 25: 10-25, 
76: 1-4). He did have indepe~~dent counsel review tlie fees in the divorce 
property settlemerzt agreement he entered into with his wife where he assuri~ed 
a l  the debt responsibility for the legal charges. h4r. Erickson has not filed a 
con~pfaint with the Wyorning Bar Association in regards to the legal charges. 
Mr. Erickson did file a motion in his chapter 12 bankntptcy case which 
challenged the prornissorq. note and the security of the mortgage. That motion 
was denied. Mr. Erickson failed to take the opportunity to file an adverse 
action against Mr. Bagley in Badsdptcy Court where jurisdiction is proper for 
sucfi claims as raised by Mr. Erickson's affirmative defenses. See 28 U.S.C. 5 
157. Also IB re S'udiarnwk, 163. F3d 925. 330-32 (5'" Cir. 1999). 
In short, Mr. Erickson has never properly challenged the promissory note 
nor the securing mortgage in accordance with the rules of procedure. Nosv that 
the statute of limitations has lapsed where jrvisdiction is proper to brillg 
malpractice claims, this backdoos attempt at such has been Sled. The C o ~ r t  
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feels that the consideration is adequate and Defendant coi~sented to the 
adequacy thereof in signing tile note and not properly making any chdlenges 
to the adequacy prior to this action. 
b. Whether the affirmatirre defenses asse&eaDefenda i t  make the 
? 
The Court will not recognize affirmative defenses which ase not properly 
brought before it against parties in interest within a reasonable time. See 1RCP 
17(a). In this case h1Ir. Bagley has not been named a party to this action which 
has been pending now for nearly four years. The Supreme Court brought 
home the fact that Sirius is a party to this action and not a third party 
beneficiary. As Sirius is a separate legal entity from Mr. Bagley this Court is 
obligated to consider only those defenses applicable to the parties named in 
the action. 
Defendar-tts have not claimed that the corporate veil sl~ould be pierced in 
this case. It is irnplied that because Sirius is a closely held corporation owned 
by Mr. Bagley and his wife that the affirmative defenses involving Mr. Bagley 
should be construed against Sirius. It is not enough to show a close 
relationship between the corporation and the individual, there must also be 
proved harm or a likelihood of h m .  Baker v. Kulciyk, 1 12 Idaho 4 t 7. (Idaho 
App. 1987). Here, there is no evidence that the corporation was formed 
~~rithout adequate initial capita1 or created to evaded honest obligations. There 
has been no evidence presented thaeirius is an alter ego of the Bagieys and 
therehre there are no grounds on u"i.,ich to pierce the veil of the legal entity of 
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Sirius. There is no evidence presented that harm would result in this case 
because the note was supported by adequate cctnsideration. Therefore the 
affirniative defenses irivoltring Mr, Bagley's conduct, ~rhetber urongful or 
not, are not applicable here. Had the Defendant impleaded Mr. Bagley his 
actions could be properly considered. It is weti settled Law in Idaho that a 
cross-cornplail is restricted to matters which are related to or depend upon 
the contract or transaction upon which the main case is founded. or affect the 
property to which the action relates. Hulfier v Porier, I O Idaho 72, (Idaho 
t 9041, C.L T Carp. v. Elliott, 66 Idaho 384, (Xdd~o 19451, See afso; Beco 
Ctirp. v. Roberts & Sons Const. C'o., Jnc., 1 14 Idafio 704, (Idaho 1988). 
Defendar~t fails to raise any valid defense to Sirius' ownership of the note as a 
result of Sirius' tvrongful conduct. Therefore the Court must find ownership 
rigkfully belonging to Sirius. 
In the alternative, this Court feels that the defenses raised by Defendant do 
not negate the Plair~tifFs rights to enforce the note and the underlying 
mortgage security due to a lack of evidence. 
6. m7bether a conflict of interest existed as to Mr. Banlev's re~resenting both 
Mr. and Mrs. Erickson? 
Dekndant claims a conflict of interest in representing both Defendant and 
uptcy despite a pending divorce prevented chargeable 
representation of Defendant. These defenses fail 3s Mr. and Mrs. Erickson 
were still married when the Chapter 1 1 work was performed. Both of them 
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agreed to the representation by Mr. Bagley because .they shared a common 
goal, and each had independent legal counsel representing them in the divorce 
proceedings. Therefore there W ~ S  no conflict. 
d, 
Initially tile burden of proof does lie on the anorney as to the reasonableness 
of his fees Jarrtzan v. Hale, 122 Idaho 952, (Idaho App. 1992) Once this has 
been show~i~  the burden of proving that the fees shouId not be paid lies with 
the party clairnilig the affirmative defense thereto. nonzas v. Arkoash 
Produce, I m ,  137 Idaho 352, (Idaho 2002). Mr. Erickson claims that because 
Mr. Bagley cannot produce an itemized billing statemeld reflecting the 
specifics of the legal charges they are not reasonable. Defendant aIso claims 
that he may raise the setoff defense as to Mr. Bagfey's wrongful conduct. 
Elowever. as discussed above, the facts slzow that Mr. Bagley did perform 
extensive legal work on behalf of Mr. Erickson by filing the Chapter 1 I .  This 
elltailed meeting -4th t11e client, conducting an inventow of assets, and filing 
scores of documents wit11 the ba&uptcy court. (Def.'s exhibit A) Mr. 
Erickson voluntarily signed the promissory note without duress or coercion. 
(Ericksoil Dep. 25: 10-25, 26: 1-4) This seems to indicate that Mr. Erickson felt 
that the charges were reasonable. He did not claim that the amount was 
excessive at that time, but rather to the contrary '"At that time I trusted Mr. 
aagley 100 percent." (Erickson Dep. 25: 10-25,26: i -4). He did have 
independent counsel review the fees in the proper~j  settlement agre, "merit he 
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entered into with his wife where he assumed all rhe debt responsibility for the 
legal charges. Mr. Erickson has not filed a complaint with the Uyonning Bar 
.Association in regards to the legal charges. Furthermore, Judith Shtrely who 
took over the already filed Chapter 12 banhuptcy proceedings charged in 
excess of $24,000 .for her legat fees, an mount comparable to those charged 
by Mr. Bagley. The fees charged by Mr. Bagiey are reasonable and 
Defendant has failed to meet the burden of proof as to any affirmative 
defenses regarding the fees. 
e. U;hetlier there was a conflict of interest caused by the violation of 
? 
Del'endant argues the property should not be deemed as Plaintif'rs because 
the transactio~l transferring the property to Mr. Bagley was prohibited, 
unlawful, and void under Wyoming law. T1iis defense is negated by the fact 
that no ocol~flict of interest existed. As to the assertion that Rule 1.8 was 
violated by Mr. Bagley this Court is governed by Idaho law which was not 
presented by Defendmts in suppol? of their argment. In fact, the very rule 
they cite as violated is a Miyoming rule. Nevertheless, this Court feels that the 
rule has not been violated because the note and securing mortgage were 
provided as consideration and not as an adverse ownership, possessory, 
seetrrity or other pecuniary interest. Were this Court to find othenvise, no 
attorney could enter into agreeme~~ts for payment as they wouid be in conflict 
with their clients thereafter. 
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CONGLtISXON: 
IT  1s HEREBY BmERED, DECMED and ADWDGED that pursuai~t o the 
above reasoning, the note represents a valid debt which was properly transferred to 
SIRIUS LC. Judgment is therefore entered in favor of the Plaintiff in tbe amount of 
$29,173.3 8 plus interest at the rate of ten percent (1 0%) per annum from November 13, 
1999 until the date of rhis judgment 
IT IS ALSO ORDERED that interest which has accrued on the note tlxough 
September 30, 2008 is equal to the sum of $336,138.17 and will continue to accrue in the 
arnount of $7.9927 per day until the date ofjudgment and will co~zinue to accrue 
tliereafter at the rate of 10% per annum until paid. 
IT IS ALSO O W E m D  the mortgage is a valid lien upon the real property 
described above. Plaintifrs liexi as evidenced by the mortgage is forever foreclosed and 
the property ellcu~nbered thereby shall be sold at a foreclosure sale in the nlanner by 
applicable law, with the proceeds thereof applied on the judgment, attorney's fees and 
costs, and such additionaj amounts as Plaintiff can prove was advanced for taxes and 
other items as ma) constitute liens against the property together with insurance and 
repairs necessary to prevent impairment of the security, together with interest the breon 
from the dale of the advancement. 
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IT IS H E m B V  DECWEC) that if any deficiency remains after app1icatior-t of the 
proceeds of the sale of the property, that the deficiency may be satisfied from any other 
property of Defendant" as allowed by applicable law. 
IT IS ALSO O W E m f )  the Plaintiff i s  awarded its reasonable attorney fees for the 
prosecution of this action in an mount: to be determined in accordance with the 
provisions of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
IT IS FURTHER 8mEME) the Plaintiff is awarded its reasonable costs and 
expenses incuned in this action to be deter~nined in accordance with the provisions of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
IT  XS FINALLY ORDERED The Plaintiff is hereby awarded post judgmellt interest, 
attorney? fees and costs it incurs in attempting to coIlect its judgment. 
P 
Dated this 2 day of September, 2008 
Don L. Harding I/ 
District Judge 
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THE MATTER B-EFORXi: TBE COURT; 
This onse comes bofore Lkto Court on PIaintiETs oon~plaint lo foreclose on property 
located within Caribou County. This Court's prior decision in tl~is matter w a s  nfFimed ia 
part and vaontcd in part &rci r~mandod from thc Idaho Supreme court saying 
consideration was given for the  note (al*ho~~glr t ~ e  Sixprefne Court decked to answer 
vvliett~ar it was adequate), and oase was rcrnmdcd as to the issue of thc a.ff5rmazive 
defenses ofthe Refendmxt. Defendant argues .the prap~rty should not bfti deemed as 
P f a i r ~ t i f f  s bocause t t le tm~xsztctioa trm~sfesring the property to h?ir. Bag l~y  was prohibited, 
unL~p\x,*Ed, and void under Wyoming law. Defendant argues that Ire may raisc thf.. se.toff 
defense as to R.Zr. Bagley's s~ongful  conduct. F ~ d e r m s r e  Defe~~ciartt contends that 
Fkdings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law Memormdum decision and Order 1 
IN THE DISTHCT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTNGT OF THE 
SEP 3 0 Pi4 4: 50 
STATE OF XBMO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF C 
SIRIUS, a l&7yoxning Limited ,I 






BRUCE H. ERXCKSON, .4hTI> ANY 1 
PERSON CLAIMmG BY OR TmOUGH j 
BRUCE EEUKSON IN AND TO THE 1 SUDGMEKT 
REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBED AS 'I 
FOLLOWS: 
1 
CARIBOU GOLPJTY, IDAHO: 1 
I 
TOWTSHIP 5 SOUTH. GE 46 E.B.M. ) 
SECTION: 27, LOTS 1 il_ND 2, N % NW "/h ) 
EXCEPT THEEFROM THE S % NE % ) 
XMJ % NW %, 1 
Defendmts. f 
'1 
It is hereby ORX)EmD, DECmED AND ADJUDGED that based on the 
reasoning col~aained in the Court's Memorar2durn Decision and Order dated September 
20, 2008, it is hereby O m E E D  that judgment is entered in favor of the Plaintiff in the 
a~nount of $29.173.38 plus interest at the rate of ten percent ( I  0%) per amurn from 
November 13. 1999 until the date of this judgment and will continue to accrue thereafter 
at the rate of 10% per mnum until paid. 
It is also ORCIERED that the Plaintiff may proceed with the foreclosure on the 
mortgage dated Xovember 13, 1999. PIaiiztiff s lien as evidenced bq the mortgage is 
Judgment 
forever hreclosed and the propedy encumbered thereby shall be sold at a foreclosure sale 
in the maturer by applicable law, with the proceeds thereof applied on the judgmer~t, 
attorney's fees 2nd costs, and such additional amounts as Plaintiff can prove was 
advar~ced for taxes and other items as may constitute liens against the propedy togedner 
witlt i~~surance aiid repairs necessary to prevent irnpaiment of the security. together with 
interest thereon from the date of the advancement. 
It is liereby D E C E E D  that if any deficiency rernaixzs after application of the 
proceeds of the sale of the property, that the deficiency may be satisfied from any other 
property of Deferidmt? as allowed by applicable law. 
It is also DECEEI)  the Plaintiff is hereby awarded its reasonable attornej? "Les for 
the prosecution of this action in an amount to be determined in accordance with the 
provisions of the Iddio Rules of Civil Procedure. The Plaintiff is also awarded its 
reasoriable costs md expenses incurred in this action to be determined in accordance with 
the provisions of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Fufibermore, the Plaintiff is hereby 
awarded post judgment interest, al-torney's fees and costs it incurs in attempting to eoifect 
its judgment. 
I9 Dated this 30 day of September, 20%. -
Judgment 
Don L. Marding 
District Judge 
GERTf Ff GATE 01: LJZAILING/SERVXGE:E 
I hereby certify that on the 2 day of September, 2008 I served a true copy of the 
foregoing docment on the attorneyjs)iperson!s) listed below by mail with correct postage 
d~erectn or causing lf ie same to be hand delivered, 
A~o~-ney(s)[Pers~n(s): Method of Service: 
A. Bruce Lars011 
Attorney at Law 
1 5 5 South Second Avenue 
Post Office BOX 6369 
Pocatello, Idallo 83305-6369 
Telephone: (208) 478-7600 
Faesir-rzile: (208) 478-7602 
E-faid Delivered 1 1 
By U.S. :\/fail 
Fax 
Bryan D. Smith Hand Delivered 
B. 5. DriscolI By U.S. Mail 
McGMTW, MEACIJM,  & SMITFI, Fax 
PLLC 
P.O. Box 50731 
4 14 Sfzoup Avenue 
Idaho Fails, Idaho 83405 
Tel: (208) 523-073 1 
Fax: (208) 529-4165 
Dated: 
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BRYCE H. EmCKSON, AND ANY 1 
PERSON CLAIMmG BY OR TBROUC3E-I 1 
BRYCE EMKSON XN AND TO T E E  
REAL, PROPERTY DESCRLIBEEID A S  
) > 
FOLLOWS : f 




SHE S SOUTH, RANGE 46 E.B.M. ) 
SECTION: 27, L O T S  1 AND 2, N % NW 'A ) 
EXCEPT TI-IEWFROM TEE S "/a NE % ) 
NW " LTW 54, 1 
D658ndmts. 
reasonir~g coidained in tho GoLu"~'s S e r ~ z ~ ) r a ~ z d u r ~ z  Llfecisio;~ and Order datecl September 
txrnowi of $29: 173 -3 8 plus inteerest at the rate of tcxi percent ((1 0%) per axmum froui 
Navell~ber 11, 1999 mtfi t l xo  date of this judgment a d  will continue to accrue ?hereafter 
at the rate of 1 OO/o per arm- until paid. 
It i s  also ORDERED that the Plaintrff may proceed with the forcciostx-e on the 
ri~o~-tgage dated Xovenaber 13, 1999. PIaintiS%s lien as cvidencsd by thc mortgage is 
1 
Judgment f 44 
- - 
Bryan D. Smith, Esq. - ISB No. 441 1 
B, J. Driscoll, Esq. --- PSB No. 7010 
s m ~ a ,  ~ ~ u s c o ~ ~  a hssocwres, P m e  
2008 DCT 111 P f l  't 21 
P. 0. B O ~  50731 
4 14 S h o q  Avenblc. 
ldstho Falls, ld&o 83405 
Telephone: (208 j 524-073 1 
Telefm: (208) 529-41 66 
AMorneys for Defendm 
Bryce £4, Ericlison 
STATE OF IDAWO. XN AND FOR OF' CAmOU 
SIRES LC, a %'yo 1 
f,iabiliw Company, 1 
1 
Plau~tiff, ) Case No. CV-04-284 
1 
\is. MOTION FOR 
1 WCONSDlEMTEON, OR mT TEE 
N A N U P E R S O P J  ) a m m  F B K m W  
OR m O U G X Z  1 
BRYCE H. ERXCKSON fiT nND TO 
WA.L PROPERTY D E S C D E D  AS 
1 
C ) 
T O W S m  5 SOUTH, RANGE 46 E.B.M., 1 
SECTIOX 27: LOTS 1 AND 2, N1/2 1 
NWI/4, EXCEPT S ?4 1 
NE114 NW % WJVli4, 
1 
Deferidmts. 1 
C O W $  NO%? defendmt, Bryce H. Ericksorr, by and k o u g h  his cowel ofrecord Bryan 2). 
$mi&, Esq., of the Grn of Sl\illTE, DRISCOliL & ASSOGL&ES, PLLC, and moves this court: 
purstlzult to Id& RuIes of Civil Proccdwe 11 (a)(2)(f3) and 59(a) for reconsidcratlon of &fie corn's 
Findings of Fact m d  Conclusions of Law Nemormduzn Decision and Order dared September 30, 
2008, mci the conesponding Judgment entered that same dare, on. in the altemadve, for a new trial. 
' I b s  Motion is made on the pounds and for the remom that the court should reconsider its 
hndxngs, conclusions, decision, and order. In the d tc rm~ve ,  -;he court should gmt a new trial mder 
Rule 59(a) for the reafons of f 1) irregPliari~ in the proeeedkgs of the court or order of llte court or 
abuse of discretion by which bfi. Ericlison was prevented &am having a fair hid; (6) insuBciency of 
the evidence to j ustijiji the court's decision and the declsion i s  against the law: and (7) sut error in law 
occurring at the trial. The facts relied on in st~pport of tile motion under Rde 59(a)(2 j are set fori:Il 
more lirffy in the =davit of Bryan 2). S~"iX1 filed concurrently herewi&. Tlte grounds for a new 
trial under Rde  59(a)(t;) and (7) are set forth. as folliows: 
I. The court's decision i s  against &e law because fhc consideration relied on by plaintiff 
violated Rule 1 .S(aj of the Idaho W e s  of Prof'cssiond Conduct a d  Rde I. -8(a) of the Wyoming 
Rules of Profession& Conduct for P+tiomeys at Law and rendered the promissory note md moagage 
prohibited, d 
2. The co~~st:\ decision is against the Xaw because the law and evidence showed that 
* 
Wi!li&m Bagley: f&e plaintiff's prior b w h p ~ c y  aaorney, charged Mr. Erickson for services rendered 
in Icgd mslpraciice. Mr, Bagley testified &at hc would have origjndtl:y 5Jed a Chapter 12 
proc~edhg dhe could have. The evidence at trial showed as a matter of 1awthat he could have Iiied 
b2OTION FOR RECONSfDEUTI43N, OR IN THE ALTEkNATPX, FOR. NEW T - 2  
F:\CLIEKTS\;BDS\7453Wieadings\O57 Msdon,Post Tnal.doc 
McGrach Meacham Smith <&B+ 
m%! 
-*<%A 
a Chapter 12 proceeciing, but that he did not. Mi. Bagley2 c h g e s  for his malprac&ce caaaor serve 
as considemtion. for the promissory note md mortgage the p f h ~ E  sues upcan. 
3 .  The court cormnitred an error in law at ;rtd by r eh ing  to allow Mr. Erlckson's expert 
wimess, Judiflx Sbively, to give her opinion ns to ?he dmages sde r ed  by Mr. E R C ~ C S O ~  a d  the 
ursasonabteness of Che aaorney" fee charge t h ~ t  formed rbe basis for the promissory note md 
mortgage. At trial, W. Ekckson" aaorney spec%e&y requested &at the c o w  take and report tbe 
evidence in full to preserve the issue for appeal, but the court refused to take m d  report h e  evidence 
in violation of ldabo Rule of Evidence 103@). 
4. The evidcnce was i n s ~ c i e n t  to justifjr the court's de~ision that the attorney's fees 
comprisi~~g the pronzissory note and mortgage were rewonable. U. Bagley provided ;lo itemrzation 
for Jtis charges. He did sot attempt to recreate an accomt;ing of his charges. 1-ie admitted &at be did 
not perform some of his work eE~ienfily where he filed multiple uusuceessful perhetory 
applications just to retain professionds, dhougb he charged for each of h s  fiiiled attemp% at filing 
these routine maners. Mr. Bagley charged M. Erickon $165 per hour when the b tcy court 
approved him to charge only $140 per hour. La a March 1 999 monthly financial report, Mr. Bagley 
represented that he was still owed $7,000 over the $5,000 Mr. Erickson Eilready paid, but by May 1 1, 
1999, M. Bagley was char ,~g hk.  Erickson $28,668.57. Chatgmg Mr. Erickson $1'7,668.57 In 
April arid May f 999 without any evidence to support ihese charges other than his own testbony &at 
rhe charges must be reasonable because he charged &ern is irrs&cient. short, there was an 
insui%iciency ol'the eviden~e at trial to justifjr &e court's decision regarding the rcasonablel~ess of 
the attorney's fees charged by MI. Bagley tba sewed as the basis for the psornisssrj~ nole and 
mortgage. 
MOTION FOR RECCrPr'SEB)EUTION5 ORIN - 3  
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4 - . The COW'S reksal to allow Mr. Erickson to arajse the aEma~t le  defense ctf setoff to 
the plahhfps eLjtim~ IS against the law and an error of law occurring at aid. For the c o w  lo allow 
the p l a i n ~ g  to rely on cons~deration &om a t k d - p ~ ~ ,  Mr. BagIey, v~vi&out considering the 
de5ciencies md legaliry of that considemtion creates an unasstlilable "super-considesation": that 11s 
contray to Ianv. " f i e  court r e b e d  to consider fie dmages from hiir. Badey's mdpractice as a setoff 
to the plajntifPs promissory mte artd mortgage based on W. Bagley3 scoaduct. 
6. *l%c COW'S dcc~slon. to selectively and bntedttendly apply Idaho law itnd Wyoming 
law PS against &e law. 
'7. The cocati's decis~on is ag&st the law to the exlent it awards the piaintiEfdamages for 
atl.omcy9s fees incmcd while the attorney, Mr. Bagley, acted under a conflict of interest in kis 
rcprcsentation of Mr. Eriekson. Specifically, k4.r. Baglcy represented both hlr. Erickson and -Mi. 
Erickson's wifc in b tcy while they were divorcing. Moreover, h4i. Bagley became m 
unsecwed creditor of -?&. Erickson at'ter the dismissal of Mr. E~ckson's Chapter I. 1 proeeding, but 
Mr. Bagley continued to represent (and charge) Mr. Erickson in dealing with Pvlr. Erickson's other 
creditors, The plaintiffs promissory note and moagage are unenforceable to foe exrent hey are 
based on anorney" fees incurred while the attorney operated under a ~onRict of  interest. 
Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 7@)(3)(C), Mr. Erickson will f'lle his brief in 
support of this motion and notice of hearing with the court w i h  t 4 days hereof. 
This motion is based on. th is  Motion, the forthco B,ef in S L C I . P P ~ ~  of hfofon for 
Reconsideration, or in rfie Alternative, for New Trial and the Notice of Hearing, tfie A,fYidavit of 
ar?/an D. Smi th  filed concwcnt;ly herewith., md the court records md files herein. 
McGrath Meacbam Smith 
#"* \g&$j$ 
D A E D  this 
~ ~ ~ o r r z e ~ s  Tor Defendmt 
Bryce E-l. Erickson 
X E E E B Y  CERTIFY that on "this 2008,I cawed atrue and 
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR mCONSX.DEK4TION, OR THE: 
&TEmhhWX, FOR NEW T K a  to be senred, by plachg the same in a sealed envelope 
m d  depositing it la Ihc United States Mail, postage preg&d, or hand delivery, facsimile 
nansmission or ovemi&t delivery, addressed to the fatlowmgg. 
A, Bruce Larson, Esq. 
Attorney a t  Ltmr 
Horizon Plaza Ste 225 
1 070 X-liline b a d  




t 1 F a  
[ 1 Hand Delivery 
[ ] OveAght Delivery 
MOTlOK FOR W68NSXDEMPION, OR UTEaLYATIVE, FOR hXW TRIAL - 5 
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Bryan D. Srtiith, Esq. - IS13 No. 441 1 
B. J. Uriscoll, Esq, - ISB No. 701 0 2008 M I  28 Pfl 12 22 
SMITH, DNSCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLG 
P. 0. Box 5073 1 
4 1 4 Sboup Avenue 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telepiione: 1208) 534-073 1 
Telefrur: (208) 529-4 166 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Ericksoii H. Erickson 
X THE BISTNCT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRfCT OF TI 11: 
STATE OF IUAI40, lfii AND FOR THE COUSTY OF CARTBOLJ 
SIRIUS LC, a Wyomirtg 1,imited 
Liability Company. 1 
1 
Plaintiff. ) Case No. CV-04-284 
1 
VS. 1 BMEF IN SUPPORT OF MOrl'lOIb' 
FOR WCONSZDEmTIBtu', OR IN 
ERlCKSON H. ERICKSON, AND ANY PERSON ) TEE: ALTEmATIEVE, FOR P.U'E%PT 
GLAXMnTC W D E R  BY OR THROUGH TRIAL 
ENCKSON H. EHCKSON IN AND TO THE 
REAL PROPERTY DESCMBED AS FOLLOWS: ) 
1 
CARfBOU COLNTY, IDAHO: 1 
TO%NSHIP 5 SOUTH, RANGE 46 E.B.M.. 1 
SECTTON 27: LOTS 1 AND 2, Nl/2 1 
NW 1I.I. EXCEPT TWEREFROh9 THE S 34 1 




1 -- - 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR REGBNSIDEIIATION, OR lK THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR NEW 
TRIAL - 1 
F.\CLlEliTS\BDS!7453!Pleadtags\059 Brief in Support of Post Trial Motion.doc 
'I'his case was tried to the court on July 30,2008. Tlne court entered i ts  decision awarding the 
piaintifi(.'Sirins'-) all the relief requested. Defeiidmt, Hlycr Erickson. ("Erickson") Files this brief in 
support of his motion for rccvnsiderarion or, in the jrpernative. for new trial. 
11. CHlt0NOLt)lGV 044' EVENTS. 
Since the tirne the court entered its decision, a new judge has assumed responsibility i'or 
this case. Erickson will provide a ch-rcjnology of events for the co~rrt's quick review. This 
choilnlqy of events is nut intended to cover all the evidence. But it does illustrate su~l ie  of the 
more important facts in the case. 
DATE EVEXT 
I OM1998 Erickson and his wife, Kathleen, were going "rough a divorce. 
Erickson was referred to Uiillim Bagley ('"agley") to file 
bankruptcy and stay foreclosure on the fmily  farm. Bagley began 
his represer?-tat.ion of Erickson. ' 
101811 998 Bagfey filed a petition fbr Chapter t I b a b p t c y  for Erickson in 
the Wyoming Banhptcy Court.' 
Erickson paid Bagley a $5,000 retainer to represent him in the 
Chapter 1 1 .3 
1 012 lil998 The United States Congress reer~acted Chapter 12 of the 
Icy Code retroxtivc to October 1, 1998 .4 
12/14/1998 Bagley prepared and later filed an unsuccesskl motion on bel~alf of 
Erickson's wife, Kathleen, while their divorce was pending, to join 
' See BagIey Depo., 624-7:3; 17: 19-10. 
"ee Enckson Exhlbit ,4-I. 
See Bagley Depo., 13:25-14:5; 20:25-2 1.6. 
See I I U.S.C Chapter 12 Legislative history and coments .  
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR E-tECONSU)ERATLrSPi, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR S E W  
TRIAL - 2 
F:\CLIENTSBDS\7453Wleadings\O59 Brief in Support of Post Trial Motion.doc 
her as a codebtor m the C'hapter i I ~ a s e . " a ~ 1 ~  nirw represented 
Erickson and Kathleen. 
2/19/1999 Bagley files a Chapter 12 petilion f i r  Erickson's wife, Kathleen. 
while their divorce is still pending." 
5/11/1999 The Wyoming B tcy Count enters an order dismissing 
Bagley's Chapter I I GFited for Erickson for failure to effectuate a 
plan after giving Bagley a 10 day oppodunity to cure the 
prrob~mjs).7 
Bagley agrees that he was not complying with 1 1 U.S.C. Section 1 1 12(61 
to prosecute a plan within the time period fixed by statute8 
Baglep accepts a part of the responsibifity for the inability to effectuate a 
plan as of Mar-ch 17; 1 999.9 
Bagley has no explanation why lie could not get a b 
confirmed in a case that was not complicated.'' 
61311 999 After dismissal of the Chapter 1 1, Bagley resumes representing and 
billing Erickson. " 
8/1!1 999 Bagley bills Eriekson $1,237.50 for services from June 3, 1999, 
though July 30, 1999. '~ 
9,411 999 Bagley bills Erickson $660.00 for sen-ices from August 2, 1999, 
through September 2, 1999. l 3  
911 1/i 993 Bagley is charging Erickson for working on a Chapter 12 
bankruptcy petition yet to be filed.14 
b e e  Erickson Exhibit B-I. 
See pp. 2-3 of Exhibit "&'to the Affidavit of Judith A. Shively filed concurrently herewith. 
7 See Erickson Exhibits A-69, '4-74 and A-87. 
E See Bagley Depo., 180: 13-18. 
S See Bagiey Depo., i 79: 18-180:G. 
'' See Bagley Depo., 197:3-7. 
I '  See billings Erom 'l"'iliiam Bagley to Bryce Erickson identified in Erickson Exhibits C-51 and C-52. 
I' See billings f om William Bagley to Bryce Erickson identified in Erickson Exhibits C-5 1 and 6-52. 
'3 See billings from William Bagley to Bryce Eriekson identified in Erickson Exhibits C-53 and C-54. 
'4  See billings from William Bagley to Bryce Erickso~~, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "BB" to the Affidavit of 
B. J. DriscolI filed concurrently herewith. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, OR IN THE ALTEWATIVE, FOR MEW 
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9/30!1999 Bagley bills Erickson $2, t 28.50 for scn~ices from September 7, 
1999, through September 28, 1999.'' 
11/1"999 Bagley bills Erickson $429.00 for services from October 6; 1999, 
through October 27, 1 999.16 
1 111 211 999 Since dismissal of the Chapter I 1 case, Bagley has biljed Encksor~ 
an additional $4,323 .57.17 
I 1,'13!f 999 Bagley has Erickson sign a promissoq note and modgage prepared 
by Bagiey payable to Sirius, LC, a company owned exclusively by 
Bagley md his wife, to secure payment of Bagley's attorney's fees 
from October 8. 1998 to November 13, 1999. l 8  
In addition to signing the promissory note, Erickson pays Bagley 
an extra $3.000?' 
Bagley did nut fully disclose in writing to Erickson the tra~ssactio:l 
and terms on whicls Bagfey acquired rfie security interest in a 
writing separate and apart from the note and mortgage. Moreover, 
Erickson never colssented in writing (in response to Bagley's full 
disclosure) to the trmsaction and terms before signing the note axid 
mortgage. 
12/3/1999 Bagley files a petition for Chapter 12 b a ~ h p t c y  for Erickson in 
the Wyoming Ba&uptcy Court and lists the debt on the 
promissory note to Sirius fur Bag1ey.s prior attorney's fees.'" 
6/6/2000 The Bankruptcy Court disqualifies Bagley from representing 
Erickson in the Chapter 12 bankruptcy, concluding that "courisel 
[to a Chapter 12 debtor] cannot hold an interest adverse to the 
[banknxptcy] estate," 'Mr. Bagley is a creditor," and "The security 
interest in estate property [i.e.. the promissory note and rnortgage 
in this case] could possibly be a prefereririal t~ lsf ier ."~ '  
15 See bllI~l~gs from Urrlham Bagley to Bryce Enckson identified m Erickson Exhrbrts (2-55 and C-56 
6 See blllrngs iLom Wtlltam Bagiey to Bryce Erlc~son ident~fieci In Erickson Exh~brt C-57 
' 7 See bJLlngs f i o n ~  Wr!ham Bagiey to Br--ce Enckso1-i ~dent~fied In Ertchson Exhzblts (2-5 1 through C-57 
i s  See S~rlus Exhibits I and 2 
9 See btll~ngs fiofn Wlfiian Bagiey to Bryce Er~ckson identified m Errcksor, E~hrbr t  C-58, s-e also Bagley Depo , 
SX 25-89.5 
" See Errckscl~l EXhlblts D-20 and D-36 
'' See Ertckson Exh~bit D-56 
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8/28/2006 Hugiey's attorney-client relationship with Erickson ends.22 
12120117000 Erickson retains Judilh Shively as new counsel irs the Chapter 12 
t3~kruPt~y ,23  
6i4/209 1 Erickson's Chapter I2  bdllhruptcy plan is coniir~~led'" 
8/20/2006 Erickson receives a discharge fi.orn banlicrqtcy after completion of 
the Cillapter 12 plan.25 
111. LEGAL STPrNDAmS. 
Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59ia)l. a new trial may be granted for an irregulariy in 
the proceedings, ir~cludi~ag my order of tile court or abuse of discretion, by which a party was 
prevented fro111 having a fair trial. Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)6, a new trial may be 
granted for insufficiency of the evidence to justify the decision or if the decision is against the law. 
Under Ida110 Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)7, a new trial may be granted for an error in law occurring 
at the trial. Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 1 l(a)(2)(B), a party can move the cou1-t to 
reconsider any interlocrttory order of the trial court at any time within 14 days after the entry of the 
final judgment. 
IV. THE COURT'S DECISION IS ACAIII\IST THE LAW BECAUSE THE COVRT'S 
DECISION DOES NOT ALLOW ERICKSON TO RAISE ANY DEFENSES N O L V Z N G  
BAGLEY'S WRONGFUL CONDUCT. 
This case can be broken down into two parrs: Sirius I and Sirius Il. Sirius I occurred when 
the trial court sua ;dponte granted surnmarq; judgment in favor of Sirius, and Ericksoli subseque~itly 
succcssiitl1-y appealed. Sirius 17 refers to all proceedings after the Supreme Court decided Sirius LC' 
-7 
-" See Pfaindfrs Answer to Interrogatory Xo. 7, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "A" to the Affidavit of B. J. 
Driscoil dated May 9, 2008 and filed with the court. 
23 See docket 73 in Erickson's Chapter 12 bankruptcy identified in Erickson's Exhibit D-8. 
24 See docket 98 in Erickson's Chapter 12 identified in the record as Erickson's Exhibit D-10. 
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I ~ .  E~-i-isk~son, I44 Idaho 3 8 (2007). In Sirius I, the trial court held that even though Sirius provided no 
consideration for the promissory note. Sirius could "borrow" consideration from the legal services 
that Bagley perfornled for Erickson. The trial court also ruled that Erickson had not produced any 
evidence to satisfy its burden of shotving any issue of material fact on its claimed deferzses agaillst 
Sirius. The ;rial court *also denied Erickson's motion to coxnpef to get discot?eq from S i r r~~s  to 
establist~ its defenses. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court heId that the senrices Bagley perforr~zed 
could serve as corzsideration for the Sirius note. Thus, the Suprerne Court held that Sirius could in 
fact "borrow" ~o~zsideration from Bagley. The Supreme Court then held that the triat court abused its 
discretion in granting sumniary judgment (by improperly placing the burden on tbe defendant) and in 
den3 ing Ericksoii the requested disco~ery. The Supreme Court remmded the matter for f~u-ther 
handling that ir~cluded Erickson's getting the requested discover?; and the triat court's determilling 
whether the 'borrowed" consideration was "adequate" in light of Erickson's affirmative defenses, 
which included "'set off" for Bagley 's malpractice. 
The trial court in Sirius 11 has held that ""the affimative defenses invofviiig Mr. Bagley's 
coilduct. whether '~wongfui or not, are not applicable here."26 In other words, the triai court has held 
that it ivould not consider whether Bagley charged Erickson ~ o n g f i t l l y  for Bagley's services. This 
is tanta~~~ount to a conclusion that the triai court would not consider the "adeqtlacy" of the 
coclsideratiirn for the Sirius note. This conclusion is contrary to footnote nunher two wl~ere the 
Supreme Cou1-t said: "111 one of his affirnnative defenses, Erickson alleges that there was "inadequate 
and insuficient consideration' to support the agreements. we hold that Erickson received 
'"ee Erickson Exhibit F 
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consideration f i r  the note, we do not opine as to the adequacy of the consideration" and the Sutpr-erne 
Court's holdirzg that "We vacate the district cousi's grant of summa7 judgment with respect lo 
Ericksox-i's remaining affinxative defenses and the denial of his motion to compel. The case is 
rernmdcd iisr h9-tl1er proceedings on those issues." Sirills LC v. Ericksor?, supra, 144 Idaho 42 and 
44. The Supreme Court h e w  t&dt Erieksors claijned Bagley had co~mit ted  malpractice and that 
Erickson c1aimed tiis legal services were insufficient for consideration to support the f irius note. 
Xf rile Suprelne Court had really thought as a matter of Law (like the trial court ibulld here) 
that the sufficiency o f  Bagley's senriees \%ere not '"pplicable," then the Supreme COT& would r~ot 
have retnmded the case to conduct discovery on those senices and to test the adequacy of those 
serc ices. Illstead. the Suprerl-ie Cowct would have simply ruled as a matter of law that Ericksort was 
lzct entitled to any discovery on Bhtgley's services because those sewices are legally irrelevant. In 
other words, if the Supreme Court's decision is to have any meaning at all, then the trial court's 
holding that ii3agley.s sersices are "not applicable here" is against the "Iaw of the case.*' 
A4oreover, for the trial court to allow Sirius to rely on consideration horn a third-paw 
(Bagley) witliout considering the deficiencies and legality of that consideration creates an 
unassail&le '%super-consideration." Just think of the implications. A crafty lawyer could avoid the 
cansequsr-ices of his o m  negligence by alvirays having his client execute apromissor3; ~iote to a third 
party entity the I a ~ y e r  awns. Then after the two year malpractice statute of limita~ions period has 
passed, the third party entit3 could sue tile client for payment. The client could not fife - ~oilnter - 
ciairn because the third party entity provided no services; the client could not file a third party 
'"ee Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law R4ernorancTum Decislon And Order, p., 9. 
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coriiplaiilt against the lawyer because the statute of limitations bad nm; and the clieiit could iiot roise 
the la\hiver7s negligence as a set off becsllrse the lawyer, not the third party, provided !he 
consideration. This would m~ount  to "super-consideration'" that would open the door to fraud and 
abuse (the kind that has happened berej. 
. THE COURT" DECISION IS AGAmST THE LAU7 BEC'4LJSE THE TMYS$LCTIOK 
IS li?lENFORGE,4BLE UNDER M'UOMIPJG RULE OF PROFESSIONAL COTu'DUCT 
'"An attorney's freedom to contract with a client is subject to the constraints of ethical 
considerations."'" Petit-Clair v. ,Velsa~z, 782 A.2d 960, 962 (N.J. Super. 2001); citations omitted. 
"'Any trailsaction bet~ieen an attorney and client is 'subject to close scrutiny."' id. at 9622; 
citations oxnitted. "'An attorney in his relatioils wit11 a client: is bound to the highest degree of 
fidelily and good faith. The strongest infiuences of public policy require strict adherence to stt~fi 
a role of conduct."" Id. at 962-963: citations omitted. "Consequently, an otherwise e~iforceable 
agreernerit bctiveeti an a ~ o r n e ~ i  and client is invalid 'if it m s  afoul of ethical rules gover~iirig that 
relationship. "' H. at 963; citations omitted. See nlsn ~ / h 1 1 ~ / 5 0 ' ~  ,4vcnuc, L.L. C. v. Sfcri~ar.d, 153 
P.3d 186 (Wash. 2007) ('Xttorney fee agreements that violate applicable mles of professional 
conduct are against public policy and uiletiforceable"). 
In 1999, Wyoming followed IVjroming Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(a) that read as 
follows: 
Rule 1-8. Conflict of interest: prohibited: transactions 
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly 
accpire an ovlinership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client 
unless : 
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(1) the trat~saction and terns on which the Lauiyer acquires the interest 
are fair md reasonable to the client and are .fully disclosed and transmitted in 
ivriting to the client in a marmer which can be reasonably understood by the client: 
(2)  the client is given a reasonable opporturzity to seek the advise of 
illdependent counsel in the transaction; and 
(3) the client consents in w~iting thereto. 
An attorney fee trmsaction in whictl the attorney secures payment with a prornissorq. note 
arid a security interest that viofates Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(a) is void and 
unenforceable. kiieYl5~l" Avenue, L.L. C, v. Steward, supra. 353 P.3d at 1 86 (holding that 
Ia\%?~er"s note and deed of trust securing payment of past attorney's fees are void and 
unenforceable unless la~qrrer strirtge~ztly complies with Rule 1.8 (a); and Pelit-Clul'r v. L3jelsan, 
supra, 782 A.2d at 960 (holding that note and mortgage securing attorney's fees were invalid 
where the lawyer failed to comply with Rule 1.8(a)j. 
The furtl~er importatlce of Rule 1.8(a) is that by its elrplress terms a Lamyer's failure to 
ihllow RuIe I ,8(a) renders the transaction a '"prohibited transaction." Erickson submits that 
"'proliibited" by law means "'untawfuf." 111 Uryorni~?g, as in most states, an unlaw-ful tralzsaction is 
void. Ti.ck~~izasl.ii v. Pepper Tmzk & Contr-ucting Co., 13 1 P.2d 339; 354-355 (W-yo. 1942): EIecISlt 
I> Acme Coal Co . 113 P. 758. 790 (Wyo. 191 1). Accordingly, the security agreerxent and 
trzsaction Bagley seeks to enforce through Sirius are ""prohibited," "unlawEu1,'kand "void" 
because Bagley did not comply wirb the provisions c?f Rule 1.8(a). Eriekson will address iti 
detail the issues that relate to this purely legal defense and wilt specifically address where the 
trial court er-red on this issue. 
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.''[AJn attorney-client transaction is prima facie ii.auduient.'" ~oilej~\50'~ .Ive,rue. L L  il 
1.. S'le~vnvd, szqra, 1 53 P.3d at 190; citatiolls omitted. See also P cli- ikf E ~ t e r .  I' h4tlrraj1, 680 
A.2d 790, (N.1, App. Uiv. l 936) (holding that a "transaction between a lauyer and client i s  
presumptively inva!id"l. Conseque~atly, """the burden of establishing fairness and equity of the 
tra~lsactions rests upon the attorney."' Petif-Ctair# v, hretson, supra. 782 A.2d at 962-963: 
citations omitted, 
Specifically, "D]he burden of proving compliance with Rule of Professional Cond~~ct  1.8 
rests wit11 the Ia~ayer." 1,llaliej1/50" Avenue, L.L. C. v. Sle~~crrQ supra, T 53 P.3d at 190. '"[.4] 
lawyer must prove strict compliance with the sal'eguards of Rule of Professional Conduct l.s(a); 
fuIL disclosure, opportunity to consult outside counsel, and conset~t must be proved by the 
com~nutiicatio~is between the attorney and the client." Icl. at 190. 'The disclosure which 
acconlpa~~ies an attorney-client transaction must be complete. Attorneys, to defend their actions, 
must prove they complied with the 'stringent requirements imposed upon an attorney dealing 
with his or her client. "' Id. 
A tavcyer seeking to prove compliance with Rule 1.8(a) does not meet his burden where 
involveinent of independent counsel is not meaninghl. "'The burden is upon the l a y e r  to 
beino~zstra~e that a real and meaningful opportunity TO seek independent counsel was afforded to 
the client." t7alleY/50'" A~)enue, L.L. C. v. Sfeward, supra, 1 53 P.3d at 19 1. ""The opportunity to 
seek independent advice must be real and mea~~ingful. It is not enough that at some moment in 
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rime an opponunity existed no ~ a i t e r  how brief or fleeting that opportunity might have been." 
id, at 190. 
By its express terms. Rule 1 .S/a) qpiies to all "security interests" a lawyer ia~owingiy 
acquires in his clicnt's pmperty. The ..ad~rerse'" requiremem applies only to "other pecuniaq~ 
interests.'"TEzis must be so because all securiy interests are necessarily ""adverse" lo the person 
whose property is subject LO the secilrit). interest. Although the "'adverse" requirement of Rule 
I . X ( l ? j  applies only to ''other p e w i a y  interests," case holds that a mortgage on a client's 
property given to the lawyer as secuiq is "clearly" a security inerest adverse to tile client. Petit- 
CIair 11 j"\ielsarz, supru, 782 A.2d at 963. See also I v r  re Taylor, 741 N.E.2d 1239 jl~zd. 200 1 ) 
(holding that a note and security interest in favor of an aiwrney in his client's residence to secure 
the payment of attorney's fecs is ""an interest in the client's property adverse to the client"); and 
In re Dotlglass, 859 A.2d 1069 (D.G. 2004) (holding that a note  hat requires the client to pap 
motley tn a Iav\yer is quite natwaIly understood as an interest "adverse" to the interests of the 
client). 
C.  Rule 1.8(al Applies To All Business Transactions mo t  Just Security Interests), 
And A Business Transaction Includes A Laivver's Taking A Note A12d Security 
Interest To Secure Payment Of Past Attorney" Fees. 
By its express terms, Rule 1.8(a) also applies to all '%~csi~ess fmnsncfinns" between a 
lawyer and his client. In lhis regard, a l a ~ y e r  \vho takes a security inxerest in his client's real 
property to secure pa j in~e~~t  on a note for payment ofpnsf attorneyas fees engages iiz a "business 
transaction" uritir the client that im-okes the protections of Rule 1.8(a). ~ a i l ~ / 5 0 "  .4ventie, 
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L I, C v 'i'lewar.4 stlprn, 153 P.3d at 196. Such an agreenient is not a fee agreement betsvsen a 
lawyer and client but in reality an agreement between a creditor and debtor that rises to a 
"buusir-iess transaclion" wi"i~in the meming of Rule 1 .@a). id. Here, the note and mortgage 
const~ttiie a '"business transaction" in addition to being a "security interest." 
D. 
At trial. Bagley testified that he did not cotnply with Rule 1 .%a) because he said his nnle 
and mortgage were not ""adverse." However, as explained above. a mortgage on a cliexrl's 
property to secure the payment of fees is 'ccciarly"' adverse. Petif-Clair 11. Neiison. supra, 782 
A.26 at 963. Even just a note payable to the attorney is "quite naturally understood" lo be an 
interest --adversen to the interests of the client. l~ re Douglass, supra, 859 A.2d at 1082. There 
is just no questiorz that a note and security interest in favor of an attorney in his client's residence 
to secure the payr~lent of attorney's fees is "an interest in the client's property adverse to the 
clicrtt" h2 re Tqdlor., szcpru, 741 N.E.2d at 1 242. Moreover, tl-re note and mortgage Bagley 
obtained from Eri~kson through Sirius was a "business transaction" within the meaning of Ruie 
I .& a). See ~ ' u t i e j ) i j @ ~  A V C ~ U C ,  L.L. C. 1.. S t c w d .  supra, 153 P.3d at 186. Accordingly, Bagtey 
was required to comply with Rule I .8(a) and in fact bears the burden of proof at trial that he did 
comply with Rule 1.8(a). However, as set forth below, Bagley did not con~ply with the 
requiverns~zts of Rule 1. %a). 
1. The transaction and terms OM which Bagley acquired his interest are not fair and 
reasonable to Erickson. The RRe Estate Mortgage Erickson signed mortgaged 173.35 acres ro 
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~ a ~ i e ~ . ' ~  This propen). is hnown as the "Deer Creek I'roprfly" with a stated value on Dcccmbcr 
9. 1998 of $688.000'~ and a stared value on December 1, i 009 of $602,000.'~ The banh-ruptcy 
docunlents show only two secured creditors other than the Sirius note on the Deer Creek Property 
at the tiiilc Ragiey filed the Chapter 12 on December 3, 1999.'' One creditor was First Security 
Sank whose secured claim in the Beer Creek Propeq was $1 15,000. and the other creditor was 
Wyoming Farm Loan Board whose secured ciaim in the Deer Creek Property was $70.000." 
Using the lower $602,000 value -for the Deer Creek Property, Bagfey obtained at least $4 17.000 
of unencumbered coIIatera1 to secure a note in the an~ount of $29,173.38. 
The picture of BagIey7s over secured positio~l is far worse considering the reality of the 
situation. In this regard. Erickson had assigned a $97,000 receivable to First Security Badi tvho 
was applying the $97,000 receivable to pay off its 91 15.000 claim." Giving credit for this 
$97,000 receivable increases Bagley's over secured position to $514,000 on the $29,173.38 note. 
Even worse, the total value of Ericksorl's real properv was $1.3 million in which First Security 
Bank and Wyoming Farm Loan Board also held security for their $1 15,000 and $70,000 claims 
respectively." This means that once First Security Dank and Wyoming Farm Loan Board were 
paid from the other properties sold in the Chapter 12, Bagley wouId be the !one remaining 
secured creditor with security valued at $602.000 for his $29,173.3 8 note thus making Bagley 
over secured by as much as $572,000. And, in fact, Bagley admits in his closing brief that '..[n]o 
27 See Srrlus Exhib~t 3. 
28 See Ericksol~ Exhibrt A-27. 
"See Erickson Exhibit 0-30 
30 See Erlckson Exh;firtit D-36. 
3' See Erickson i-lxtxib~t D-36 
32 See Ei'lchson Exh~b~ts  D-32 and 36. 
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other part) iv idl  a priority greater than the Plaintiff has claimed an interest in the real proper5 
tilai is the subject to this actionsyG4 
"54 fee ayreernent between a lawyer and a client, revised after the relationship has been 
established on Perms more favorable to the lawyer than originally agreed upon tnay be void or 
voidable unless rhc attorney shows that the contract was fair and reasonable, free from rti~due 
infuence, and made aiier a fair and full disclosure of the facts on which it is predicated."' 
irulie-~,50"' A V ~ ~ Z Z I I ? ,  L.L.C. Y. ,riewurll, supra, 153 P.3d at 189. A mortgage lo SGCLIT~ a note for 
past attorney's fees has been found to be unfair and unreasonable where it expmds a client's 
Liability i j r  beyond the terms the lawyer md client originally agreed to. Petit-Clair I'. Nelson, 
supra, 782 A.3d at 960 {finding that independent counseI may have convinced the client not; to 
execute the li~or-tgage securing a note for past attorney's fees where the original debt was owed 
by eczr13orations, not indi~ridual clients personally). 
Here, the original agreement with Bagley was that Erickson was to pay him $140 per hour 
plus costs. The original agreement did not inelude any terms for security. The origirsal 
agreetnerrt cer-tai~:iy did not include giving Bagfey a security interest over securing Bagley 
between $41 7,000 and $572,000. Any independent lawyer not wanting to commit malpracrice 
would have advised Ericlcson not to pledge his entire 172 acre farm with a net equity value 
bel'c'i~ecsn $317,000 and $572,000 to secure Bagley's $29,173.28 note. Erickson submits that sucli 
an over secured pusl~ion heavily irz favor of Bagley is neither fair nor reasonable to Erickson. 
"' See Errckson SAiblis 1)-30 and 36 
54 See Sirius's Cios~ng Brief p , 3 
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2. Ragley did not kI ly  disclose the transaction and terns in witill& to Ericksoil at a11 
let alonr: in a malmer Erickson could reasonably ur~derstand. 'The only documents 11l;et contzin 
elte transxtion and iems are the note and mortgage Esickson signed. Bagley was unable to 
terms identi6 any scparnle writing, a case law requires, fillly disclosirig the transaction and th, , 
to Erickson that he could rlien consent to as Rule I .S(a) requires. It? re Exlaill-! O ~ U T C I I Y M ,  930 
h.2d 249,253 (D.C. 2007); Irz re Slephe~s, 851 N.E.Zd f 256. 1258 (Ilnd. 2006); L U W P ~  
Disci/7iir?aq* Board v. Btrrtrer, 566 S.E.2d 24S1 15 1 W.Va. 2002): and Mailer o f C I ? q f i o ~ ,  183 
B.R. 121, 136-137 (Ba&.E.D. Mich. 1994). 
3, Bagley did not give Erickson a reasonable opportu~zity to seek the adx~ice o f  
independent counsel. There tvas no evidence at trial that Bagley gave E-rickson a reasonable 
opporturri~ to seek the advice of independent counsel. L4s explained above. Bagley bears the 
burden of proving his compliance with Rule 1.8(a). i/ailev/50" Avenue, L.L. C. v Steward. 
szcpra, 153 P.3d at t 86. Afthouglr Bagley testified that Erickson had a divorce lawyer who 
included the debt to Bagley iri the Maniage Settlement ,Agreement, there was no evidence that 
Erichso~i eves had the opportunitji to seek the advice of the divorce lawyer with regard to the 
transaction. In fact. the Decree of Divorce was entered on October 19, 1 999.j5 But Erickson 
signed tlic prnmissoty note and mortgage on November i 3. 1 999.3"herefore, by the time 
Erickson signed the promissoy note and mortgage, the divorce case was concluded. Bagley 
failed in his busden to present my evidence that the promissor~i note and mortgage xvere even in 
existence during :!re ililrorce for Erickson-s divorce attorney to review tit provide advice c?n. 
;5 See Sirius Exhibit 6 .  
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4. Hricksorz did not cozzseat in writing to the terms of the transaction. The onlqi 
hritterm culiscnt Bagley cnllid point to is the Mmiage SeTtlm~ent Agreement the divorce iaqters 
prepared m d  that Erickson signed on September 14, 1 990.j7 However, Bagley admits that the 
lal-riagr Setticincnt g r e r ~ n e n t  contains none of the terms of the transaction and specifically 
does not er eii identrfq. the property in which Bagley would claim a security interest "rough 
Sirius. Citcn tliese facts, Bagley cannot meet his burden of proving ""srlct compliance with the 
safeguards of Rule of Proicssional Conduct 18(a)." ~ai ic~/50"  Avenue, L L C v Sicivo~d, 
hitoreover. Erickson submits that Eriekson's simply affixing his name to the R4arriage 
Settle~lnerzt Agreeme~~t that refere~~ces the debt to Bagley is not "informed consent" just as rnerely 
siglli~lg a listing agreement is insufficient to show a client's "iinfomed cor~sent" in ~iritirzg (in re 
Eslufe ofBrol.rj~. supra, 930 A.2d at 249) and merely signing a check is insufficient to show a 
client's "ixllonned consent" in writing. L n ~ y e r  Disciyllnary Board v. Barber: supra, 565 S.E.2d 
E. Erickson Has Found Two Cases That Have Addressed The Very Issue Presented 
Here And Both Hold That A Note And Securitv Agreement A Law~er  Obtains 111 
Violation Of Rule 1.8 Are Not Enforceable. 
At least two courts have held that a note and security agreement to secure payrxent of 
attorney's fees constitute a '-husfrress trmsactlon" and or "security interest" subjecting the lawyer to 
the ~nandator). pro\-isins of Rule I &a,). Ln ~hlle.~/5i?ih Averrue, L L. C. v. SCeivm-t. sup!-a. 1 53 P.3d 
at 1 86. the Suprerne Court of Washington reviewed a sec~red trarnsaciion between a fir111 a i d  its 
j6 See Sirius Exhibits 1 and 2 
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client. The firm rcqulred d-ie client to sign a promissor); note allit deed of trust as securiq f ir  pas: 
aonley's fees. At the time they enlcred the agreemeiil, the client owed the fm S 160.IilaO.!m. 
Affer &e client defaulted, the firin sought to foreclose on the deed of trust. 111 its defense, the client 
ague3 t!lctt 111e securiv agrcenre~lt was unenforceable because the attorney oblairri-d it in vinlatiorr 
of Ruie 1.8 (a). -rile trial court and corn of appeals nlled thzt the alleged violation of RLllc I .gid 
did not render the security agreement mencorceable. However, The Suprernz Cot11-t of 14,'asInin@on 
rexersed boll1 the trial court and court of appeals. reasoning as follows: 
The deed of trust ti-e., tlie security agreement] at issue in this case has the 
cbtamcler v f a  business tmnsncfiniz belrveerz a lawfirm and its cjiezzt. Though 
described as a fee agreement by the Firm, it was, in fact, relevant to a sigrzt~cnrzl 
existirig debt. . . . The relationship was trot merely nttnrp-aey-client; it rvns also 
erectitor-ctebtor. . . . [IJt was in reality an agreement between a creditor and a 
debtor. Furthemore, the fee agreement entailed the corzveyaitce of a securig 
irzierest ijt the client's proper@> a trazzsuctloiz absent safeguasds spec@cal& 
proltil~ited by RPC lr.8(a). Finally, we note the Finn advised its o m  client on a 
mettzod of paying the debt owed to it--a meflzod a clisi~tevested attorney nzigl'tt izof 
h nve erzcournged. 
(Emplyasis added .) 
Concluding that "the note and deed of trust was more like a business transaction than a fee 
agreemer~t," the J/alley court applied the mandatory requirements of Rule 1.8(a). hportantly, the 
I/izlt"iy court never questioned .ivhether the securit-y interest was "adverse." Rather, the court 
focused on the "character" of the security agreement and the "creditor-debtor" relationship between 
the parties concluding that the lawyer bad entered into a "%business trmsaction" requiring 
3' See Slrlus Exl-iibr: 3 
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In Pellt-(:!air. I! A7elso~, supra, 782 X.2d at 960 (3.J. 2001 1, the Kew Jersey appellate court 
held &at a lmq er's mortgage on the cfier~t~s residence constimed a security interest ur-tder Rule 
t .8(a). The court explained, " " ~ l n  aaorney's freedo~n to contract with a. client is subject to the 
constraints of ethical considerations' and the Supreme Court's supervision." Id at 992. The Petit- 
Claw court continued, '" [Aln agomey in his relatioils with a client is bound to the highest degree of 
fidelity anct good faith. The strongest idluences of p~tblic po1ic) require strict adllererzce to s ~ ~ e h  a 
role of conduct. Gonseyuer~tIy, an otherkvise enforceable agreement behraieen an attorney and client 
is invalid "if it runs afoul of ethical mles governing that relationship. "' 62 at 963 (quotations 
ornitted'l. 111 concluding that the Lawyer had violaled Rule 1.8(a), the court noted, "By its vei? 
tetms. [Rule 1.8(a!] is ma~datov." 'Id: at 963. Based on these obsematims, the cotll-t held. "Hcrere, 
it is clear: that defe~~dlmts' t~iortgage on their personal residence given to plaintiff [attorney] was a 
'security . . . interest adverse to [the defendaits]. . . .'" Ic- Because -the lawyer could not prove 
compliarice with Rule 1.8(a), the court held that the note and security agreenient were 
wienforceabf e. 
The J'nlley and Pefit-Clair eases are strikingly similar to this case. Just like this case, both 
17alledv and Petit-Clair i~rvotve an attorney's obtaining a promissoq note and a mortgageideed of 
trusr from their clielnts as vehicles to secure the pay~nent of past attorney's fees. Just like this case, 
both J izllcj9 ar~d Pelif-Cluir inxrs1ve the issue of whether the aactrney could foreclose on their 
respective clients' real property. Just like this case, the rjauyers in both fialle-y m d  Petit-Ctcnir did 
not cornply with the requiremeas of Rule 1.8(a). Just as the courts in both Falle~ =d P~rir-CIair 
11oid t11at the promissory notes and mortgage a-~d eed of trust constituted a "'business 
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trmsacriorv'securiq interest" within the meaning of Rule 1 .S(a), this court should rule that Bagtey's 
imte and tnorrgage he obtai~led th-rougla Sirius coristiturr: a ""business trmsactionisecurity interest" 
witl~in the meaxing of Rule 1.8(a). And just as the courts in both Vatley and Pelif-Clair hold that 
the attorneys' failure to corz~ply with Rule 1.8(a) reridered the promissoq notes and naortgage and 
dezd of trust invaIld and unenforceable, this court too should mle that Bagley's failure to cctmply 
with Rule 1.8~af retxders the promisso0 note and mortgage invalid and unenforcedle 
The trial court mied that Bagley did not violate Rule 1.8(a) because "the note and securing 
mortgage were pro~ided as consideration and not as an adverse ouaership, possessoly, security or 
other pecmiay interest." If- it were not so, says the court, then ""no attorney could enter illto 
agreements for payment as they uioibld be in codict  with their clients tthereafier." The COLU? is 
simply wrong on this point. AII aMorney can agree to provide services for paj~ment. This does not 
eveti implicate, let alone violate, Rule 1,8(a). The aaomey works, and the client pays. No problem. 
Rule 1.8(a) does not even apply or become implicated. Rule f.8(a) applies when the client does not 
pay, and the attomy takes a security agreement in the client's property to secure his fees. Now 
Rule I .8(aj applies because the at"conzey has just taken a "security interest" in his client's property. 
The attorney Izas also entered a "'business transaction" because tbe relationship has changed kern 
at.iomex~/cliex~t to er-editoridebtor, Thus, it is simply a false dile a to say that "'no attorney could 
enter into agreements for payment as "iknej- would be in conflict with their clients" if tlris court were 
to apply Rule 1,8(a) to the facts of this case. 
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Moreover, the trid court wroi1g1y states that ('the note and securing mortgage were 
prorrided as considerrztion and not as an adverse ownership, possessay, security or other 
pecutiiq interest.'TThis is another false d i l ema .  The note md securing xnofigage are not 
either "consideraliurz" or a '"security interest." The note and securing martgage can be both 
""consideratio~t" and a ""seuriq interest.'" Xn this regard, the court misreads Rule I .S(a) to require 
an 'kwinersfiip,"  p posses so^," or '%ecurit>;" "interest to be ""adverse" before " t h e  rule will apply. 
Rule 1.8(rz) addresses "ownership interests," '>ossessory interests," '"ecufity interests,'. or 'ktlteer 
peculzinr-v ifzterests adverse to a cliear." Rule 1.8(a) nccesstrrily assumes that all ""ownership 
interests," "'ppossessory interests,'. m d  "3ecwity interests" "at a lawyer gets in his client's 
property x e  adverse to t l~e  client. Not to limit its application to just these necessarillr adverse 
i~~terests, Rule 1.8(a) contains a '"catch all phrase" to cover all ot!zerpecunl'niy iizferests nrlverse 
to n ctietzt. T1iis "catch all phrase" is obviously designed to head off some creatively titinking 
Ia\&yer trying to avoid the requirenlents of Rule 1.8(a) tvho says that his pecuniav iriterest may 
be adverse, b .~ t  it is nei-l-f~er an "ownership interest," '"ossessory interest," nor a "security 
interest.'. Therefore, the ''catch all phrase" is necessav to encompass all other yecuatinry 
ifzterests ndvsrse to n client besides just inherently adverse ""ownership interests," ""pssessory 
interests," aid ""security interests,"' 
Even assuming that the security interest at issue here must be 'badverse" to trigger Rule 
1.8ja), t i le  mofigage clearly is adverse to Erickson. In general theoretical terms, a mortgage 
neeessariip is adverse to the fee holder. See ira re Taylor. supra, 741 X.E.2d at 1239 (holding that 
a note aid security interest in favor of an attorney in his client's residence to secme the payment 
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o f  attorney's fees is "an interest in the ciiei~t's propedy adverse to the client"); and In re 
Dczugicilz~, .iupru, bScj A.2d at I069 (holdkg that a note that requires the clierrt to pay money to a 
lawyer is cjlt~te naturitlly understood as an interest "a&erse" to the interests of the client,?. 111 
spccif:c 1,iaaical terms. Eickson mortgaged his $602,000 f m  for $29,173.38 resulting (1 j in 
t i le DaglcyiSirius note being the only secured interest in the fm; and (7) in his  very laarsuit in 
which Bagicy through Sirius seeks to foreclose on Eiicltson's $602,000 fium to pay a alleged 
$29,173.38 debt. 
FinaUg, by its express terms, Rule 1.8ia) applies also to '-business tmnsactions." ?he ~ i a l  
court never even discussed wheil~er the transaction here mounts to a "business nansaction."' 
However. as a matter of Law. a lawyer who takes a security interest in his client's real properly to 
secure pajime~lt on a note for paynlent ofpast ar-tomey's -fees engages in a '"business transaction"' 
with the client that invokes the protectioiis of Rule 1.8(a). ~aiie~/50'" Avenue, L.L C r. Sie~ioi-d, 
st~pri-r, 153 P.3d at 186. The reason is that once a lawyer takes a security interest in his client's 
property to secure fees, the relationship changes from attomeylclient to creditorldebtor. Id. 
For all the reasons stated above, the trial court's analysis with respect to Rule I .&a) is 
wrong. Rule I .8(a) applies to this case to prohibit enforcement of the Sirius note and mortgage. 
VI. TIXE COURT'S DECISION IS AGANST THE LAW BECAtTSE THE EVIDENCE IS 
CmDISPUTED THAT BAGLEY COMMITTED MALPRACTICE THAT CAUSED 
E'FetCKS0S.i DAMAGES. 
In U'>roming. "[a] t a ~ y e r  shall not make a11 agreement for, charge, or collect a11 
u~weasunable ike or an uixeasor~able amount for expenses." Wyo. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5. In 
Idaho, the law is identical. See I.R.P.C. 1.5. Thus, whether under MTycsrning law or Xdabo law, 
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Rngielr ~nnnot  "kchrge. or collect an ulucssonable fee." Id. To the extent the p romisoy  note 
includes a pol9ion ii,r unreasonable afomey? fees, that poaion of Ihc note is unreasonable, i.e., 
not supported by adcqrrate consideration, and Erickson sl~ould get a credit or set off for that 
ur-~reasonable a111olltlt. However, the trial court gave Eriekson no credit for any unreasonable fees 
Bagley eliarged, 
In this regar-d, Bagley Gfed a chapter I I for Erickson or1 October 8. 1998. The ban2tluptcqr 
court disr-riissed tile CI~apter I I on May 1 1. 1999 for failure to effectuate a plan after giving 
Ragley an order to cure the dcfecr(s). At the time Bagley filed the chapter 11, Chapter 12 was 
not available. However, 13 days after Bagfey filed the Chapter I I ,  Congress reinstated Chapter 
12 retroactive back before the time Bagley filed the GI-rapter I I .  Conversion was available from 
a Chapter I I to a Chapter 13, and Bagley could have and should have converted the Chapter 1 1 
to a Chapter 12 just 13 days after he filed the Chapter 1 I .  See f 1 U.S.C. Section 11 12(d). 
As evicicnlce that Bagley's conduct was below the standard of care for not car-iverting the 
Chapter I I to a Chapter 12 once it became available, Bagley himself testified that he would have 
initially filed this case as a Chapter 12 if it had been available because Chapter 12 is Iess 
cvqlicated and more debtor 6-ieudly than a Chapter i I where Erickson is a r;j~mel-irancher.~" 
Bert Ragley never considered converfing the Chapter L I to a Chapter 12 until after the Chapter 11 
xias dis~~issed."  h fact. Bagley never even h e w  that the Chapter I I could have been converted 
in a Chapter 12."' Juiii.ch Shively, Erickson's exper!, testif ed that Bagley's failill-:: to convert 
38 rn see  Eagle] Depo , 7.9-1 6 ,  31 20-42.2 
34 See Bagiey Depo , 3 7 5 8  
40 1 see Bagiey Depo.. 42.12-14. 
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from a Chnpter I 1 to a Cbaptm 12 under these l j t l s  was conduct below the standard of care 
becmsc a Chnpter I:! is much better for farmers and ranchers. Bagley never disputed Ms. 
Shit ell's testimony on this 13oi1lt. This means that the evideilce is undisputed that Bagley 
engagcd iz: negiigencc when be ilziied to convefl the bankruptcy from Chapter 11 to Chapter 12. 
As for damages, Ms. Shivel? took over Crickson's Chapter 12 case after the bakup tcy  
court discf~arged Bagley for his conflict of interest. Ms. Shively was able to get the Chapter 22 
plan appro~red. and Erickson successliizlly completed the plan. Eriekson ultiznateiy received a 
Chapter 12 discharge order, Tliis proves tIiat if Bagley bad converted to a Chapter 12 and 
peribrrned competently, tie too could have gotten a Chapter 12 plan approved, Erickson co~rld 
!lave successfu!ly completed the plan, md Erickson ultimately could h a ~ ~ e  received a discharge 
order, hlore impo13ant, Erickson would not have incurred attorney's fees for the failed Chapter 
11. iZs it turns out. Bagfey did not convert to a Chapter 12, but instead was responsible for the 
Cfrapter 1 7 get"iing dismissed for what amounts to a Lack of prosecution. In the end, Bagiey 
charged Ericksori $Z7,68.57 for a "no value Chapter 11 dismissal" when Erickson should have 
gotten a valuable Chapter 12 coril-ir~xation just like Ms. Shivefy got Erickson-if Bagley had 
converTed and cornpete~itIy completed the Chapter 12. 
Ail this means that the promissory note at issue in this case is inflated by the annount 
Bagley's negligence cost Erickson. Because the trial court's previous decision is agai~sr  the law, 
!his COW should grant a. new trial to determine this m ~ o u n t . ~ '  
- 
.! j This argument does not even address the clear malpractice that exlsts by Bagie~  al!uw:ng the cour-t to disrr,~ss the 
Citapler 1 : for farlure to effectuate a plan 
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VI1. THE COLJRT GOMMYTTED E M O R  AT TRIAL BY REFUSII.jG TO AlaLOW 
EWCKSON'S EXPERT TO GIVE HER OPmXON EGAmXNG DAhilACES PLND TO --- 
TAXCEI'HE TESTIMONY ON THb WC0m TO PIeSERVE IT FOR LAPPEAL. 
.'In the case of a11 inconeet ruling regarding evidence, a new trial is rnerited only if the error 
affects a substantial right of one of the parties." Clark v Keiin, 137 Xd&o 154, 156 (20021. See ttlso 
6'a]?~?s v. Wood, I 10 Idaho 778 ( 1986) (error in excluding testizony was prejudicial error warra~lting 
new trial 1; md Lur7zbet.t v. JVorthwcsrent LVal. ff2s. C't, , t I5  Idaho 780 (Ct. App. 1989) (Ilo!ding that 
exclusion of expert witness testirnon>i was prejudicial error). 
The trial court colnniitted error at trial by refusing to allow Erickson's expert witness, Ms. 
Shivel>, to give her opinion as to the attorney" fees damages Eriekscsn sustained as a result of the 
Chapter I 1 .  On this issue, Ms. Shively testified that First Security Bank and Fir-st National Bank 
recovered attorney? fees for the work their aaorneys periitrmed in the Chapter I I that included the 
work they did iri bringing a motion to dismiss the Chapter I I that the court did in fact dismiss. 
Clearly, atiy anzount of attorney's fces Ericksorz had to pay the two banlcing creditors for their 
attorney's fees in the failed Chapter I I (that Bagley should I-lave converted to a Chapter 12 and 
gotten eonfir~~led) should be set off against the Sirius note as damages caused by Bagley's 
~sgtigence. Eve11 Bagley admits that Erickson bad to pay these ereditsrsbattorney's fees for the 
work they did in the failed Chapter I I .42 
After allowing Ms. Shiveliy to r:esti@ that Erickson paid $9,750 in attorney's fees to First 
Security Baa& for its work in the CL~apter I 1, the trial court would nor: allow Ms. Shively to 
42 Se; Bagley Depo.?62: 10-17; G3:7-3; 6 4  i -65:4; and 192: 13-1 949 
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testify tinat Eri&son also paid First National Rank $8.500 for the xvurk it did in the ihiied Chapter 
1 i proceedings. The issue bere is tirat h l s  Sliivcly kiiew the amount of fees paid to First Securiq 
Bank because those fees are a :niizEer of record in the Chapter 12 where they were paid. 
E-Iowever, First Yational Bank's fees were paid outside the Chapter 12 and the records 
sstablisfiing rile fees were lost. Thus, Ms. Shively was prepared to offer her opiniotz 011 the 
rwbinimti~n doliar amount those fees must have been. But the court ruled that she was not an 
expert i11 ""dmagrs" although clearly die has the tmining, experience, and education to testi@ on 
tile n~ir~lmtlrn amortnt of attorney's fees Erickson must have paid. But the court did not allow 
this testimony. 
' I l l i s  erzor is pre-judicial because Erickson has a right to receive a set off against the Sirius 
note in the a i~~ount  of the damages. Another way to state the right is that the note lacks 
consideration to the extent of the damages. In either event, the court's (1) not giving Erickson 
any credit for the $9,750 in attorney's fees paid to First Security Rank; and (2) not ailowing Ms. 
Shively to testify that Erickson also paid First Natiortal Bank $8,500 is prejudicial enor. 
?\/loreover. refusing to aflvui a parry to put into the record excluded testimony is error that 
routinely results in a new trial. See Perkins v. Commanweulth, 834 S.bY.2d 182 (Kentucky 1992) 
(holding tltat court's refusal to allow defendar~t o make avowal after precluding cross examination of 
police officer was reversible error); Sfale v. ,FiOdges, 734 P.2d 1.161, 1168 (Kan. 1987) ("The trial 
cow? clearly er~e=l by denying the State's requested proffer of the testimony of Dr. R4odlin"); and ,%'ix 
v. i f l l n ~ r e  1~~zur.unce Cocrzpirnj). 314 S.E.2d 562 (Ct. App. N.C. 1984) (trial c o w  ~om~nit ted 
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rr\~ersihie error requiring new trial where it refused to piace excluded testimony on the record iur 
later appellate review). 
Hen:, E2:ickson.s attomey specifically requested at the trial that the court take and report the 
evidence in full fro111 Mr. Siiiveiy to preserve the i sue  for appeal as mandated under Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 1(13(b). Counsel illtended to ask hds. Shiveiy about her qualifications and the nature of!icr 
testimoilr if tire court zvnuld have aiiuured it. However. the court rehsed tit al1o.i.i Ms. Shiveiy to 
give her testimony on tile record so that the court reporter could report it iri full as Rule !~3(b)  
requires. 'This too is prejudicial error. 
VIII. THE EVIDENCE WAS TNSUFFICIENT '1.0 JUSTIFY THE COURT'S DEGISIOA 
THAT TEIE ATTORKEY'S FEES COMPRlSENG THE PROR4iSSORY NOTE AXD -
MORTGAGE %TEN3 mASONABLE. 
The trial cou-t Iield that Bagley has the burden of establishing that the amount of his 
tlttomey's fees is reasonable. However, Bagley has not met his burden to prove that his 
attorney's fees of $28.668.57 for the Chapter I I proceedings are reasonable. Specifically. Sagley 
lzas tiever testified that $28:668.57 is a reasonable a111ount for at-torney's fees for the work he 
performed in the Chapter I I proceedings. Bagley bas not identified the work he performed in the 
Chapter I1 proceedings. Bagley has no attorney billings to document what services he 
performed in the Chapter 11 proceedings because he lost Bagley can provide no 
itenzhnfiorr or si~ow what he actually charged for the work in the Chapter 11 proceedings.4' 
Bagley can proside no azccouiztitzg or brenkcEcrrwz for vv~hat he charged to arrive at the total figure 
45 See Bagley Depo., 69: 19-24. 
44 See Bagley Depi?., 70: 15-19. 
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of $141,668.57." 9Bagiey simply cannot locate h s  billings to justify his attorney's fees lir: the 
Chapter 1 1 j3rocedirigs and has made no effort to recreate the work he performed for iris 
46 services. 
Ai!hougir Ragley charged Erickson for ail rhe w o k  Bagley performed In llzc Chapter 1 
47 proceedings. Ragley admits that he did not perfom some of his work "effjciemly" as is t i le case 
48 
where Bagley filed ~nulliple uxasuccessful pertilaclory appications just to retain professionais. 
Bagley furrhcr admits that it would not be reasonable for him to charge Ericksntl for k e  
successive applications to retain professions.'9 But Bagicy did charge for all the successive 
applicatio~~s he filed in obtaining the orders to appoint professionais.50 Given Bagley'r 
adrnissio~i 011 Illis issue, this court committed ret ersible error when it fomd that 100% of 
Bagley's attorrzey's fees were reasonable, 
Bagley also charged $165 pcr hour when the bahuptcy court approved hirn Ibr only 
$140 per hour. BagLey's charged Erickson $; 165 pcr hour for the work he performed in the 
Chapter I I pmceedings." Yet, Bagiey's application for employment and the court order allowed 
o171y $ I40 per hour." Bagley cvcn filed a verified statement that "pursuant to retention 
53 agreement" with Erickson be .\.;-as charging $230 per hour. Therefore, Erickson is entitled to a 
credit of $25 per hour for all the hours Bagfey has charged for services performed in the Chapter 
4 5 See Bagley Depo., 70:20-25. 
46 See Bzgiey Depo., 6"J:X-I 1. 
4 7 See Bagley Depo., 146:20-21. 
48 See Bagiey Depo., 14321-22. 
49 See Bagley Depa., 136: 15-19. 
50 See Ragley Depo., 14 1 :S- 1 1. 
" See Bagley Depo., 2224-23~5; 3721-223. 
sZ See Erickso:~ Exhibits A-25 md A-36. 
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! I proceedings eve11 assurning dl his hours were reasorable, Stated differenily, Bagley can 
charge only $140 per hour for any I-rour he proves was reasonable in the Chapter I 1 proceedings. 
Bagley also testified at trial that because of problems he encountered rctaini~zg the 
accuu2ta1zt that hc personally filed the accoulzting reports. The LJnited States Trustee's Stalus 
Ileport dated April 19, 1994 refers to the i34arcti moiltkly financial report and states that "[tlhe 
dcbtnr stiaei on the report that Mr. Baglej. is o\ved $7.000 in fees over firc relnirrer.'*'4 r his 
inems that tllrougl~ March, Bagley's attorney's fees, according to the Financial report that Bagley 
prepared, were $12.000 Ibr the services he performed in the Chapter I I proceedings. (The 
$7.0013 in the Marc11 report plus the original $5.000 retainer.) Yet. by May 1 1, 1999 (the date the 
court dis~l~issed Erickson's Chapter 1 I proceeding), the total attorney's fees he clzarged for the 
services he psrfor~~ied in rl-te Chapter I I proceedings was $28,668.57. Titis means tlzaifor the 
nzorztlt qffiipril 1998 andfvr IX rlcrys in May 1999, Bngiq cltarged Ericksort $1 7,668.57fnr 
servi~e~s. A revier\ of the Chapter I I banbup t~y  file shows that Bagley did precious Iittle during 
ihis time. More illlportmt, Bagley prosided no evirler-tce at trial (no testimony and rio 
docurnentation) to carry his burden that $17,668.57 for attorney's fees for the work done was 
reasonable for any services he perfomed between April and May I 1, 1999. Yet, the trial found 
that 100% of Bagley's attorney's fees were reasonable. 
In the end, Uagiej- has llot carried his burden to establish that his attorney's fees of 
$28.668.57 irrcrmed in the Chapter I I pro~eedirngs are reaso~abie. The facts Erickson has raised 
on this issue clearly point out that the e\-idence is insrrffieient to warrant a finding that 10C% of 
" See Ericksnn Exhibit A-33 
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Rngley's fees \:ere reasonable. Accordingly, this court should grant a new trial for it to 
deter~~line the alxuunt of attorney's fees that are reasonable, 
1X. ?'HE COURTS DECISION IS AGAIlirST THE LAW TO THE EXTENT IT AWARDS 
THE PLAINnFF DAM'kGES FOR ATTOKNEV'S FEES INCUmED WHILE THE 
ATTORKEY, h4R. BilG-LEY, ACTED UWDER A CONFLICT OF %TEEST IN HIS 
EPESENTTATION OF MR. EHCKSON. 
The law is clear that a lawyer c m o t  recover attorney" fees for services rendered while 
the attorney l-tas 3 col~flict of interest. One court explained. "'" jtfhe relationship of attorney and 
client is at1 extremei?; delicate and i iduciw one . . . . [Cjo~~r ts  je liously hold [the attorney] to the 
iitrr~ost good faith in the discliarge of his duty.' Misconduct in violation o f  a statute or acts 
against public policy, or in breach of an anorney's fiduciar3; duty to his client. may support a 
cotnpiete forfeittire of fees,'' Cran,Sbrd v. Logar?, 656 S .U'.2d 360. 364 (Tern. 1 983) (quotation 
m d  citation omitted); see also Sii~zpson Peiformance Producls, Jnc. v. Roberr @: Norn, P. C., 92 
P.3d 253, 257 ( Wyo. 2004) (t~olding that forfeiture of attorney's fees incurred while the lawyer 
ltas a conflict of interest is appropriatej; Cal Pak Delivery, It~c. v. trr3ited Parcel Service, inc., 52 
Cal.App.4th I. f 4 1 1997) (stating the general rule in conflict of interest Gases that where an 
attorney violates his or her etliical duties to a client, the attorney is not entitled to a fee for his or 
her seryices); 112 re S'unjer Bros., Inc., 191. B.R. 738 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Xl1. 1996) (if a debtor's 
attorney does not satisfy the dici~tterestedness requirements, then the b ptcy court  rias st deny 
attornel 's fees for tlie period that the conflict existed). 
54 Erlckson E ~ l i ~ b l t  '4-83, p. 3 .  iEmpl-iasls added ) 
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R,loreover, ""a client need not prove actual damages in order to obtain forfeiture of an 
afiomey's kt: for the attorney's breach of tiduciarg. duty to the client." Burrow r.. Arcr, 997 
S.551.2d 229, 240 (Tx.  1999): Prrmk v. Bloom, 634 F.2d 1245 (lOtb.Cir. 1980) (Where an attornel 
represents clients %% ith actual existing conflicts of interest, the attorney's compensation may be 
tvitl~l~eld even M here 110 da~nages are shotvtn). 
A. i3agiev7s Conflict Of Interest That Precluded Hirn From Representing Erickson In 
r m w a a n  As Early As June 3, ! 999. 
Bagley obt iousiy had a conflict o f  interest that prevented him from representing Erickson 
in the Ghaptcr 22. The b a k u p t c y  court dismissed Bagley relying on 1 I U.S.C. Section 327. 
'fbe order dis111issii~g Bagley states, "Ptrrsuzlat to 11 U.S.C. Section 327, the trustee may, with the 
court approval, e11iploy an attorney that does not hold or represent an interest ad~erse  to the estate 
and who is disii~te~sted."" The court further relied on I I U.S.C. Section 101 (14).'?he court 
continued. "Under Section 101 (14), the Code defines a disinterested person as one that is not a 
The coiirt found "Mr. Bagley is a credit~r."'~ The court then dismissed Bagiey from 
further representation. 
EricIcson submits that this creditor confiiet that prevented Bagley from representing 
Bagley in the Cl-tapter 12 prevented him from even filing the Chapter 12 or from performing 
\vork necessary to prepare the Chapter 12 for filing. If a client's attorney has a conflict in 
represer~rirzg a client afler tile filing of a Chapter 12 because the attorney is a creditor representing 
55 See EI lclisorl E\h~bits D- 156-1 57 
56 
<" 
See Ei~rckson Ext~ibtts D- 156- 1 57 
" See Erl~kson Exkllblts D-156-157 
j8 See Ei.~clison Exln~brts D-156-157 
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tine client 011 crcdltor-related work out issues. the attur~~ey has the conflict at the time the anomear 
bccomzs khc cllei~t's creditor representing the client on creditor-related ttiork out issues, not at the 
t h e  the petition is filed. In other ~,vords, the aaorney's conflict arises from his creditor stai-us. 
not from him filing rlie petition. The filing of the petition merely makes the conflict open and 
obvious. 
I11 th is  regard. Bagley agrees that he actually had a conflict as a creditor in representing 
Eric1;son in the Chapter 12 before Erickson signed the promissor)i note.59 This is imporlani 
because the i'l-iqtcr 1 I! was filed on December 3. 1999," and Erickson signed the promissoly 
note eon November 13, 1999.~ '  Thus, by Bagley's own testimony, the Chapter 12 conflict 
actually arose before fiiing the Chapter 12 and eyen belbre November 13, 1999. The Chapter 12 
conflict arose cvlien Bagley becan~e Erickson's creditor whife representing Erickson in creditor- 
related work out issues. In fact. Bagley agrees that he had a conflict for filing the Cliapter i 2 
petition as early as June 28, 1999 because he definitely was one of Ericksonk creditors at that 
time." In actuality, BagIey's conflict started as early as June 3, 1999 because Aagley admits that 
by that time l1e was "preparing and organizing to H e  the Chapter I2 
Not oi-ilt did Bagley have an actual conflict as of June 3, 1999 that prevented him from 
preparing and orgmizing to file the Chapter 12 petition, but Bagley was also required to disclose 
to Ericksonl that he u70uld have a conflict representing Erickson in a Chapter 12. Erickson could 
then decide .ivlneti-ier to keep Bagley as counsel knowing that Bagley would get disqualified zAer 
5 9  See Bagley Depo., 54: 12-17 
GO See Erickso:~ Exhibit D-20. 
61 See Sirius Exhibit 1 .  
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filing the Chapter 12 13etition. Erickson testified &at Bagley never disclosed his Chapter 12 
conflict. and I-lagie?;. presented no evidence to cont-radlct Erickson's t e s t in~oq  on this issue, In 
fact, Bagley admits that he did not disclose the conflict to Erickson before lie filed the Chapter 12, 
because he did not eX;en see the cor~flict as an issue.64 Erickson also testified that he would not 
have used Bagley as h i s  attorney to file the Chapter 1 2 if Bagley Iiad disclosed to him the conflict 
that Bagley u~ould have in the Chapter 1 2. If Bagley had disclosed his eorzflict, Erickson would 
not have used Bagley, and Bagley would not be entitled to any attorney's fees for preparation of 
the Chapter 12 petition, 'This is irnpoflant because although Bagley is not seeking to recover 
tfiro~~gli S rius ibr his attor11ey3 fees for rep~esenting Erickson after filing the Chapter 12. the 
promissory rloti: includes attorrzey's fees for Bagley's pre-petition Chapter 13 work that lie cannot 
recover. 
As a matter of law. Bagley cannot charge Erickson attorney's fees for time periods that he 
is p e r f o r ~ ~ ~ i ~ ~ g  services undcl- a carlfiict of interest." Thereiitre, Ragle); has the burden to 
establisfi any attorrtey's fees he cfiarged after the dismissal of the Chapter 11 w r e  both 
reasoilabis (as expiailled above) and not incurred under a conflict of interest. However, Bagley 
has testified that he cannot quantifq. the time he spent preparing and organizing to file the Chapter 
12 012 fact, Bagiey cannot differentiate between the time he spent preparing the 
Chapter 13 petition and other rfiings that he was doing.67 Therefore, Bagley cannot satisfy his 
62 See Bagley Depo , S l  23-82 5 
L? See Baglel Depa , 80 22-8 ! I 
64 See B a g l e ~  Depo , 88 7-1 4 
6 i See p I0 of B: ief rn Support of Motron for S u m a r y  Judgment dated hlay 9,2008, dteady or, file 1~1th the court 
06 See Bagiey Depo . 80 22-81 6 
67 See Bagley Depo . 8 1.7- 14 
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burden to prtivc that any of the attnniey"~ fees be chxirged after the dismissal of the Chapter I I 
pelition were reasouable a~ id  not incuncd under a conflict of hterest. 
Wlirle Bagley represented Erickson it1 the Chapter 1 I proceebir-tgs, Bagley Mas one of 
F ~ :  1~ .k- ~ O I I ' S  creditors. Bagley d ~ d  not have a conflict during the pendency of tbc Gliapter 1 I 
because Bagley's attorriey's fees were subject to court approval. However. once the Chapter 1 I 
was dismissed, Bagle) becarne a general creditor. Once he becarne a genera! creditor, he had a 
conflict that prel ented hinil from representing Erickson in connection with the creditor claims 
that arose against Erickson once the automatic stay in the Chapter 1 f was lifted, After all. 
Bagley could not be expected to negotiate with himself to work out payment of Eriekson"~ debt. 
This co~iilict is separate arid apart fioin the conflict of prepaing and organizing to file a Chapter 
12 petitioll that Bagley could not file or represent Erickson in after it was filed. 
Bagley has failed in his burden to establish that any of the a~tosxzey's fees he incmed after 
the distxissal of ~ i l e  Chapter 1 I petition were incurred for something other than creditor-related 
work out issues whether related to the Chapter 12 or not. Accordingly, Bagley cannot recover 
any ai-tonieq 's fees incurred afier the Chapter I 1 petition was dismissed while he had a conflict of 
interest.68 
68 See p 10 of 81 ief ~n Support of Motion for S m a v  Judgment dated May 9. 2008. already on file -81th the court. 
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C. 
i111d Collrinued Until Octohe&I 999. 
Bagley prepared and filed a nlotlon for Kathleen Erickson while represenling Erickson 
and while tile Ericksons were going Ihmugh a divorce." The motion sought to add Kathleen as a 
cndebt~r.~%~;ltr illire11 signed the motinn oil December f 4, i 9 ' ~ 4 1 . ~ ~ o l l o w i n ~  his u stlccess!i:l 
motion, Bagley filed a separate Chapter 11 petition as counsel far Kathleen while Bagley still 
rcpesented Ericksoi~ aiid while the Ericksons3 divorce was still pending." Both Erickson aiid 
Kathleen were represented b? separate ~ounseI in their divorce action. Bagley represented 
Kathleen at least as late as September 27. 1 9 9 9 . ~ ~  
Ericdson submits that -just as one attorney could not represent both Kathleen and Erickso~l 
in their divorce. Bagley could not represent both KatNeen and Erickson in two Chapter I 1  
proceedings addressing property issues where both Kathleen and Erickson were dividing up their 
property in the divorce. The fact that Kathleen and Eriekson were represented by separate 
counsel does rtot resolve the conflict because Bagley was conflicted on Whom he could take 
~narcbillg orders from: Kathleen's counsel or Erickson's counsel? Erickson submits that Bagley 
~ o ~ l l d  represent them both at tlie same time only if Kathleen and Erickson agreed on how to 
divide their property. 111 this case. that agreement did not come until Kathleen signed the Marital 
Seltlernsnt Agreerxent on October 12, 1999. Thus, Bagley had a conflict of interest in 
60 See EI icksoil Exl~ibit A-35 
70 See E~~ciison Exhlhit A-35 
71 See EI ickson Exhibit A-35 
'2 See Ei lcksorr Exliib~t B-2 
-3 See Erichsoa Exh~brt 6-55 
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regrese~iting both Ericlcson and kcathieen that started behre December 14, 1998 and continued 
until October 1 2, 1999. 
In this case, Erickson testified that he wanted to retain as much of the farm arid ranch as 
possible wilereas Katl~leen wanted to liquidate their property and cash out. This testimocly 
moved m y  lstcrte~~tiai colzflict Bagiey had to an actual conflict. And Bagley offered no testimony 
to rebut Ericl~sori's testimony. In fact, Bagley admitted on cross exmination that from day one 
tliere was ail issue in the divorce court that Erickson wanted to retain possession of the farming 
or rmching operations whereas Kathy did not want to do that, and this is fairly typical.74 
Bagley's coilduct in representing Erickson and Kathleen while the parties were going 
tlxougli a contested divorce constitutes a co~lfliiet of interest. Bagley could no more represent 
both di\iorei~ig parties in b uptcy than be could represent both divorcing parties in the divorce 
itself. Both divorce and b a n h ~ ~ p t e y  irivolve the division and distribiiLion of property between the 
parties and their creditors. The u~idisputed evidence at trial proves that Erickson and Kathleen 
~iecessarily and in fact had adverse interests. Despite the conflict between the parties evideliced 
by their pendirig divorce. Bagley represented them both. 
As a result of Bagley's representing both Erickson and Kathleen in b 
divorce was pending. as a matter of law Bagiey cannot recover his attorney's fees charged from 
Decenzber 14, 1948 though October 12. 1999, the period that the conflict existed.'" 
74 See Bag!ey Depo.. 172-18: I .  
""ee p. 10 of Brief in Suppoi? of R4otion for S w a y  Judgment dated May 9, 2008. already on file with the court. 
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Specificall?, Bagley represented both Erickson and Erickson's wife in bankruptcy while 
they were divurcir~p. Moreover, Ragley became an unsecured creditor of Ericksor, afier the 
dismissal of Erickson's Chapter 1 I proceeding, but Ragley continued to represent (md charge) 
E~ichscln in dealing v.itii Ericksonas other creditors. The promissoq~ note and mo&gage are 
une~~forceable to the cxteni they are based on aEomeyvs fees incurred while the attorney operated 
tinder 3 conflict of ~rtterest. 
D. Bartie,. Owes -A $3,000 Credit For XVhich 'The Trial Court Gate No Credit, 
The ijcts are not in dispute that Erichson paid Bagiey $3.000 to represent him in the 
Chapter 12. The facts are fi~rther not iri dispute that the barkuptcy court discliarged Bagley 
because fie had a c o ~ ~ f l i c l  representing Erickson while at the same time having a creditor-s claim 
tl~ougll Sirius. Because Bagley had a conflict of interest in representing Erickson in the Chapter 
12, Bagley is not entitled to the $3,000 Erickson paid him. Tilerefore, Erickson should get a 
$3,000 creditiset oE  against the promissory note. However, the trial court gave Ericltsorn 
X.  THERE WAS AN IIUCECULARXTY IN THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE TRIAL IY FIIS 
CASE BY ViWT-IICW THE DEFENDANT I$?AS PETTENTED FROM HAVING A FAIR 
TRIAL. 
In Idaho. a court's failtlre to exclude expert testimony that was not properly disclosed arid 
that prejtrciicss the opposing party constitutes an abuse of discretion. Clark 1.. &a@. 137 Idaho 
333. 347 (6t.ilpp. 20%). The Clark court stated, "[Flallrire to meet the requiremenzs of Rule 26 
'tjpically' rcsults in exclusiori of the proffered evidence. The potential for prejudice to the 
opposing pa~?.y fia~ the ad~ilission o f  evidence that was not disclosed in disc31 sry is pa,-ticuiariy 
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acute with respect to exper? testimony, for as the court noted in Radmer, '[elffective cross- 
cxa~~ina t io i~  f ziexper? witness requires advance preparlllion," and 'effective rebmal requires 
advance luno\~?ledgc of the line of testimony of the other side."TClark, stipra, at 347 (quoting 
X n h e r  I. i;ord]Motor Go , 120 Idaho 86. 89 (1991)). 
I-lere, Si l ius called only one witness at trial: \Yilliarn Bagley. Bagley offered expert 
testiinolly that "'overall" his attorney's fees %ere reasonable although he never got very specific. 
Mr. Bagley also testified that his coriduet was not below the standard of care. This testimony 
obviously involves expert opinion testimony. However. Sirius never disclosed Bagley as an 
exper?. Sirius never disclosed Bagiey's opinions or the bases for those opinions before trial even 
tfiotlgh Ericltson aslted for them in discovery. In response, in a written pleading dated June 17, 
2008, Ericiison objected befbre trial to allowing Bagley to testify as an expert and moved to 
exclude Ragley3 expert testimony or grant a short continuance of the trial to allow. Erickson to 
discovery Bagley's expert opilliotis and the bases for those opinions. The trial court both 
ovemled the objection arid denied the motion for a continuance. Erickson raised the same 
objection at trial when Bagley started to give expert testimony. The court ovemled that too 
telling counsel for Erickson that rlie written objection was sufficient to protect the record on the 
Ericicson s~rbmits that the court's allowing Bagley's expert testimony constituted an 
irregularity in tlie proceedings of the trial that prevented Erickson from having a fair trial under 
Ida110 case lain, set out in Clarlc 17. Xaty. supra. 137 Idaho at 347 and Xadnzer ti. Ford Motor C5 . 
supra, 220 Ida110 at 89. Accordingly, the court should grant Erickson a new trial, 
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XI. CONCL~JSION. 
Based on die foregomg, this court should reconsider i t s  decision and grant judgmenr in 
f2vur of Erickson on the gmund that Wyoming I'rofessionai Rule 1. h';ja) prohibited the 
transactioii consisting of' a promissory note arid mo13gage. The promissory note m d  mol-tgage are 
a "security" iittcrest aidiiir "bus~ness transaction" within !he meaning of Rule I .S(a). 'l'hcreiiire, 
Bagley was required to colnply with Rule 1.8(a) but failed to do so. Alternative. this court 
should grant a new trial for a11 the reasons set for41 abore. 
ESI 'ECr I  TVELY SUBl\?l.l.TED this z % a y  of October, 2008. 
Atto~ney for Bryce Erickson 
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I HEREBE* CERTIFY that on this ay of October, 2008.1 caused a true and 
correct copy o f  the foregoing BRTEF" IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FUR 
EG0NSXIlEMTZON, OR IN  THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR NEW THAL to be served, by 
placing the sane in a sealed envelope and depositing it in the United States Mail, postage 
prepaid, or. band deiive~y, facsimile tra~tsmissiol~ or overnigh delivery, addressed to the 
foliowing: 
A, Bruce Larson, Esq. 
Attortzey at Law 
I "; South J " " ~ A V G ,  
P.O. BOX 6x9 
Pocaiello, Idaho 83205-6369 
Fax: 478-7602 
[ &.s. Mail 
[ I FrW 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ Overnight Deliveq 
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HcGr ath Meacham Smi th  
/**-%& * s4 g*$J 
\d& 
Bryan D. Esq. - ISB No. 441 f 
&. J, Driscoll, Esq. - ISB No. 701 0 
SMTR, DRJISGOLL, & ABSOCIATES, PLLC 
P. 0. Box 5071 1 
4 14 Shoup Avellue 
X a o  Falls, Id& 83405 
TeXeplxsne: (208 j 524-073 1 
Telefax: (208) 529-4 1 ti6 
20013 OCT 1 Y  
STATE OF D,I"LE-EO, IN FOR TEE COmTU OF C N B 0 1 J  
SZIZIUS LC, a Wyoming Limited ) 
FlhtiE, ) Case No. GV-04-284 
) 
VS. ) mFXDAVIT OF 
) BRYAN I;). SMTH 
BRYCE W. ERXCKSBN, AND Ah4 PERSON ) 
CL G ER BY OR TmOUGH 1 
BRUCE K. ERICKSON LN AkJD TO 1 
REAL PROPERTY DESCmED AS FOLLOWS: ) 
) 
C a B O L f  COWTY, DmO: 1 
TO%NSHIP 5 SOUTH, R..A..?VGE 46 E.B.M.: 1 
SECTTON 27: LOTS 1 AND 2, N1/2 
NW li4, EXCEPT T m E F R O M  S "/z I 
NE114 N W  % hWli3, 1 
1 
Defendmts , 1 
1 
STAE OF Dm0 1 
) ss. 
County of Bomevillc 1 
BRY*W D. SAYrlTiSR, being first duly swm on oath, deposes and says: 
(1) I m one of ~ % e  attorneys for rhe defendmi in fhe above-referenced marter 
(2) 1 m&e this asdavit based on my o w  personal h o d e d g e  as the atrorney fiat 
tried the case on beh& of defendmt. 
(3) There was a;rr inrcs@wiv h Fne proceedzslgs ofthe t15al in h s  c s e  by which the 
dcfcndant ura prevented &om havhg a fair trial. 
(4) Speczcdly, over a witten prekial ot?jection dated June 22,2008 md rn 
additional oral objection at rrlill, rfie court allowred the pl&~Xto present the expert festkony of 
a previously undisclosed export ~ t a e s s ,  W Z f i m  Biagliey. 
(5) By d o w h g  W. Bagley to tesd@ despite not being disclosed as an expert witness 
before trial or before ihe close of discovery, "rhe court prohbited the defendant, from conducting 
an expert wibess deposition before trial, from discovering the cxpert o p ~ o n s  of Mi Bagley 
before trial, &om dismverlng the basis for Mr. Bagley's expert o p ~ o n s  before trial, Erom 
prepaing his defcnse to Mr. Bagley's e x p ~  testimony at trial, and from effectively cross 
exarnirung Mr Bagley at trial. 
6 The plGat"Lff failed to provide "the substance of any opinion, or other tesrkony 
h e  expert is expetcd to give at trial of this cause" md the "specific facts and data on which 
such opinions are based'' as Mr. Erickson had previously requesed in discovery.' 
I See Interrog~tory Na 2 in the Rcsponse to Defendaot Bryce Ericksan's First Set of Interrogatories to Sirius LC 
and Requestx for Product~on of Documsn& at~nched ari Exkiibir. "'A" to die Affidatit of B. J. Zh-iscoil dated May 9, 
2008, atr,pacfy on f ire with hi: court 
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(9) f i e  pl&tiBfai.led to "&sclose in ~ t * '  Mr. Bagley as an expept %tifr?css 
""eage.t-lzer with my of the t c s ~ o n y "  h4x. Bagley inrended to 
(8) in Idaho. a court's failwe to exclude expefi tesiimony that was not properly 
disclosed and that prejudices the opposing p q  constihltes an abuse of discrerion. Clark v Rnfy, 
1.37 Idho  333,347 (el-App. 2002)- 
(9) The Clark cowl stated, "Fjaiiure to meet the requirements of Rule 26 'typicoliy' 
results in exclusion oE&e proffered evidence. The potential for prejudice t~ the oposhg  p w  
from rhe adlnissioln of evidence that was not disclosed in discovery is p&icufarty acute with 
respect to expe& testimony, for as tbe court noted in Radme~, '[o]Eective crass-exmhation of 
un expert witness requires advance prepara~on,' and 'effective rebuttal r oqees  advance 
-linowIr;dge of the Line of te 
Ford iMoror Go., 120 Idaho 86, 239 (lggl)). 
(1 0) The court allowing the plaintiff to present Lbe expert testimony of Mr. Bagley 
constiluted an irreguladv in the proceedings ofthe trial in his case by which Mr. Enchon was 
prevented f om having a fair trial 
F d e r  your 
DATED &s 
See Order for Trial, Pre-Trial Schedule, and Pre-Tr:& Confmence filed in tbh c s e  on August 9, 2007. 
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CERTIFICATE 
I HEWBY CERTIFY that on r k s  day of October, 2008, I caused a mc and 
correct copy of the foregokg M F W A n T  OF fSRYAlV D. SMITH io be served, by placing the 
same in a seded envelope rtnd depositing it in h e  United States Mail, po&age prepaid, or hond 
delivery, facsbile rransrnission or ovcmight delrverq., ddsessed to Ule f o l l o ~ h g :  
A. Bruce Larson, Esq. 
ABLE LAW PC 
Horizon Plaza Ste 225 
P. 0. Box 6369 
155 S. 2" Avenue 
[ -.s. Mail 
I I FAX 
[ 3 Wand Dclivcry 
[ ] Overnight Deliver; 
A. Bruce Larson -ISB No. 2093 
Able Law PC -- Attorneys at Law 
155 South 3"d Ave. 
P.O. Box 6369 
Pocatelio, ID 83205-6369 
Telephone: (208) 478-7600 
Fax: (208) 478-7602 
.Attorney for l>laintiff 
IN 'fHE DISTRfCT COTiRT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IhT AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CARlBOU 
STRILJS LC, a 1hryoming Limited L i a b i l i ~  ) 
Company, 
PlaintiE. ) Case No, CV-2004-284 
1 
vs. 1 
) ORDER DETEkMmLNG ATTOKVEY 
BRYCE H. ERICKSON, AND ANY FEES 
PERSON GLAIMNG UNDER. BY OR 
THROUGH BRYCE 13. EMCKSON IN AND ) 
TO THE E , 4 L  PROPERTY DESCRIBED ) 
,4S FOLLOWS: ) 
1 
CANBOII COLihTTY, IDAHO: 1 
1 
TOWr\lSHIP 5 SOUTH, GE 46 E.B.M., 
SECTION27: LOTS 1 14ND2.Ni/2NW114, ) 
EXCEPT TWEEFROM THE 1 
SI /4NEI!4NWl/4NWl14, 1 
1 
Defendant, 1 
.Ibc Plaintiff in the above and forgoing action on or about the 8"' d q  of October 
srrbmitted a timely -Memorandum of Costs and A.ttorney Fees ("'Memormd~m~'') pursuant to 
TRCP 54id)(5). The Defendmt failed to file an objection within 14 days of the senice of rhe 
Memoran&an as required by IRCP 54(d)(6). The Court finds that based upon :he agreement of 
the parties and pursuant to Idaho Code $12-120(3), Idaho Rules of C i ~ 4  Procedure 54jd)jl). 
Sii(e'j(1) Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41. that costs were expended by Plaintiff Sirius in the 
ORDER DETEMINi-NG ATTOLVEY FEES 
Pzge I 
amount o f  $1335'29 and attorney fees were incuned by said Plaimiff in the mounri of 
$29,0 1 129. 
Kow therehre: 
IT IS H E E B Y  O m E E D  AUJUDGED AND D E C E E D  that the Plaintiff Sirius LC 
be aid is Iiereby akvarded costs in the sum of $1335.29 and aMorney fees in the amount of 
$?!2,,R:i 1 .?0 t e a h e r  with ir?lerest accruirlg thereon at the highest statutoy rate from the 36:"' day 
of September 2008. 
/ 
Dated this f?_ day o 
ORDER DETERMmNG ATTOKYEY FEES 
Page 2 
aR'f lFICATE OF SERVICE 
I H E E B Y  CERTIFY that 1 caused a true and correct copy of the foregoi~~g 
document to be delivered to the following individuai(s) by the method indicated: 
Bua~n D. Smith 
B. J. Driscoll 
kfcGrath, itileacham & Smib  PLLC 
P.O. Box 50731 
Id&o Falls, ID 83305-071 1 
A, Bruce Larsoti 
Able Law PC -- Attorneys at Law 
155 South 2"* Atre. 
P.O. Box 6369 
Pacatello. ID 83205-6369 
n 
[4/1 U.S. h4all. Postage Prepaid 
L_I X-Xmd Delivery 
C__7 Overnight Delivery 
Fax: 529-4166 
U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Eland Deli\ ery 
O~vemight Delivet?, 
Fax: 478-7602 
DATED this day o 2008. 
ORDER I>ETERMI%~~G ATTORNEY FEES 
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STFATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COT_fNTy OF C A N  U 
SIRXUS. a Wyorning Limited 
Liability Companj. 1 Case No. GV-04-284 
1 
Plainiii-f; 1 
1 ILIEMOKkNDUPVI DECISION 
t s .  J AND O m E R  ON DEFENDANTS" 
i MOTION FOR 
BRYCE 14. ERfGKSON. AND ANY 1 WGONSXDEMTXON OR IN 
1 THE ALTEWATIVE, FOR NEWJ 
PERSON CLL4Sb4mG BY OR TEIROLrCH 1 TRIAL 
BRUCE EEKSON im AND TO THE 1 
REAL PROPERTY DESCXBED AS 1 
FOLLOU'S : 1 
1 
CARIBOU CC>bxTY, IDAHO: 
1 
TO17vniSHIP 5 SOUTI-I, RLYGE 46 E.B.fvf. ) 
SECTION: 27, LOTS 1 P;ND 2. N 54 NW 54 1 
EXCEPT THEWFROhl TI IE S !4 NNE % 
NW 55 NW %, 1 
Defeiidax-rts. 
This 111atter is before the Court on a hlotisn for Reconsideration, or in thc 
Alternative, for New Trial. Tlie motion was brought pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure I 1  (a)i2)(B) and Tdal~o Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a). This matter was tried to 
the Court. r1ae Hor~orable Judge Don L. Harding presiding; on June 30, 2008 and July 1, 
2008. Otl September 30, 2008, the Court entered its Findings of Fact and Gonclusior~s of 
La?; h4srnormdurn Decision and Order. The Court ibund la favor of the Plaintiff, Sirius. 
and entered Jridgmer~t o that effect on the same date, September 30, 2 O G S .  On October 
14, 3008, Defendant, Bryce Erickson (Eriekson) filed a motion recjrresting the Court to 
reconsider its decision. or in the alternative, to grant his request for a IIPW trial. 'T'hls 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendants' 
Motion for Reconsideration or in the Alternative, 
for Eew Trial 
1 
motiun w a s  aecompar~ied by tile Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith, filed otr October 14, 308 
and a Brief in Srrppsr"iof Motion for Reconsideration, or irr the Alrer~~ative, -for New 
Trial, filctl on October 28, 2008. Plaintiff, Sirius, filed its hitemormdum in Opposition to 
the Defendant" Mfv~otiol~ for Reconsideration, or in the Alterntltive, for Xew Triai, on 
No\ien;ber 17: 2008. Finally, on December I ,  2008, Erickson filed Defer1dant.s Repit 
Brief to Plarntiffs Mexnorandun~ in Opposition to hilotian for Recorrsideraticrn, or in t l~e  
Aiterriativt;. Keu Triai. 
This matter was argued to the Court on December 5, 2008.' At the conclusiolr of 
the hearing the Coux-t advised the pil~ties that it may require additionai briefing. 011 
December 17, 2008, the Court entered an Order requiring that a tra~iseript of the trial be 
prepared along with a tra~lscript of t11e bearing on the Motion for Reconsideration. Once 
tlie tratlscript was conipleted, the Court allo~ved tfie parties the opporlunity to subrnit 
additiolial txiritteti argumetlts. On February 2, 2008. each party submitted a supplemental 
brief or memorandum in suppofl of their respectitie position. On February 3, 2008. the 
Court took this matter under advisement. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This ease origir~ated as an action to enforce a promissory note and zn a c t' ion to 
foreclosure real property located in Caribou County. Idaho which was rnnrlgaged io 
secure the prorrzissory note in question. Tlse action was brought by Plaintiff, Sirius, a 
%/yonling Limited Liability Co~npany, co-owned b~ \Vil!iam Bagley 2nd his %rife. 
Zrickson retained the services of William Bagley. a Wyoming a t tor~~ty ,  10 represent him 
The Coult's Findrrigs of Fact and Conclusions of Law Memorandum Dec~slon and Order m this case wzs 
entered on September 30,2008 This was Judge Don L Wardmg's Iast officlai d a ~  on the bench The 
foiiowing da), judge Mltcheil W Brown assumed the bench As such the Motlor, filed on October 14, 
2008 hnd all subsequent proceedings hate been htlndied by a judge other than the judge who ?resided over 
~ i l e  ti ial of tills inatier 
Memorandum Dec~sron and Order on Defendants' 
Rnociii?ri for Recons~ieratron or In the Aiiernatrve, 
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in a bankruptcy proceeding. Mr. Bagley filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding for 
Ericltson in Wyoming. This baikuptcy proceedir~g was ultimately disn~issed by tile 
h a ~ k l ~ p t c y  ourt. Erickson again approached Bagley to represent birn ixi a Chapter 12 
banhriptcy proceeding, Bagley agrecd to represent Erickson, but as a condition of his 
rei~resentatiori requested that Erickson sign a promissor): mte, payable to Sirius. in the 
anlount of $29,f 73.38, which was the amount Bagley eIaims was due and owning for the 
work 011 the origrnal Chapter I I barkmptcy proceeding. This promissory note was also 
lo be secured by a niortgage on real property located in Caribou County, Idaho, ivliich 
was otvned by Erickson. Erickson agreed to these conditions of representatioti and on 
November 13, 1999 signed a promissory ~zote, payable to Sirius, and a mar-tgage securing 
the promissosy r~ote. 
When Erickson defaulted on the promissory note, Sirius filed the lawsuit in 
question. Ericltson iriitia1ly appeared and answered pro se. Following a stipulation of the 
parties, Erickson appeared though counsel and filed an Ame~nded Answer raising thirteen 
separate affirl~lative defenses. 
On April 25. 2005, Erickson moved for Surnrnary Judgment arguing that there 
was a hilure o f  eo~~sideration for the pronnissoq note in question. The parties briefed 
this issue and argued the motion to the Court. The Court denied Erickson's motion for 
summary judg~~lent finding that there was adequate consideration to support the 
promissory note. The Court found that the note was supported by consideration tlrlder 
either of two ti~eories, one of which was af5rmed on appeal, the other was dererr-ilir-red to 
be i:i er-ror. The G o ~ r t  hen went one step further and sua spome granted summary 
judgment against Erickson with respect to each of his affirmative defenses. Erickson 
[demorandurn Dec~sron and Order on Defendants' 
fdction for Reconsideration or In the Alternat~ve, 
for Kew Trial 
appealed thc Court" decision on summary judgment m d  on appeal the Ida110 Supreme 
Court affirmed the Court's decision as it related to its finding that consideration existed to 
support the prori~issory note and reversed xhe Court's order granting Sirius s u m n a p  
judgmen~ on each of Erickson's affirmative defenses. Sirius LC v Ei-ieicj.on, 144 Idaho 
Upon rer~~and this matter proceeded to court trial or1 June 30, 2008 with the Court 
ruling in Plaintiffs favor and entering *judgment against Ericksol~ in the ari~ount of 
$29,173.00.35 plus interest at the trial's conclusion. It from tliis judgment thar Erickson 
has filed tbe per~ding motions. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Ericlcson has filed h ~ s  motion under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure l l(a)(2)(B). 
This rule provides. in relel-ant part, that: 
h motiorl for reconsideration of any interlocutory orders of the trial 
court niay be made at any time before the entry of filial judgment but not 
later than burteen 114) days after tile entry of the final judgme~it. 
[Emphasis Added] 
In the present ease the order which Erickson is requesting that the Court reconsider is 
not a11 iilrerlocutory order, Eirg rather is a final, appealable order, which has been reduced 
to judgment. As such the appropriate rule for Erickson to be moving under is Idaho Rule 
of C i ~ i l  Procedure 59ie) rather than I.R.C.P. 1 l(a)(2)(B). The distinctioti between a 
niotio:i to alter or ariiend under I.R.C.P. 59(e) and a motion for reconsideratioti under 
I.R.C.2, is discussed by Idaho Supreme Court in Straub I*. Smith, 145 Idaho 65. 175 P.3d 
r.3 ,. 
i sl. (29317). In Strixub the Supreme Cciurt mtes as foiiows: 
[a] party may only make a motion ro reconsider interlocutory orders or 
orders entered after the entry of final judgment. I.R.C.P. 1 I(a)("). The 
dismissal was a Gnal judgment and thus, the Smiths' motion to reconsider 
Memorandum Decision and Order on  Defendants '  
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should be treated as a n-totion to modify or amend the order of dismissat. 
The Court reviews an order denying a motion to alter or mend judgment 
for abuse o f  discretion. Slacstthmug v. Allstare Ins. G o ,  132 Idaho 705, 
707, 979 P.2d 107, 109 (1999). Pursuant to 1,R.C.P. 59(e), a district tour? 
can correct legal and factual errors occurring in proceedings before it. . , . 
145 Iddio at 71. As made clear by the Izxiguage in Straub, if the order the moving party 
is seeking recorisiderrttion of is final. the appropriate mcrtion is to alter or m e n d  
j~tdgment under Icidio Rule of CiviI Procedure 59(e). 
111 Slaalhnnug t.. Allsfale I~zzs. Co.. 132 Idaho 705. 979 P.2d 107, (1939), the 
rationale beinind a motion to alter or amend judgment is addressed. In Slaarhaiqug, the 
Supreme Court states: 
[his a meals to circumvent an appeal, Rule 59(e) provides a trial court a 
rneclzarrisrn to correct legal and factual errors occurring proceedings 
before it. [Citation Omitted] ... So long as the trial court recognized the 
matter as discretionary, acted within the outer boundaries of the court's 
discretiori, and reached its coriclusion tkrougli a11 exercise of reason, this 
Court will not disturb the decision on appeal. 
132 Idaho at 707 
Erickson also moves tile Court, in the alternative, for a new trial pursumt ro Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a). Erickson cites tlze Court to various bases which he 
conte~ids supports the Court ordering a new trial in this matter. Depending upon what 
subsectiorz of I.R.C.P. 59(a) is being challenged the analysis is different. So~ne of the 
issues raised by Erickson, by ~lecessitji would require the Court to co~zsider, weigh and 
111ake judgme~lts concerning the evidence submitted at trial. T1ie sta~dard utiii-zed Sy the 
Coirrt in addressing each su'oparagrzph of I.R.C.P. 59(@ seeking new a trail varies 
depending on the subparagraph being raised. However, rhe Court chooses, for reasons 
stated below, not io address each of these various standards. 
Finally, as the Court !sas grappled mightily with what effect. if any, it has on -ibe 
Menorandun? Decrsloi? and Order on Defendants' 
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posture of this case that the preseizt judge did not preside over the court trial, or hear the 
cvtdei-rce presented. The Court has come across other applicable law, Idaho T<uIc of Civil 
Frocedure 63 addresses the issue of disability of a judge, It provides as follows: 
If by reason o f  dcatb, sicliness, or other disabiirty, a judge before wliorn an 
action bas been tried is unable to perforn~ the duties to be performed by 
the court under these rules aRer a verdict is returned or findings of fact md 
co~ielusions of law are filed, then any ocher judge regularly sitting in or 
assigned to the court in which the action was tried may perform those 
duties; but if such other judge is satisfied that the judge cannot perform 
those duties because the judge did not preside at the trial or f'or m y  other 
reason. the judge may in the judge's discretion grant a new trial. 
111 the case of -4ncfersun it D e w q ,  82 Idaho 173, 350 P .X 7734 (1960) the issue of the 
autlnority of cz "'successor judge'311 the context of motions brought under 1.R.C.P. 59 was 
addressed, The Suprerzle Goun ~iores as follows: 
In cases tried tliitt~out a jury, the gerieral rule is -that a party litigant is 
entitled to a decisiori on the facts by a judge who lieard and saw the 
witnesses, and &at a deprivation of that right is a denial of due process. 
[Citations Omitted] 
82 Idaho at 180. Tlze Supreme Court also slates: 
[Ixi'Jhere the lnotion is heard by a successor to the trial judge, such 
successor may make new findings and conclusions and direct the entry of 
a new judgment under the authority of Rule 63. subject, however, to the 
limitation tf~erein contained; that is, if he '5s satisfied that he cannot 
perform those duties because be did not preside at tile trial or for m y  other 
reason, he may in his discretion grant a new  rial." If the successor is not 
satisfied with the findings. conclusions =d decree of his predecessor. and 
thiriks such should be vacated or modified, but cannot do so because he 
did not see and hear the witnesses, then he is limited to the granting of a 
ne-* triaf. 
82 Idaho at 179. As such It appears clear "clna~ a "'successor Judge" in cor-rsiderir?;g a 
motion for r ~ e ~ v  trizl "is not required to weigh conflicting evidence or pass upon the 
credibility of nitnesses." In fact to do so would be to deny the iitiganss of their due 
process rights 
Memora~dum Decrs~on and Order on Defendants' 
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ANALYSIS 
7'hc Court has cIosel~y reviewed the file in this matter, including all pleadings, 
motions, and mcrizora~~dum, The Court has closely reviewed the memormduin and briefs 
subtiiitted by the paties in support of and in oppositiorz to the pendlng motiotz. Finally, 
the Cottrt has listened to the arguments of the parties and has reviewed and read the 
transcript of the trial proceeding along with the trailscript of the argument on the pending 
113ntion. As stated above rlie coui-t has grappled with these issues and has determined that 
in accordance wit11 1.R.C.P 63 and the case Law ititerpreting a11d applying 1.R.C.P 63 this 
Court callnot rule or? the motion. 
At trial, Erickson stipulated that the PIaintiff had proved its entire case. Erickson 
furtiler adsised the Court that the sole issue at trial was for Erickson to "put on our 
iilfirmative defenses." Trial Transcript pp. 4-7. Sirius accepted this stipulation and tfie 
case proceeded to trial in the mique manlier of defendarrt proceeding first. having 
admitted to the substance of the Plaintiffs case. Trial Transcript pp. 7-8, As such the 
only issues tried at trial were Erickson's thirteen affirmative defenses, upon which 
Eri~lisort had the burdeli of proof 
The Court Lias considered the motion of Erickson requesting a new trial. As the 
Court reviews each of these claimed bases for new trial, the Gourt sees the need to 
consrder the evidence produced at trial md make judgments concerning the sufficiency 
ald,/or weight to attach to this particular evidence. Each of these considerations is 
contrary 10 the general rule cited iii Anderson v. Dewey, supra, which prohibits the 
"successor judge" froin weighing a id  evaluating the quality of evidence iiztrodiltced at 
tsldi, 
Fdemorandum Decision and Order on Defendants' 
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In applying the rules set forth in I.R.C.P. 63 and the case law interpreting this 
rule, the Court concludes that it is nut in a positiol~ to fairly evaluate and ccl~~sider the 
motion Ibr recornsideratiori, or in the alternative, request for a new trial. Ths Court 1s 
colivinced that to do so, ~7ou!d violate the "'general rule" enunciated by the Idaho 
Su~p~.eme Court in Atzclerson 17. Dewe j .  82 Idaho 173, 350 P.2d 734 ( 1960). In Ariderson 
rlie Slipreme Court notes that "'if the successor is not satisfied with the G~~dings, 
cor~clusions and decree of his predecessor, and th~nks such should be vacated or 
i~~odified, but c a n ~ ~ o t  do so because he did not see and hear the witnesses, the11 he is 
Limited to the g r a ~ ~ t i i ~ g  of a new trial." 82 fdafio at 179. !-Towever. as set fori-th cIearIy in 
I.R.C.P. 63 tlie decision is left to the discretion o f  the ""successor judge" concerning 
nrhetlier he should grant a new trial or riot. In tlie present case, the Cou-t is not 
dissatisfied tvitl~ the trial judge's findings of fact or the cor~clusions of based upon 
tilose Gndirtgs of fact. However, the Court also concludes that it carmot give full arid fair 
coxlsideratio~i to Ericltson's motion atid arguments ~ritlnout considerir~g the evident;, md 
making judglnents as to the sufficiency and weight to be attached to the evidence, ail of 
which is counter to the general rule set forth in Anderson v Deupey, supra. 
Tlierefore, the Court has determined the more prudent approach is to deny tlze 
~rrotion to aIter and mend ,  pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(e) and also deny the motion for a new 
trial, pmsumt to I.R.C.P. 59(a). It appears that a review of the trial court's findings of 
fact and conclrrsioirs of Ia-w is best left to the province of the appellate colrrts. 
As such this Court wiIl not consider the merits of Erickson's Motion for 
Reconsideration, or in the Alternative, for New Trial. It is here5y OmEWB),  
DECREED A3D ADJUDGED thzt based on the above the Defendat's Motion for 
IUemorandum Decision and Order on Defendants' 
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Recorzsideration or in the -%Iternatitre for Hew Trial is DENIED. 
Dated this day o 2009. 
District Judge 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendants' 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAZLINGISERVXCE 
I Isereby cer-ti@ that f sewed a me copy of the foregoing docmele on the 
attomey(s)/persunis) listed below by mail with correct pitstqe thereon or causing the same 
to be hmd delivered, 
Anorney(s)/Person(s) : Method of Sewice: 
A, Brxce Lars011 
AMon~ey at Lavt~ 
1 55 S s i t 1 2 1  Secolid Avenue 
Post Office Box 6369 
Pocatelio, Idaho 83205-6369 
Telephor~e: (208) 475-7600 
Facsixnile: (208) 478-7602 
Wand Delivered 




Bryan D. Smith H a ~ d  Delivered 
B.J. DI-iscotl By U S .  Mail 
McGMTH, MEACFI-4M, &r; S-WITH, Fax 
PLLG 
P.O. Box 5073 1 
4 14 Shoup Avenue 
Ida110 Fails, Idaho 83405 
Tel: (208) 524-073 1 
Fax: (208) 529-4166 
Dated: 
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TIzis mattes* i s  before tf-rc Court on a Motion for Rccox~rsidora~on, or 111 LIxe 
Aitezi~ative, for He% Trial. The rnodon was brought pwsum1t to Idaha Rule of Civil 
Procedure I l (a}(Z)CB) and TdaIm Rule of Civil Prooedwe 59(4. This matter was tr rcd  to 
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Tix is  matter is bafofore the Court on n Motion for Reoonsideratiorx, or in t-l~e 
Altcrliative. Por New Trial. T h e  motion was brought pwsuant to Idaho Rule o f  Civil 
Pracedure 1 l<a?C2)CfS) and Idaho Rule of Civil Pro~edwe 59Ca). This niaitter was 3icd to 
ti~c Gnil~-t, the Hi-inorabLe Judge Don L, P-Ia~ding presiding, on June 30, 2008 and July I: 
2005. On Septerm'uer 3 0 ,  2005, the Cout  entared its Findings o f  Fac t  and Conc2usiox-i~ of 
Law iicijesino~audurn DGC~S~OII and Ozdcr. Court f iund h favor of the Plaintiff, Sirius, 
and cntererl Judgxnent to that effect on the s m e  datete, September 30, 2008. On October 
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Mernoraqdum 3ecrs1on and Order on DPfendants' 
Motion for Reconsrderation or In r h ~  iiitematlve, 
far New Trial I 209 
Bryan B, Smith, Esq. - LSB No. 341 1 
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. - ISB No. 701 0 
S~r-rx-r, URISC~LL O;r. ASSOC~ATCS, PLLG 
P, 0. Box 5073 1 
,enue 4 14 Shoup IIir 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telephone: 1208) 524-073 1 
Telefax: (208) 529-4 166 
Attorneys for Uefendant!Appellarlt 
Bryce 13. Ericksan 
fir THE DISTRlCT COURT OF TI-IE SIXTH JUDICIAL BISTRTGT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, XN AND FOR THE COUlc'TU OF CAHBOU 
SIRlUS LC, a Wyoming Limited 1 
Liability Company, 
PlaintifURespondent. ) Case No. CV-04-284 
1 
vs. ) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
1 
BRYCE El. ERTCKSON. AND ANY PERSON 1 
CLAIM%G UNDER BY OR THROUGH ,l 
BRYCE 1F-I. ERZCKSON XN AND TO THE 1 
REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: ) 
1 
CRRlBOU COUNTY, IDAHO: 1 
1 
TOWWSI-IIP 5 SQL'TH, RANGE 46 E.B.M., 1 
SECTION 27: LOTS 1 AND 2, K1/2 1 
NWLI4. EXCEPT THEREFROM THE S X 1 
WEli'lF KIV NWii4, 1 
1 
f)el^enda1ts/ilppe11ants. 1 
TO THE ABOVE NARTEI) PLAINTIFFIRESP0?4DENTf SIRIUS, LC, AND ITS 
ATTORIYEY, A. BRUCE LARSOK, ESQ., ABLE LAW, 155 SOUTH SECOND 
A'\'Xl;NUE, P. 0, Box 6369, POCATELLO, IDAEIO 83205-6369, AND TO THE CLERK 
OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - I 
F:tCLICNTS,BDS\7453 Pleadings\Obt "cotice.Appe;rl.doc 
NOTICE: IS EIEmIEEY GIVEN THAT: 
I ,  The above-:~arned defendant. Bryce H, Erickson, appeals from tile Findings Of 
Fact ,kid Conclusions Of Law R4ernorandum Decision And Order dated September 30,2008, 
the dudglnsnt dated September 30, 2008. Don I;. Eiarding, District Judge. presiding, the Order 
Determining fitomey Fecs dated December 5,2005, and the Memorandum Decision And 
Order 011 Defendant's Motion For Reconsideration Ckr, in The Alternative, For New Trial 
entered April 1,2009, Mitcl~eif Mi'. Brown, District Judge, presiding. 
7 . Defendant tias the right to appeal to tile Idaho Suprenie Court, and the 
memora~ida, decisions. orders, and judgtnellt described in paragrqti 1 above are subject to 
appeal pursualt to Rule I 1 (a), Idaiio Appellate Rules, 
3 .  TSie issues which the defendant, Bryce F-I. Ericksori, intends to assert in the 
appeal are the following: 
a. Can pla~ntiff recover on the pramisson; note where William Bagley 
violated Wyoitiing Rule of Professional Conduct 1 .%,a) that prohibits business tra~~sactions 
with clients absent comptiar~ce with Rule 1.8(a)? 
b, Does substa~itial evidence exist that the attorney's fees William Bagley 
ctiarged in the arnount of $29,173.38 and awarded bq rbe court for the Chapter 1 1 Bankrrrptcy 
are reasonable? 
C. Did UTilliam Bagley's ach~ourledged conflict of interest in represeilting 
defendant in the Chapter 12 Bankruptcy predate its fi!ing so as to preciude charging a portion 
of the "69.173.38 in attorney's fees the court avlarded? 
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d. Did I$Tilliarn Bagley have a conflict of' interest as a general creditor that 
began upon dislnissal of the Chapter 11 Bankruptcy so as to preclude chargirsg a portion of the 
$29.1 73.38 in attorney's fees the court awarded? 
e. Did William Bagley have a conflict of interest in represeriting his wife 
and the bizlendant together it1 the Chapter 11 Bakup tcy  so as to preclude charging a portion 
of 111: $20,173.3 8 in attorney's lees the court awarded? 
f. Can defendant raise the affimative defense of set off?? 
g. Did tlze district court err in failing to apply $830. $9,750, $8,500. sad 
$3,000 as set off ddaunages against the $29,173.38 in attorney's fees the court awarded? 
11. Did the district court c o m i t  reversible error at trial by refusing to 
allow clefendmt's expert to give her opinion regarding darnages and to take the testimony on 
the record to preserve it for appeal? 
i .  Did the district court commit reversible error by allowing the plaintiff 
to offer the expert: testimony of Wiiliani Bagley at trial where (1) the plaintiff never disclosed 
UTillim Bagley as an expert before trial; (2) the defendant requested William Bagley's 
opinions and the bases therefore in discovery, but the plaintiff never disclosed this 
illformation before trial; and (3) where the district court refused the defendant the oppo~-tunity 
to depose William Bag ie~  to ascertain his expert opinioias before trial? 
4. There fias been no order entered sealing an! portion of the record in this case. 
5. Tile defendant does not request that the reporter prepare the transcript of the 
trial because the reporter has already prepared the trial transcript in connection with the post 
trial motions. Defendant requests that the trial transcript already prepared be included as part 
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of the appeal, Defendant does request that the reporter prepae the transcript of the June 6, 
4008 hearing. 
6 .  The defendmt requests the followirig documents to be included in the c1erk.s 
record in addition to those automatically Included under Rule 28, Idaho Appellate Rules: 
a. Reini"rtitur dated April 19, 2007. 
b. Objection To Allowing William Bagley To Testifq. As Expert And 
Motiori To Continue Trial Seaing dated June 12, 2005. 
6. Afiidavit of B.J. Driscoll dated May 9, 3008 with attached exhibits. 
d. Affidavit of Judith A. Shively dated May 9, 2008 with axtacf~ed 
exhibits. 
e. Affidavit of B.J. Driscall dated June 19, 2008. 
I: Defendant's Closing Brief dated July 16, 2008. 
g. Defendant's Closing Reply Brief dated August 13, 2008. 
h, Motion For Reconsideration, Or In The AIternati\.e, For New Trial. 
1. The Affidavit of Bryan I>. Smith dated October 14, 2008. 
J .  Defendant's Brief In Support Of Motion For Reconsideration, Or In 
The Alternative, For New Trial. 
li. The Deposition of M'illiam Bagtey dated April 25, 2008 submitted as 
Exhibit at trial together with a11 trial exhibits. 
7. I certifj : 
(a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the reporter, 
and defendant has paid the estiinated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript; 
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jb) That defendant has paid the clerk of Ibe district court the estimated fee 
for preparation of the clerk's record; 
(c) That defendant has paid the appellate filing fee; 
( 3 )  That defendant has made service service tipon all parties required to bil 
served pursuant Idatlo Appellate Rules. 
DATED this a day of April. 20C9. 
SMITI-I. DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC , 
By: 
Attorneys fordcfcndmt/apPe~la~~t 
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I $<EREBY CERTIFY t 9.1 caused a true and correct 
copy of llte foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to be served, by placing the same in a scaled 
envclope and depositil~g it in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, or hand delivery. facsimile 
transn~ission or overnight delivery, addressed to the following: 
A. Bruce Larson, Esq, 
ABEL LAW 
j3.O. Box 6369 
Poeatelln, Idaho 81205-6363 
Fax: 478-7602 
Edie Bus11 
Clerk of t l ~ c  District Collrt 
Caribou County Courthouse 
229 South Main. Room 203 
P'O. Box 775 
Soda Springs. ID 83276 
Dorothy Snarr 
Reporter to Judge MitefieIl W. Brown 
159 South Main 
Soda Springs, ID 83276 
t 
t fFm 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
t ail 
[ ] FAX 
[ ] Overnight Delir~ery 
[ 1 Wald Delivery 
f I F M  
[ 7 Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
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In the Supreme Court of  the State o f  
?OU9 l'lll'l' 11 [;Iii l g  11. 
SIRIUS LC, a Wyoming limited liability 
colllp"lyl 
Bl<IrCE H. ERICKSON, and any pcrson 
claililing ~ ~ n d c r  by or tllrough BRYCE H, 
EIilCKSON in and to thc real property 
dcsc~ibcd as follows: Caribou County, Idalto: 
Townshil:, 5 Soutli, Range 45 E.B.N., Section 
27: Lots 1 and 2, N% NW%, exce~:,t hcrefrom 
the S% NE % NW% NW Kt, 
) Supreme Cour-t Docket No. 36466-2009 










A Rcportcr's Transcript md  Clcrk's Rccord was filcd April 27, 2006, in appcal No. 111 
32582, Sirius LC v. Erickson; therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT IXEIBBY IS OmERIED that the Appeal Record ir-r this case shall be 
AUGMENTED to include the Reporter's Transcript and Clerk's Record filed in prior appeal 
No 32582. 
1T FUKTI-EER IS ORDERED that the District Court Clerk shall prepare and file a 
LIMITED CLERIC'S RECORD with this Court, wliich shall contain the docunle~lts requested in the 
Notice of Appeal, togetl~er with a copy of this Order, but shall not duplicate any docur~lent included 
in tlic Clerk's Record filed it1 prior appeal No. 32552. 
lr FUtiTHER IS OFXIERED that the District Court Reporter shall prepare and 
lodgc a SUPPLEMENT& REPORTER'S TRANSCRlPT with the District Court, wl~ich shall 
contai~l the proceedings requested in tile Notice of Appeal, but shall not duplicate any proceedings j// 
included in the Reporter's Transcript filed in prior appeal No. 32582. The LIMITED CLERK'S / I /  I /  
RECORD and REPORTER'S TRANSCWT shall be filed with this Court after settlement. 111 
Further, thc exhibits subniitted in prior appeal No. 32582, which werc returned to District Court on 
, are not covercd by this Order and they will not be sent to tllc Supreme Court unless 
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-- 
s~>ccifically rcqucstcd by the parties. I h c  party requesting any or all of tlie prior exhibits must 
spccifi~aliy dcsignstc: tl~osc exl-tibits being rcquestcd. 
DATED this 6& day of  May 2009. 
For the Supreme Court 
cc: COUIISGJ o f  Record 
District Court Clerk 
District Court Reporter 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNrY OF CARIBOU 




VS ) Case No: CV-2004-0000284 
BRYCE ERICKSON 1 
) CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
AND ANY PERSON CLAIMING UNDER BY OR ) 
THROUGH BRYCE H ERICKSON IN AND TO ) 
THE REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBED AS 1 
FOLLOWS 1 
1 
CARIBOU COUNTY, IDAHO: 1 
TOWNSHIP 5 SOUTH, RANGE 46 E.B.M, ) 
SECTION 27' LOTS I AND 2 , N112 NW114, 9 
EXCEPT THEREFROM THE S112 HE114 1 
NWl14 NW114, 1 
1 
DEFENDANTIAPPELLANT j 
- - -- 1 
I, Sharon L. Wells, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District 
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Caribou, do hereby certify: 
That the following is a list of the exhibits which were offered and admitted into 
evidence during the proceedings in this cause: 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 : Promissory Note Dated 1 111 311 999 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 2: Real Estate Mortgage Dated 1 111 311 999 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 3: Marital Settlement Agreement Dated 911 411 999 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 4: Decree of Divorce Dated 1011 811 999 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 5: Warranty Deed Bryce Erickson to Dennis 
Sanderson 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 6: Quit Claim Deed Bryce Erickson to Kathy 
Erickson 
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 7: Bill of Sale 
Plaintif's Exhibit 8: Defendant's Answers to Interrogatories 
Plainties Exhibit 9: Deposition of Mr. Smith 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 10: Chapter 12 Petition for Relief 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 11: Chapter 12 Applicat~on for Retention of 
Attorney 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 12: Letter Dated May 6, 1999 together with 
anachments 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 13: Chapter 12 Motion to Confirm Debtor's 
Chapter 12 Plan 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 14: Chapter 12 Order for Debtor in Possession to 
Retain Attorney 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 15: Chapter 12 Order rescinding Order for Debtor 
in Possession to Retain Attorney 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 16: Chapter 12 Order on Motion to Dismiss and 
Remove Debtor from Possession 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 17: Chapter 12 Motion for Release of Mortgage to 
Secure Payment of Promissory Note to Sirius 
LC 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 18: Chapter 12 Order vacating order on Motion for 
Release of Mortgage 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 19: Chapter 12 Status Report and Motion for 
Debtor to Obtain new Counsel and file an 
Amended Plan or Re-organization 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 20: Chapter 12 Order Granting Motion to Confirm 
and Confirming Third Amended Plan 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 21: Answer to Complaint for Foreclosure 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 22: Certificate of Service of Initial Financial Report 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 23: Debtor's Plan of Reorganization 
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Plaintiffs Exhibit 24: Chapter 11 Motion to Dismiss of Kathleen 
Ellen Erickson upon withdrawal of Disclosure 
Statement and Plan 
Plainttff's Exhibit 25: Chapter 2 1 Order Granting Motion to Dismiss 
of Kathleen Ellen Erickson upon withdrawal of 
Disclosure Statement and Plan 
Plainties Exhibit 26: Final Account of Trustee, Declaration of Full 
Performance and Petition for Decree 
Defendant's Exhibit A: Bryce's Chapter 11 Documents 
Defendant's Exhibit B: Kathy's Chapter I I Documents 
Defendant's Exhibit C: Bagley's File 
Defendant's Exhibit D: Bryce's Chapter 12 Documents 
Defendant's Exhibit E: Deposition of Mr. Bagley 
Defendant's Exhibit F: Order Discharging Debtor After Completion 
of Chapter 12 Plan 
I further certify that all the exhibits in this matter have been sent to the Supreme 
Court for review. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
said District Court at Soda Springs, Idaho, this 1 l f h a y  of June, 2009. 
VEDA MASCARENAS 
Clerk of the District Court 
By: 
~ g r o n  L. Well eputy Clerk P 
Certificate of Exhibit's 
In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
SIRIUS LC, a Wyoming limited liability 
company, 
BRYCE H. ERICKSON, and any person 
claiming under by or through BRYCE H, 
ERICKSON in and to the real property 
described as follows: Caribou County, Idaho: 
Township 5 South, Range 45 E.B.M., Section 
27: Lots 1 and 2, N ?4 NW 54, except therefrom 




) ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 
) AUGMENT THE RECORD 
) 
) Supreme Court Docket No. 36466-2009 





\ 1 i j 
) 
$11 /if Defendant-Appellant. ~ l j  
j'l 11 
\ I  1 
, l ,4 MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD AND STATEMENT IN SUPPORT I! 
' j l  
/ I 1  
1;; THEREOF was filed by counsel for Respo~ident on December 1, 2009. Therefore, good cause ' j l  / I  ! 
11 appearing, i I:/ 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Respondent's MOTION TO AUGMENT TI-IE RECORD \I/ Ij! 
1 1 1  I I 
be. and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation record shall include the documents listed 
I' / I !  
t 
below, file stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion, as EXHIBITS: 11 I l l  
L 1 
I. Plaintiffs Closing Argument, file-stamped August 5,2008; 
2. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, file-stamped May 8,2008; 
3. Memorandum in Opposition to the Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration, or in the 
Alternative, for New Trial, file-stamped November 17, 2008; and 
4. Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to the Defendant's Motion for 
Reconsideration, or in the Alternative, for New Trial, file-stamped February 2, 2009. 
DATED this of December 2009. 
For the Supreme Court 
Stephen W. ISeny&, Clerk 11  




j cc: Counsel of Record $ 1  , 
I i i  
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CARIBOU 
1 




VS ) Case No: CV-2004-0000284 
1 
BRYCE ERICKSON 1 
) CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
AND ANY PERSON CLAIMING UNDER BY OR ) 
THROUGH BRYCE H ERICKSON IN AND TO ) 
THE REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBED AS 1 
FOLLOWS: 1 
1 
CARIBOU COUNTY, IDAHO: 1 
TOWNSHIP 5 SOUTH, RANGE 46 E.B.M, ) 
SECTlON27~LOTSIAND2,N1/2NW1/4,  ) 
EXCEPT THEREFROM THE S112 NE114 1 
NW114 NW114, 1 
1 
DEFENDANTtAPPELLANT ) 
I, Sharon L. Wells, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District 
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Caribou, do hereby certify that The above 
and foregoing Record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my 
direction and is a true, full and correct Record of, the pleadings and documents under 
Rule 28 of the ldaho Appellate Rules. 
I do further certify that all documents, x-rays, charts and pictures offered or 
admitted in the above-entitled cause will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme 
Court along with the Court Reporters' Transcript and Clerk's Record (except for Exhibits 
---.-A which are to be retained in the possession of the undersigned), as required by 
Rule 31 of the ldaho Appellate Rules. (See Clerk's Certificate of Exhibits if there are 
exhibits and no Reporter's Transcript or not listed in the Reporter's Transcript.) 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
the said Court this I I" hay of June, 2009. 
(SEAL) 
VEDA MASCARENAS 
Clerk of the District Court 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CARIBOU 
1 




VS ) Case No: CV-2004-0000284 
1 
BRYCE ERICKSON ) 
) CERIFITCATE OF SERVICE 
AND ANY PERSON CLAIMING UNDER BY OR ) 
THROUGH BRYCE H ERlCKSON IN AND TO ) 
THE REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBED AS 1 
FOLLOWS 1 
1 
CARIBOU COUNTY, [DAHO 
TOWNSHIP 5 SOUTH, RANGE 46 E.B.M. ) 
SECTION 27. LOTS 1 AND 2 , N1/2 NW114, ) 





I, Sharon L. Wells, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District 
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Caribou, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by United States mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the 
Clerk's Record on Appeal to each of the parties or their Attorney of Record as follows: 
A. Bruce Larson Bryan D. Smith 
Able Law PC McGrath, Meacham & Smith PLLC 
P 0 Box 6369 P.O. Box 50731 
Pocatello ID 83205-6369 Idaho Falls ID 83405 
Certificate of Service 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
the said Court this 1$h day of June 2009. 
(SEAL) 
Certificate of Service 
VEDA MASCARENAS 
Clerk of the District Court 
